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The United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (‘the Declaration’, which is introduced in detail in Chapter 1) is 
a comprehensive codification of indigenous human rights. It was adopted 
in 2007 by the UN General Assembly by a vote of 144 to four. Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States (US) dissented. There were 
11 abstentions: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, 
Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine 
(UN, 2007c). Over time, the four dissenting states, which are this book’s 
principal focus, withdrew their objections and, in each of these, as well as 
in other jurisdictions, the Declaration has come to provide political, legal 
and moral frameworks for thinking about what it means not only for 
both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples to say that ‘we are all here 
to stay’ (Delgamuukw v British Columbia, 1997, para. 186), as Canada’s 
Chief Justice Lamer put it in 1997, but also for thinking beyond justice 
as the simple reconciliation of indigenous presence with the sovereignty 
of the Crown. Indigenous and non-indigenous populations ought to 
recognise the other’s presence in more substantive terms, which, from 
the Declaration’s perspective, means that the rights and capacities of self-
determination are accepted as belonging to indigenous peoples as much 
as they belong to anybody else.
This book provides a comprehensive critical analysis of what it means 
in political practice for both indigenous and settler populations to 
recognise the other’s presence and, in particular for indigenous peoples, 
what it means to enjoy the rights and capacities of self-determination. 
The book makes its arguments with reference to each of the Declaration’s 
46 articles. Each is referred to in a specific jurisdictional and policy 
context so that both the theoretical and practical policy significance of 
the Declaration’s component parts may be examined. This analysis begins 
with a description of the Declaration’s development through the UN 
system before introducing self-determination as the overarching principle 
that the Declaration enunciates.
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The book then explains that it is their shared British colonial heritage and 
development into liberal democratic states (the meaning of this term is 
explained later in this introduction) that allows and rationalises this book’s 
focus on Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US. These common 
experiences help to explain the four states’ initial objections as well as their 
subsequent reading down of the Declaration’s potential impact, leading to 
their positions being reversed in 2009 (Australia), 2010 (New Zealand), 
2011 (the US) and 2016 (Canada).
The principal theoretical concepts used to inform this book’s analysis 
and develop its arguments are introduced following the discussion of the 
book’s jurisdictional focus. The introduction of these liberal concepts—
sovereignty, citizenship and democracy—and their interpretation to form 
a liberal theory of indigeneity (O’Sullivan, 2014, 2017) are discussed. 
Their meanings for political relationships in societies like those that 
dissented are explained. Their interpretations, to reframe debates about 
the workings of the state to support political relationships grounded in 
trust, are discussed as the basis for reconciliation (explained later in this 
introduction)—a political objective often stated but not consistently 
pursued in the dissenting states. A further and related condition for 
reconciliation is the operation of public institutions according to values 
that neither assimilate nor alienate indigenous peoples.
The introduction of the political concepts that this book uses to analyse 
the Declaration is followed by a description of its structure, which explains 
how these concepts are systematically applied throughout the text. This 
description also shows how sovereignty, citizenship and democracy 
inform the book’s ultimate purpose: to examine and propose what the 
Declaration may mean in both political theory and political practice.
Background to the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples
More than 25 years of indigenous advocacy and global cooperation 
preceded the Declaration’s adoption. It is the most comprehensive body 
of collective indigenous political thought ever and makes it clear that 
domestic indigenous ‘aspirations … are not out of step with international 
expectations’ (p. 9). It provides a reference point beyond the state for the 
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assertion of indigenous rights and, as this book also shows, the Declaration 
legitimises and gives international authority to an overarching indigenous 
claim to self-determination.
The Declaration’s genesis in the UN system was a report published 
in 1981 by the Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The report 
of the rapporteur, José Martinez Cobo, on the problem of discrimination 
against indigenous populations was commissioned by the UN Economic 
and Social Council in 1971. The report began the UN’s systematic interest 
in indigenous peoples as distinct peoples (Nakata, 2001). Earlier UN 
human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, adopted in 1948, enunciated principles of human equality—
rights to equal protection against discrimination, to collective property 
ownership and to participate in the affairs of the state (UN, 1948, 
arts. 7, 17 and 21). However, the 2007 Declaration is more significant 
still because it  foreshadows the interpretation and application of these 
principles in specific indigenous contexts.
As Martinez Cobo (1981) observed, ‘the principles proclaimed in existing 
international instruments concerning human rights and fundamental 
freedoms [were] not fully applied in all countries’ (p. 79) and not equally 
applied to all peoples. Therefore, he recommended that ‘specific principles 
should be formulated for use as guidelines by governments of all states in 
their activities concerning indigenous populations’ (p. 79) and that:
Such principles must necessarily contain any additional and specific 
provisions which, following careful study, may be deemed necessary 
for the full recognition and protection of the indispensable rights 
and freedoms of indigenous populations. (p. 79)
Martinez Cobo presumed that all societies, including states such as 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US, were morally obliged 
to accept and defend those ‘indispensable’ rights and freedoms. The 
obligation was to ensure that a state’s prevailing political systems could 
attend to those rights and freedoms by recognising the right to self-
determination as a right belonging to all and not just to some peoples.
The right to self-determination and its implications are discussed 
throughout the book. In particular, it is discussed as a theoretical concept 
with a potentially transformative impact on how indigenous nations and 
the states that have emerged over their territories think about the practices 
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of sovereignty and citizenship, and what these considerations mean for 
the form that democracy takes. This book is a study of the theoretical and 
practical interrelationships among these concepts and a study of what these 
relationships mean for the indigenous person’s right to live as a member 
of an indigenous nation and simultaneously, if they wish, as a member 
of the state with the right to participate in its affairs with substantive and 
distinctive equality. This idea, that indigenous peoples are entitled to enjoy 
membership of their own nations and make decisions through their own 
institutions according to their preferred processes, while also enjoying equal 
and culturally contextualised membership of the state, is introduced below 
and developed through the book as ‘differentiated citizenship’.
In response to Martinez Cobo’s (1981) study, the UN Economic and 
Social Council established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations. 
The group’s mandate was:
• to review developments pertaining to the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous peoples
• to give attention to the evolution of international standards 
concerning indigenous rights. (UN, 2001, para. 2)
The group consisted of five experts, appointed by the UN Sub-Commission 
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (now 
the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights), 
from Japan, Cuba, Nigeria, Hungary and the United Kingdom. Its meetings 
were open to indigenous representatives and, in 1985, the UN established 
the Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations to give financial support to 
their participation. UN member states and nongovernment organisations 
also participated in the group’s deliberations, establishing it ‘as a focal point 
of international action on indigenous issues’ (UN, 2001, para. 3) and 
making it one of the largest UN human rights forums.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the group’s annual meetings attracted 
more than 700 indigenous people ‘from the forests of Amazonia to the 
north of Alaska and Greenland; from the Sami people in Northern Russia 
to the Masai in Kenya to Australia’s aborigines’ (UN, 1997, para.  2). 
The  working group released its Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in 1993. The draft was approved the following year 




The draft declaration’s working definition of the indigenous right to 
self-determination was significant:
By virtue of [the right of self-determination, [indigenous peoples] 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. (Iorns, 1993, ‘Draft 
declaration’, pt. I art. 3)
The subcommission referred the draft declaration to the Commission on 
Human Rights, which referred it to a further working group of member 
states and indigenous organisations. Alongside the negotiations that 
followed, the UN created a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. 
Established in 2002, the forum comprised indigenous policy experts 
nominated in equal number by UN member states and indigenous 
nongovernment organisations. The forum’s annual meetings, which 
were open to representatives of all indigenous peoples, provided an 
environment for further indigenous advocacy in favour of what was still 
a draft declaration.
While the working group found that member states and indigenous 
organisations agreed that the draft provided a sound starting point for 
negotiation, several states had reservations, especially concerning the 
scope of the right to self-determination. Some believed that this right 
could be interpreted to disrupt the territorial integrity of the nation-state 
by allowing indigenous groups to secede (UN, 1996).
This major point of contention was ultimately resolved for most member 
states, though within the context of the indigenous organisations’ 
argument that self-determination is a right that belongs to all peoples and 
that it was already well established. It had, for example, been expressed 
as a universal right in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (UN, 1966a) and in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (UN, 1966b). Indigenous organisations 
resisted the possibility that the right to self-determination would be 
limited or qualified only for indigenous populations (UN, 1996). They 
also resisted the view that what the draft contained were social or political 
aspirations, but not rights. As a declaration, the instrument would not be 
legally binding; however, from other state and indigenous perspectives, it 
would still be politically and morally binding (UN, 1996), which as this 
book shows, gives the Declaration political value and significance.
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Some states were also concerned that the proposed requirement of 
indigenous consent to resource extraction, and other commercial activities 
on their lands, would compromise state authority to regulate land use. 
Some argued that the Declaration needed to define indigenous people 
and some questioned the propriety of distinctive peoplehood as a right 
of indigenous populations.
However, indigenous organisations argued that a universal definition 
would prevent indigenous groups from defining themselves according to 
their own value systems and would, as such, constrain the right to self-
determination. Several governments agreed that retaining this flexibility 
was essential if, overall, the Declaration was to be universally relevant 
(UN, 1996). However, there was still a concern among member states 
that the term ‘peoples’ may privilege collective rights over the rights of 
individuals and make indigenous groups subjects of international law 
with consequent rights over natural resources, for example. Indigenous 
counterarguments claimed that collective rights are the sum of individual 
rights so that the two bodies of rights could not conflict (UN, 1996).
For the indigenous organisations, collective rights were central to 
identity and being. However, some states argued, for example, that the 
draft framed the collective right to education and to separate indigenous 
political, legal, economic and social systems in ways that could give rise to 
discrimination against other citizens (UN, 1996).
The working group tried to resolve these points of contention by 
negotiation and exhaustive deliberation. However, it was ultimately only 
the UN member states who would vote when the draft was submitted 
to the General Assembly, and it was a compromise text adopted by the 
Human Rights Council in 2006 and referred to the assembly for what was 
expected to be a final vote in January 2007.1
At this point, Namibia, supported by other members of the African 
Union, successfully moved to have the vote delayed. Their reservation 
was that most African peoples were indigenous to the African continent 
and that self-determination only applied to peoples seeking freedom 
from colonial subjugation (Engle, 2011). To ensure that this argument 
was not compromised, the African Union wanted further work on the 
1  For a full summary of the differences between the draft text and the text submitted to the 
Human Rights Council for referral to the General Assembly see UN (2006b, Annex I).
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definition of indigenous peoples. It also wanted further consideration 
of self-determination, land and resource ownership and the status of 
distinctive indigenous political and economic institutions. It particularly 
wanted further consideration of the implications of self-determination 
for the territorial integrity of the state (Engle, 2011). Further negotiations 
took place, and among the outcomes was a clause specifically precluding 
the secession of an indigenous people from an existing state. The final 
declaration, adopted in September 2007, affirmed a more tightly defined 
indigenous right to self-determination, though kept it as an essential 
principle of international law.
The right to self-determination is also of sufficient scope to have significant 
theoretical implications for sovereignty, citizenship and democracy—
concepts that are introduced in this chapter’s following section. The 
various perspectives of states, indigenous nations, scholars and political 
actors may then be assessed against the optimistic expectations of the 
Indigenous Australian legal scholar Megan Davis (2007), who argued that 
the Declaration’s adoption:
was a momentous occasion for Indigenous peoples. It is an 
important document of developing standards that Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders in Australia can use in their day-to-day 
relationships with all levels of government. It was a long struggle to 
draft the document and to have it move through the UN hierarchy 
to adoption by the General Assembly. The UN human rights 
system confirmed that it is indeed capable of faithfully facilitating 
substantive standard setting activities for the collective rights of 
indigenous peoples. [It] symbolises goodwill on the part of states 
in acknowledging the historical injustice toward indigenous 
peoples. The Declaration will also go some way to delivering 
justice to those first peoples whose deprivation of human rights is 
the very cornerstone of the sovereignty, wealth and power of the 
most obstructive and argumentative states who voted against the 
declaration in the General Assembly. (Conclusion section, para. 1)
This book will show how and why Davis’s optimism is contested from 
some indigenous and state perspectives and shared from others, and it 
will show what these contrasting perspectives mean in both theoretical 
and practical policy terms.
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Self-determination
The Declaration affirms self-determination as a right that belongs to 
indigenous peoples as much as it belongs to anybody else. It does not 
introduce new rights. It codifies and contextualises existing ones, and its 
purpose is to provide a framework for applying them to distinctive 
indigenous circumstances. As the Declaration codifies it, self-determination 
is more politically significant than reconciling ‘the pre-existence of 
aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown’ (Haida Nation v 
British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004, para. 17). This is because 
the Declaration makes assumptions not just about ‘who rules, but [also 
about] how rule is accomplished’ (Corrigan, 1990, p. 264, emphasis in 
original). When self-determination is applied in response, indigenous 
rights are neither what Corntassel (2012) calls ‘re-gifted rhetoric’ (p. 92) 
nor restricted by what Carroll (2012) argues is an indigenous–state 
relationship that must always and everywhere allow states to ‘maintain 
their hegemony as the only true sovereigns’ (p. 147).
This book’s alternative perspective is that self-determination is an 
argument for the greatest possible indigenous political autonomy while 
pragmatically accepting the state’s right to govern. However, the right to 
government is not hegemonic and, if they wish, indigenous persons may 
actively participate in state affairs to ensure that their perspectives are heard 
in day-to-day policymaking and to ensure that they are always placed to 
influence the operation of public institutions. This influence is, in turn, 
a determinant of the extent to which the right to self-determination is 
either present or curtailed.
As an intellectual framework, the Declaration allows new ways of thinking 
about the political capacities that indigenous peoples may (and may not) 
claim both within their own nations and within the states that have 
emerged over their territories. Specifically, the Declaration:
sets out the individual and collective rights of the world’s 
370  million native peoples, calls for the maintenance and 
strengthening of their cultural identities, and emphasises the 
right to pursue development in keeping with their own needs and 
aspirations. (UN, 2007a, para. 2)
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It sets standards and frameworks in relation to indigenous peoples’ 
political expectations by:
affirm[ing] that indigenous peoples especially have the right to 
self-determination, recognis[ing] that they have been denied 
enjoyment of the right, and mark[ing] the parameters for processes 
that will remedy that denial. (Anaya, 2009, p. 189)
The Declaration’s standards and frameworks maintain that ‘Indigenous 
peoples are equal to all other peoples … [and there is a] right of all peoples 
to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as 
such’ (UN, 2007b, annex). They also reflect principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948) that ‘All are equal before the 
law … All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination’ 
(art. 7); ‘Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others’ (art. 17[1]); and ‘Everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives’ (art. 21[1]).
Self-determination’s potential—or ultimate objective—is, then, to 
contribute to the development of states that do not intrude on indigenous 
lives or appropriate indigenous lands and resources. It protects rights to 
political authority, cultural integrity and economic security. It asserts 
political agency and reflects international acceptance of minimum 
standards for the expression of that agency. For the Australian Human 
Rights Commission (2013), for example, the Declaration ‘enshrines 
[the] right to be different as Peoples and affirms the minimum standards 
for the survival, dignity, security and well-being of Indigenous peoples 
worldwide’ (p. 4). Self-determination is concerned with the political 
spaces that indigenous peoples may choose to occupy as peoples entitled 
to independent political authority through maintaining and developing 
their own political institutions and as citizens of the state.
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
the United States: Dissenting Liberal 
Democracies
Indigenous peoples may seek recourse to the Declaration to support 
their right to self-determination anywhere in the world. However, this 
book’s expansive consideration of what it means, both theoretically and 
practically, to say that ‘we are all here to stay’ is focused on the dissenting 
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states. Although comparative reference is made to other jurisdictions 
(in Chapter 6 especially), the focus on Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the US is made because the liberal democratic values that underlie each 
of their systems of government helps to explain their initial opposition to 
the Declaration. It also helps to explain why they subsequently reversed 
their positions and why the Declaration’s implications are potentially 
transformative in those jurisdictions.
Liberal democracy is a form of political organisation based on the primacy 
of the individual and the protection of personal freedoms. Protecting these 
freedoms is a principal function of the state. From a liberal democratic 
perspective, freedom requires that each person is fundamentally equal: that 
each is equal before the law and has the same rights and responsibilities 
to contribute to the government of the state. However, the Declaration 
posed a philosophical challenge to states whose political systems operate 
on the assumption that each person’s liberty establishes an individual 
right to participate in public affairs through, for example, voting at 
regular elections and enjoying the same rights, privileges and obligations 
before the law, but where neither collective rights nor individual rights 
grounded in culture are routinely admitted. It was from these perspectives 
(introduced in Chapter 3) that the four states’ objections highlighted an 
ongoing tension over the terms of indigenous political status within, and 
in relation to, the state. A tension over what it means to be equal and 
what it means to be an indigenous citizen, especially in relation to the 
further presumption that the government of the liberal state occurs by the 
people’s consent. A condition that, as this book shows, is rarely, if ever, 
met in respect of indigenous peoples. As this book explains, this condition 
is elusive because the presumption of freedom through equality has been 
interpreted by states and dominant populations as sameness, meaning that 
political arrangements may proceed without regard to culture, colonialism 
or the group memberships in which, and through which, freedom is 
experienced. The Declaration’s presumption that states and indigenous 
peoples ought to work out what, in practice, it means for indigenous 
peoples to enjoy political freedom makes it a liberal instrument especially 
suited to the analysis of indigenous rights in the dissenting states.
These states, with their variously assertive indigenous minority populations 
and shared British colonial heritage, feared that the Declaration would 
disrupt their territorial integrity and enhance, rather than simply 
contextualise, the rights of indigenous citizens vis-a-vis all others. These 




In short, the Declaration shows how and why there is, in fact, scope 
within liberal democratic practice for indigenous persons to enjoy both 
equal and distinctive liberal rights; where equality and difference are 
compatible, fair and reasonable. In particular, the Declaration illuminates 
the idea that individual liberty may depend on the recognition of group 
rights and may only be meaningful with reference to cultural context and 
colonial experience. In respect of these states, it is instructive to examine 
the Declaration in relation to liberal ideas of sovereignty and citizenship 
and for what the Declaration proposes as their practical application—in 
particular, the presumption that restrictions on liberty must be justified 
according to some coherent political principle. For example, that one 
person’s freedom does not impinge on the freedoms of another, or that 
individual freedom may be subject to a wider and broadly accepted 
public good—but not, as Locke (1887) argued, on the presumption that 
there are racial hierarchies of human worth that give some groups greater 
influence than others over the arrangement of public affairs.
The Declaration’s liberal character is what makes it a valuable instrument 
in indigenous claims to self-determination, for it allows such claims to be 
expressed in the prevailing language of the liberal state in ways that make 
sense in terms of the values that underlie the national political community 
and its public institutions. If self-determination is a liberal right, then its 
claims are more likely to be heard simply because liberalism is either the 
state’s prevailing political order or the political order that the international 
community wishes to impose.
The dissenting states made liberal political arguments against the 
Declaration (see Chapter 3 for the systemic development of this point). 
However, liberalism is not a singular nor absolute political philosophy. 
There are many interpretations of its essential presumption that ‘a liberal 
is a man who believes in liberty’ (Cranston, 1967, p. 459). The ways 
in which political systems give effect to that objective are also widely 
interpreted. For the politics of indigenous self-determination, the most 
important and highly contested point concerns whether each person’s 
liberty must be recognised and expressed in the same way or whether 
they may be differently understood and exercised. In particular, whether 
relationships between group rights and personal liberty may be admitted, 
and whether there are rights of culture and prior occupancy to be brought 
into account.
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This book’s recurrent themes therefore include the Declaration’s capacity 
to contribute significantly to making citizenship a more meaningful 
political status than many indigenous people have experienced by 
rethinking democracy’s capacity to ensure substantive indigenous voice in 
public affairs alongside the indigenous right to use their own institutions 
and political processes to manage their affairs independently of the state.
Sovereignty
The colonial process began in each of the dissenting states in different 
ways and at different times during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. However, in each case, it was rationalised by the assumption 
of sovereignty’s (see Chapter 7) transfer from indigenous nations to the 
British Crown. From the British perspective, sovereignty was an absolute 
political authority that allowed its permanent settlement and government 
of indigenous territories. This book introduces alternative indigenous 
conceptions of sovereignty and contests the idea that sovereignty is an 
absolute and indivisible authority vested in a single entity, such as the 
Crown-in-Parliament. It also argues that sovereignty is not an authority 
once held exclusively by indigenous peoples, taken and exercised 
exclusively by the settler state and reclaimable by indigenous people as 
an absolute power. The authority of sovereignty is more complex, and the 
Declaration helps to make sense of these complexities by proposing new 
spaces of political authority—spaces of inclusion in which a new kind of 
liberal politics can be worked out.
Each of this book’s chapters shows how the Declaration may help 
contemporary societies contest the idea of state sovereignty as colonial 
hegemony, with its intellectual origins in the writings of the seventeenth-
century English political philosopher John Locke.
Locke viewed the liberal values of freedom and authority over one’s own 
affairs as essential political rights. However, he did not believe that these 
rights applied to everybody. There were exceptions that served to justify 
the colonial demand for sovereignty over other peoples and territories. 
For example, the British acquisition of Australia in 1788 was justified 
with reference to Locke’s theory of property, which excluded hunter-
gatherer peoples from land ownership. One had to work the land, in an 
agricultural sense, to claim ownership of it. Unowned land could simply 
be taken by others, as Locke (1887) explained:
13
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God, when He gave the world in common to all mankind, 
commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition 
required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue 
the earth—i.e. improve it for the benefit of life and therein lay 
out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that, in 
obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed 
any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his 
property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury 
take from him. (p. 207)
In 1838, the Sydney Herald drew on Locke’s argument to justify the British 
claim to sovereignty in Australia, arguing that, to the Indigenous people:
This vast country was to them a common—they bestowed no 
labour upon the land—their ownership, their rights, was nothing 
more than that of the emu or the kangaroo. They bestowed no 
labour upon the land and that—and that only—it is which gives 
a right of property to it. (‘Sworn to no master’, 1838, p. 2)
According to Reynolds (1996), such depictions of precontact Indigenous 
Australia, which amounted to a view of the land as unoccupied or 
‘terra  nullius’, were not grounded in fact, but were instead examples 
of a ‘self-serving Eurocentric jurisprudence of convenience’ (p. xii).
In contrast to Locke, eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers, 
such as Immanuel Kant (1970), argued against suppressing the liberty 
of others. Kant’s writings can be seen as contesting settler colonialism’s 
attempts to assimilate indigenous peoples into settler cultures to create 
ethnically homogenous political communities. For example:
Men have different views on the empirical end of happiness, and 
what it consists of, so that as far as happiness is concerned, their 
will cannot be brought under any common principle, nor thus 
under an external law harmonizing with the freedom of everyone. 
(Kant, 1970, pp. 73–74)
Settler colonialism is an ongoing process that the Declaration aims 
to circumvent. It is a process involving the gradual and continuing 
phenomenon of settler populations increasing their relative power vis-a-
vis indigenous populations. To be clear, this process did not end when the 
four states gained political independence from the British Crown. By that 
time, settler populations were in the majority, had acquired control over 
large tracts of indigenous land and had established new states according to 
their own political arrangements and norms of government.
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The assimilation of indigenous people into the cultures of the settlers was 
supposed to ensure that there was no resistance to the development of 
these new societies. Assimilation is the process through which indigenous 
cultures were expected to become one with that of the settler population. 
In Australia, for example, it was pursued through the removal of 
indigenous children from their families, as official policy, in all states from 
the early 1900s until the mid-1970s. The Western Australian Protector 
of Aborigines, AO Neville, described the policy as one of breeding out 
aboriginality (Neville, 1947). In New Zealand, the policy was more subtle 
and implemented through Native Schools, which existed between 1867 
and 1969 and provided Maori with a lesser curriculum focused on what, 
in the 1930s, the Director-General of Education explained as ‘lead[ing] 
the lad to be a good farmer and the girl to be a good farmer’s wife’ so that 
the Maori mode of living would copy ‘the nuclear family of the pakeha 
social order’ (as cited in Hill, 2004, p. 182). Indigenous peoples, across 
jurisdictions, have seen assimilation as the antithesis of self-determination 
and of a nondominant, noncolonial or postcolonial political order, where 
the state does not exercise a controlling authority over indigenous peoples.
Instead, such a political order would mean that indigenous peoples are 
free to live according to their own cultural values, manage their own affairs 
and enjoy the land and resource rights that the Declaration promises 
and which are noted throughout this book in specific jurisdictional and 
policy contexts. Indigenous peoples would also be free to participate in 
the affairs of the state as indigenous. They would then be positioned to 
develop just terms of association with the state. Terms of association 
where, for example, the state accepts that exercising powers of domination 
over indigenous peoples is unjust and that serious attempts must be made 
at restitution for the deprivation of indigenous peoples’ lands, cultures 
and political authority, which among other considerations would include 
seeking agreement on what it could mean to live together differently 
(Maaka & Fleras, 2005). Just terms of association mean that states act 
unreasonably if they accord indigenous peoples lesser legal or political 
status by virtue of their indigeneity; it means working out the terms of 
a fundamentally equal, even though distinctive, indigenous citizenship.
The terms of association between indigenous peoples and the state may be 
just when both independent indigenous institutions and state institutions 
support indigenous people’s capacities to make decisions over their own 
affairs without interference from the state, and when state institutions, like 
schools, hospitals and policymaking agencies, accept indigenous people’s 
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participation in these institutions as indigenous. An alternative is to deny 
that the right to self-determination is inherently bound in culture and to 
assume that when people go to school or seek help in a hospital that they 
do so as ‘cultureless’ beings and to assume that these institutions operate 
from positions of cultural neutrality. Another alternative is that culture 
is relevant, but that it is the culture of the postsettler population that 
properly determines the values under which public institutions operate. 
In this way, the indigenous person’s access to equal schooling or equal 
health care depends on their willingness and ability to assimilate into the 
settler culture: to think and understand the world only in terms that make 
sense in a culture that is not their own.
Colonialism cannot be undone; however, the Declaration’s assumption 
is that its consequences may be mitigated so that, as this book argues, 
noncolonial political relationships may be imagined. This is because the 
Declaration raises questions about whether a political order—where 
the  state is the single site of sovereign authority—is a just model for 
political relationships.
Sovereignty is widely understood as referring to ‘supreme authority 
within a territory’ (Philpott, 2016, para. 1). In practice, sovereignty is the 
authority of governments to govern and to make laws and public policies 
to regulate the lives of those living in their territories. However, there 
are limits on a government’s capacity to make laws and public policies, 
including constraints that arise from Locke’s (1887) argument that 
legitimate government occurs by the people’s consent; for while Locke’s 
was an exclusive people, the Declaration’s is not. This issue is brought 
into sharp focus by the New Zealand Waitangi Tribunal’s finding in 2014 
that the Treaty of Waitangi did not involve Maori ceding sovereignty to 
Britain when the instrument was signed in 1840 (Waitangi Tribunal, 
‘He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti’, 2014). This raises the question: under 
what circumstances might a society develop in which Maori feel sufficient 
ownership to consent to New Zealand’s overall system of government? This 
theme of what, from indigenous perspectives, might justify consent for 
the liberal state recurs throughout this book and is especially important in 
Australia where there is a well-established possibility that treaties between 
some states and Indigenous nations may be negotiated in coming years 
(see Chapters 2 and 3).
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Treaties require indigenous nations to consider the terms of their consent to 
the state. Under what circumstances might consent be given? Withholding 
consent cannot disrupt state systems of government. However, a treaty’s 
foundational presumption is that it is reasonable for societies to think 
about the distribution of political authority because, as this book shows, 
treaties cannot admit absolute, indivisible and incontestable state authority 
over and above indigenous peoples. The book’s purposes therefore include 
consideration of what possibilities exist, with reference to the Declaration, 
for the exercise of multiple and sometimes shared sovereignties. It attends 
to this purpose by establishing the independent indigenous authority that 
the Declaration rationalises and by examining the capacities that exist 
and might be developed for indigenous peoples to influence, share and 
help lead the state and its institutions. The book is thus a systematic 
examination of how liberal political theory might rationalise and give 
effect to such objectives and in ways that do not diminish the rights 
of other citizens.
It is important to ask whether the Declaration supports the development 
of a politics and liberal theory of indigeneity and whether it can help 
to substantively improve the lives of indigenous peoples. Might the 
Declaration help citizenship, in a liberal state, to achieve what Ivison 
(2002) suggests is among its essential purposes—to give people reasons to 
believe that the state is theirs because:
to be at home in the world is to be able to identify with those 
institutions and practices [of the state], to see the norms and ends 
as expressed in the public life of the community as ones that are 
connected to her flourishing. And it is not just about feelings. 
These institutions and practices should actually help her life go 
better. (p. 6)
Might the Declaration then support an indigenous right to deliberate 
in public affairs as equal citizens in ways that indigenous peoples find 
worthwhile? Is there a form of deliberation not confined to what Watson 
and Venne (2012) call aboriginal management of ‘white political space’ 
(p.  88)? Might indigenous deliberation involve ‘white political space’ 
making way for a national political space in which indigenous peoples 
participate as indigenous, setting aside an ‘us’ and ‘them’ binary and 
claim in Australia, for example, ‘a bit of blackness in this country’s white 
document [i.e. the Constitution]’ (Axelby & Wanganeen, 2017, para. 8)? 
Is there such a thing as a liberal theory of indigeneity (O’Sullivan, 
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2014, 2017) that might set aside that binary in favour of more inclusive 
political arrangements than those possible under New Zealand’s bicultural 
political philosophy, for example?
Biculturalism was the dominant philosophy informing Maori public 
policy during the 1980s and 1990s. It advocated greater respect for 
Maori culture in public organisations and facilitated greater Maori 
involvement in public decision-making. Its presumption was that the 
Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840, was a partnership between Maori and 
the British Crown—or Maori and Pakeha (New Zealanders of Anglo-
Celtic heritage)—as signatories to the treaty. The bicultural presumption 
was that this partnership ought to guide national social and political 
relationships. However, in positioning Maori and Pakeha as always 
and everywhere distinct, biculturalism understated the significance of 
social, cultural, political and economic relationships between Maori 
and other New Zealanders. Instead it created an ‘us’ and ‘them’ binary, 
and the terms Crown and Pakeha came to be used interchangeably to 
describe the non-Maori treaty partner. The interchangeable use of these 
terms gave the Crown an exclusive ethnic character to mean that, while 
biculturalism allowed independent Maori authority and supported the 
development of tribal political institutions, it did not admit space for 
meaningful Maori influence within the state. The Declaration provides 
a more expansive framework for thinking about political relationships and 
self-determination’s practical possibilities.
A Liberal Theory of Indigeneity
This book considers the Declaration with reference to a politics of 
indigeneity involving both political theory and political strategy. When 
the politics of indigeneity claim spaces of indigenous agency, authority 
and autonomy, they are concerned with indigenous peoples defining 
their own terms of belonging to the state—a distinctive belonging as First 
Peoples and shareholders in the collective sovereignty that the state ought 
to safeguard on behalf of all and not just some people. When this occurs, 
the political and legal precepts that facilitated Britain’s colonisation of 
the dissenting states must be reconsidered. Likewise, the workings of the 
public institutions and political systems that undermined indigenous 
forms of government and land tenure, while simultaneously limiting their 
influence over those systems, must also be reconsidered.
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This book’s liberal theory of indigeneity rests on the assumption of an 
extant indigenous political authority, which asks what scope exists for 
a more expansive politics of inclusion. Consistent with the Declaration, 
it presumes that the liberty of the indigenous person is not simply an 
individual right, but one that only makes sense in relation to the cultural 
and other political rights that the indigenous nation retains. Thus, liberty 
is culturally contextualised. However, it is also contextualised by a colonial 
politics whose very logic is liberty’s deprivation.
Liberty is attainable only with reference to a political theory that 
recognises how and why freedom might be constrained; that is, a theory 
that recognises that liberty can only derive meaning in the cultural context 
of the persons claiming it. A liberal theory of indigeneity aims, then, 
‘to create political space for substantive and sustainable reconciliation 
through self-determination and a particular indigenous share in the 
sovereign authority of the modern state itself ’ (O’Sullivan, 2017, p. 35). 
Such a theory requires a fundamental reappraisal of colonial thought 
and the displacement of the colonial state by one that is consciously 
and sustainably postcolonial. The Declaration is not a panacea for this 
kind of political relationship, but it does legitimise the aspiration and 
provides supporting principles. It does so by facilitating the juxtaposition 
of traditional indigenous conceptions of political authority with Western 
liberal democratic theory. Its potential is to allow ‘cultural theorists [to] 
demand a degree of differentiation not present in almost any developed 
democracy’ (Fleras, 2000, p. 373). This juxtaposition of ideas tests 
liberalism’s inclusive potential, not only of people but also of perspectives 
on what the state is for and what it ought to achieve in terms of all people’s 
rights as distinct from some people’s interests.
A liberal theory of indigeneity seeks just terms of association between 
indigenous nations and the state and for indigenous peoples within the 
state. Its focus on circumventing colonialism’s exploitative logic means 
that its interest in protecting group rights is not the same as a general 
liberal interest in the rights of ethnic minorities. Prior occupancy means 
that indigenous people’s claim to distinctive status is fundamentally 
different. Theirs is a claim to exercise political rights through culture and, 
explicitly, through geopolitical relationships with the colonised land. 
The usurpation of land, linguistic and cultural rights are transgressions 
of justice occasioned against indigenous peoples solely because they are 
indigenous. It is only because of one’s membership of an indigenous 
group that one has experienced the injustice, so it follows that restitution 
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is owed to the group. Personal liberty cannot, then, occur in isolation 
from the group. If liberalism is concerned with the liberty of all and not 
just some citizens, it must be attentive to group rights. This is also because 
culture and prior occupancy provide distinctive terms for indigenous 
belonging as equal citizens. Consequently, the rights of indigeneity do not 
arise from a ‘conjunction between “culture” and “disadvantage”’ (Scott, 
2003, p. 94). A liberal theory of indigeneity is not a theory of egalitarian 
justice; nor is it a theory concerned with the rights of poor people. This 
is because the rights to language, culture and a distinctive political voice 
belong to all indigenous people. These rights embody a special moral 
significance because they are rights that colonialism has usurped. They 
have not been freely surrendered, so remain as expressions of the right to 
self-determination.
As a theory, indigeneity is concerned with protecting the right to self-
determination (O’Sullivan, 2017). It demonstrates this concern by 
contesting ‘the exclusive sovereignty of the State to pass and enforce laws, 
define agendas, establish priorities, articulate patterns of entitlement, or 
demand compliance by decree if not by consent’ (Tully, 1999, p. 223). 
Therefore, an inclusive and meaningful sovereignty that is available to 
indigenous peoples in cultural and sociopolitical contexts, as much as it 
is available to anybody else, is presumed. This presumption of the right 
to participate freely in the political, social and economic affairs of the 
state carries substantive rights of citizenship. Indigenous peoples’ prior 
deprivation is the foundational cause of their political marginalisation 
and material poverty. The Declaration’s focus is justified, as political 
domination or denial of the right to self-determination occurs only 
because indigenous human rights, and sometimes indigenous humanity, 
have been denied. Thus, indigeneity may have implications for the nature 
of one’s belonging to the state.
Differentiated Citizenship
The ways in which one belongs, or does not belong, to a political 
community can be understood as an expression of citizenship; likewise, 
the ways in which one is part of, or excluded from, the sovereign can 
also be viewed this way. As the embodiment of political capacities, 
citizenship ‘is an ideological and power laden concept [that] can 
exacerbate, exaggerate or mediate tensions over the distribution of power 
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and authority’ (O’Sullivan, 2017, p. 51). Citizenship reflects the ways in 
which people are positioned in the political community and in relation to 
its institutions of power. For indigenous peoples, it determines whether 
they are willing to see the state as ‘ours’ (i.e. as an inclusive institution) or 
as ‘their’ exclusive settler-colonial construct.
The right to conceptualise and exercise one’s citizenship of the indigenous 
nation, and also of the liberal state, in culturally meaningful terms 
is important. Personal liberty cannot occur in isolation from these 
relationships. Just terms of association require that indigenous peoples 
may claim their liberty, as citizens, in ways that are personally meaningful, 
such as through the right to a culturally meaningful political voice and 
to representation in public affairs, or through speaking in parliament or 
judicial proceedings in one’s own language. The Declaration affirms these 
rights and provides guidance on how they might be realised. They are 
justified in liberal terms because inclusivity ‘is compatible with a form 
of universalism that counts the culture and cultural context valued by 
individuals as among their basic interests’ (Gutmann, 1994, p. 5).
However, settler colonialism means that, in practice, indigenous peoples 
may not routinely (or ever) experience citizenship as the substantive and 
important political concept that Aristotle once described. For Aristotle, 
the citizen was ‘he who has power to take part in the deliberative or judicial 
and administrative power of the state’ (Hindess, 2002, p. 94). In this 
construct, citizenship means that each member of a society has the same 
opportunity for meaningful influence on public affairs as any other. Equal 
capacity, as a citizen, requires attention to culture and to sociopolitical 
contexts. This is reflected in the Declaration’s proposal that citizenship 
and its capacities belong to indigenous people as to any people—that is, 
inherently: they are not granted by the state’s benevolence.
Citizenship’s strength is measured by the extent to which people are inclined 
to use its capacities and their ‘desire to participate in the political process 
… to promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable’ 
(Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 335). Therefore, it is democratically 
important for indigenous people to see the state as belonging to them, 
and membership of the state as something worthwhile and capable of 
contributing to their capacity for self-determination. However, this is 
not a common indigenous experience. Unless contrary perceptions and 
realities can develop, self-determination will remain unattainable.
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At the same time, ensuring the political capacity of indigenous institutions 
to manage their own affairs and develop their own societies in ways that 
are collectively meaningful is important. Indigenous peoples must be able 
to claim the authority to determine what they want of their own societies 
and to determine the spheres of influence that they want their societies 
to enjoy. In some instances, colonialism has diminished that capacity; in 
others, the sense of indigenous purpose remains strong. In both cases, 
there is liberal justification for the public recognition of indigenous 
decision-making systems and for indigenous people’s capacities to:
develop the right to difference in cultural expression, but sameness 
in political opportunities; difference in forms of land tenure, but 
sameness in capacity to make decisions about how land will be 
used; difference in the way one is taught at school, but sameness in 
terms of educational quality. (O’Sullivan, 2017, pp. 51–52)
These are among the conditions for what Maaka and Fleras (2005) call 
‘belonging together differently’. Belonging together differently is possible 
when the terms of association between indigenous people and other 
citizens, and between indigenous peoples and the state, are grounded in 
a politics of participatory parity (Fraser & Honneth, 2003).
This concept of participatory parity means that indigenous people may 
contribute to public affairs with reference to the specific contexts and 
experiences of colonised peoples and from their own cultural perspectives. 
They need not express their arguments through the language and 
epistemologies of the majority population, for to insist on this approach to 
political participation would be to make indigenous culture a democratic 
disability—an obstacle to equal and meaningful participation. Measures 
like guaranteed indigenous seats in parliaments and the proposed voice 
to parliament in Australia, which are discussed later in this book, are 
examples of participatory parity, a form of democratic politics that 
assumes necessarily inclusive processes of public reason will inform public 
decision-making.
Public reason is the assumption that, to deliberate properly, people must 
give reasons for their views and expose them to informed scrutiny. Poorly 
thought out opinions or a refusal to entertain that another may have 
a reasoned (even if different) view, does not allow democracy to work to 
its potential. It does not allow indigenous people to defend their priorities 
and aspirations to an audience that is attentive, respectful and open to 
the possibility of modifying its own positions. It also means, for example, 
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that indigenous people are not able to scrutinise the opinions of others 
or argue for the unreasonableness of discriminatory positions. Public 
reason means that people must deal with disagreement with serious and 
well-informed argument. Rash opinions are unreasonable because they 
disregard another’s right to be heard and considered.
The processes that are used to make decisions are variables that 
influence people’s capacity to participate and thus influence the moral 
acceptability of the decision itself. Political values play an important role 
in policy formation, as they ensure that jurisdictions cannot function in 
a culturally neutral or acultural fashion. Consequently, liberals cannot 
argue that cultural preferences are private matters. Culture cannot be kept 
from public life because political values themselves are deeply rooted in 
human culture.
As liberal states, the dissenting states’ underlying political values are, to 
varying degrees, compatible with the Declaration’s view of the right 
to self-determination as a right ‘based on principles of justice, democracy, 
respect for human rights, non-discrimination and good faith’ (UN, 2007b, 
annex). However, liberalism is a broad and contested political philosophy. 
These differences are borne out in the ways that states and indigenous 
nations, as well as individual political actors, think about concepts such as 
sovereignty and citizenship.
Differentiated citizenship both lays the foundation for and is a reflection 
of reconciliation, which is itself preliminary to self-determination. 
Reconciliation is a process of the state acknowledging colonialism’s harm, 
expressing sorrow and resolving to correct the consequences of injustice 
and ensure that fairness and respect prevail in future relationships.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) and New 
Zealand’s treaty settlement process are state attempts at reconciliation. 
As well as these, the book assesses attempts at reconciliation in Canada 
and the US and discusses, especially, the TRC’s view that the Declaration 
is an important instrument of reconciliation and essential to the forging 
of just political relationships between indigenous nations and states and, 
for indigenous people, relationships within the state itself. Just political 
relationships require trust and an important measure of the Declaration’s 
value is whether it can be used to promote such relationships. Trust is also 
preliminary to the conclusion of meaningful treaties between indigenous 
nations and the state—as indigenous nations in Australia are pursuing.
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This book shows the significance of relationships among reconciliation, 
treaties and trust as preliminary to self-determination. Conversely, when 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US voted against the Declaration, 
they reinforced indigenous peoples’ mistrust of the state, and it is not yet 
evident that withdrawing their opposition to the Declaration has made 
a substantive difference. The relationship between trust and substantive 
improvement in people’s lives is an important one and ultimately the most 
significant measure of the substance of the right to self-determination and 
of the Declaration’s practical value. Therefore, this book examines why 
mistrust occurs and the Declaration’s potential responses in helping to 
create societies where indigenous people may exercise meaningful self-
determination through differentiated citizenship. The book shows how 
and why this is an ambitious aspiration that many indigenous peoples do 
not expect to succeed, but it also shows how and why it is an important 
goal in relation to the objectives and possibilities of self-determination.
Structure
Chapter 1 shows that the Declaration works against exclusive state 
sovereignty. This is because political agency should belong to indigenous 
peoples as much as it belongs to anyone else. There are rights of prior 
occupancy that indigenous peoples are entitled to retain and which 
distinguish indigenous claims from those of ethnic minorities as well 
as from the claims of the materially poor. The Declaration sets out the 
ways in which these claims can be admitted within the liberal democratic 
presumptions of the state. Chapter 1 is not an apology for the Declaration; 
rather, its purpose is to show how, according to the Declaration, liberal 
democracy can work better. Subsequent chapters critique that capacity.
The Declaration rationalises a liberal theory of indigeneity by proposing 
a reconsideration of citizenship, democracy, self-determination and 
sovereignty. It shows that, while these are often conceptualised in ways 
that exclude indigenous people and perspectives, exclusivity is a political 
choice rather than an inevitable outcome of the prevailing liberal order. 
Chapter 2 shows that integrating the Declaration’s principles into a liberal 
theory of indigeneity creates political space for noncolonial political 
relationships for indigenous people both within the state as substantively 
equal citizens and beyond the state as members of self-determining 
indigenous communities.
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Self-determination is a goal that ultimately presupposes reconciliation 
between indigenous peoples and the noncolonial state. It is a goal 
that is not yet realised in the liberal jurisdictions of Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the US, but one that is actively pursued through the 
Declaration setting out how self-determination might work in practice 
according to the liberal principles and presumptions that prevail in 
those jurisdictions. Consequently, while the Declaration does not restore 
indigenous political authority, it nevertheless demonstrates how the 
aspiration of self-determination is a reasonable, if contested, liberal claim. 
Chapter 3 shows how and why self-determination was contested by the 
four states who voted against the Declaration before ‘reading down’ its 
significance and giving it qualified support. It responds to these objections 
and introduces examples of liberal democratic inclusion.
As an example of the practical tension between the politics of inclusion 
and exclusion, Chapter 4 considers the Declaration’s requirement 
that indigenous peoples’ ‘free, prior and informed consent’ must be 
obtained before indigenous lands can be used by others for any kind of 
development, including resource extraction. This was one of the principal 
reasons for the four states voting against the Declaration. Their stance was 
justified with reference to an ‘us’ and ‘them’ binary in which mining was 
presented as always and everywhere in the national interest, and always 
and everywhere opposed by indigenous landowners. Chapter 4 shows 
that this simplistic yet powerful misrepresentation was used to position 
indigenous peoples beyond the nation-state and as unconcerned with the 
national interest. It is against this backdrop that the scepticism that some 
indigenous people hold about the Declaration’s political value is discussed, 
especially the argument that imposing liberal human rights presumptions 
on nonliberal societies is itself a form of neo-colonial assimilation. While 
acknowledging the logic of some indigenous people’s great suspicion of 
the liberal state, this book does not accept their arguments, and asks 
under which circumstances an indigenous person would accept a human 
right as injurious to their own cultural values.
The chapter argues that indigenous arguments against human rights 
are often arguments of convenience argued by the more powerful in an 
indigenous nation to cement their personal status over weaker members 
of the nation, most commonly women and children. The chapter’s 
contrasting position is to accept the idea that self-determination belongs 
equally to all indigenous persons.
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Chapter 5 argues that self-determination cannot occur to its fullest 
potential without indigenous people claiming the dual and differentiated 
citizenship of both the state and the indigenous nation. It introduces the 
idea of self-determination requiring substantive indigenous participation 
in a shared public sovereignty. The Declaration provides a framework for 
identifying the institutional arrangements that need to be made for this 
kind of substantive self-determination to occur. Chapter 5 considers self-
determination’s character and purpose. It considers the ways in which the 
claim to self-determination supports policy aspirations and possibilities 
across jurisdictions and policy domains and shows how and why self-
determination may be thought about not simply as a body of rights but as 
a body of transformative political capacities.
Chapter 6 examines how the Declaration is understood in other states 
and considers its interpretation by jurisdictions as diverse as Belize, 
Bolivia, China, Finland, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Norway, Malaysia and 
Sweden, all of which voted for its adoption. The Russian Federation, 
which abstained from the vote, is also considered. The chapter shows that, 
while cultural rights are generally accepted, the principle of free, prior 
and informed consent to outsiders’ commercial activity on indigenous 
lands is not. The tension between state and indigenous perspectives 
supports the rethinking of sovereignty, citizenship and democracy that 
this book provides.
The comparative focus of Chapter 6 highlights the existence of a range 
of interpretations of self-determination and definitions of what it means 
to be indigenous. For substantive and meaningful self-determination, 
the concept must be acknowledged as a right that allows indigenous 
people to determine their own affairs and allows their participation 
in public affairs as distinctively indigenous citizens. Like the role of 
sustained cultural relationships to land, such considerations are essential 
to defining indigeneity and creating meaningful political relationships. 
The chapter shows why defining indigenous peoples as ‘dominated’ or 
‘minority’ populations privileges politics and demography over culture as 
the principal determinant of what it means to be indigenous. Making 
domination a condition of indigeneity excludes the indigenous peoples 
of Fiji, for example, from the Declaration’s protections. This is significant 
because, although their majority population status is restored, colonial 
legacy remains an influence on contemporary politics, and indigenous 
‘We ARe ALL HeRe To STAy’
26
claims to language, culture, land and to economic rights remain insecure. 
In this case, majority population status is not, from their own perspectives, 
the indigenous peoples’ principal defining characteristic.
Chapter 7 considers the relationship between self-determination and 
sovereignty. It argues that self-determination requires a kind of liberal 
public sovereignty that is different from that often assumed in New 
Zealand, where the domain of the ‘Crown-in-Parliament’ is always 
in conflict with rangatiratanga, the Maori chiefly authority claimed as an 
extant right of prior occupancy.
The chapter introduces what it means for the Waitangi Tribunal, a judicial 
body concerned with the Treaty of Waitangi, to find that in signing the 
treaty, Maori did not cede their sovereignty to the British Crown. This is 
an important point, for if sovereignty remains with indigenous peoples, its 
contemporary character, and whether and how the authority it embodies 
is relative and relational to other sites of public power, can be explored.
Sovereignty is more complex than an absolute political authority once held 
by indigenous peoples, taken by the colonial state and reclaimed as the 
subject of contemporary indigenous politics. Examples from Australia and 
the US are also used to illustrate these complexities and to show that the 
Declaration makes presumptions about the nature and location of political 
power and provides ways of bringing distinctive indigenous authority 
into the national body politic. Sovereignty can then be understood as an 
authority of the people—not over the people. Indigenous peoples must 
logically and justly be part of that public sovereignty. Therefore, this book 
develops the idea of dual spaces of citizenship into a theory and practice of 
differentiated liberal citizenship, which is both consistent with the liberal 
democratic political organisation of the dissenting states and a defensible 
framework for giving effect to the Declaration.
Differentiated liberal citizenship, supported by the Declaration, 
proceeds from shared sovereignty and provides inclusive answers to the 
question of who belongs to the postsettler liberal state and on whose 
terms. Differentiated liberal citizenship allows indigenous peoples to 
reject colonial victimhood and exercise political authority in ways that 
are distinctive but equal to that reasonably claimed by other citizens. 
It presumes participatory parity in public affairs; that is, the idea that all 
people have the right to make important contributions to public debate 
and to deliberate and share in the formation of public values.
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Chapter 8 shows that liberal democracy’s capacity for assimilation does not 
reflect the ways that this system of political organisation must necessarily 
or logically function. Instead, liberal democracy has the capacity to allow 
indigenous people to participate equally and distinctively in the affairs of 
the states that have emerged over their territories. The chapter examines 
this capacity through theories of participatory parity and public reason 
that, ideally, allow all citizens to see that their ability to influence public 
decision making is fair and reasonable because it is equivalent to the 
capacity for influence that all citizens enjoy. For indigenous peoples, it 
is equivalent because, among other considerations, capacity is accepted 
as occurring with reference to cultural priorities and in response to 
aspirations for noncolonial political practices and relationships. Although 
the Declaration is not a panacea for the full restoration of indigenous 
nationhood, it raises liberal possibilities that are worth pursuing for 
their potential to make self-determination an aspiration of substantive 
value through differentiated citizenship. At the same time, as Chapter 9 
explains, there are well-developed indigenous objections to differentiated 
citizenship.
Chapter 9 uses a report commissioned by the New Zealand Iwi (Tribal) 
Chairs Forum to demonstrate how much is given away when a politics 
of self-determination through separation from the state is proposed. 
The report, He whakairo here whakaumu mō Aotearoa, recommended 
a constitutional order that maintained rigid distinctions between Maori 
and Crown authority which are referred to, with reference to the Treaty 
of Waitangi, as rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga, respectively. In the 
report, rangatiratanga was depicted as belonging to Maori (i.e. ‘us’) and 
kāwanatanga to the Crown (i.e. ‘them’). Conflated with New Zealanders 
of Anglo-Celtic descent (i.e. Pakeha citizens) the Crown was thus 
given an ethnic character that made it the site of only some citizens’ 
political authority.
Rangatiratanga’s purpose, among others, is to constrain sovereignty. 
However, if sovereignty is understood as the people’s political authority 
exercised by, but not belonging inherently to, the ‘Crown-in-Parliament’, 
then rangatiratanga is part of the sovereign. Thus, rather than constraining 
sovereignty, it helps to shape it. Understood in these terms, rangatiratanga 
becomes an example of a collective indigenous voice influencing public 
authority, reflecting the argument that everybody has the right to help 
determine the political values of the state. At the same time, indigenous 
people retain the capacity to govern their distinctive affairs in their own 
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ways through their own institutions. Further, they have an inclusive 
citizenship in which indigenous political authority is independent in 
one sphere and shared in another; sovereignty is a collective power, and 
self-determination is a meaningful concept belonging simultaneously 
to individual citizens and to indigenous nations as an extant power of 
prior occupancy. The Declaration’s ultimate value is that it supports these 
aspirations as liberal politics. The chapter uses examples from Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand to examine contemporary attempts at inclusive 
liberal politics and discusses, theoretically and practically, what these 
attempts mean and why they are more likely than isolationist approaches 
to self-determination to contribute to greater indigenous political 




on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples
[There is a] profound question of whether a State built upon the 
taking of another people’s lands, lives and power can ever really 
be just. (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 2016, p. 29)
Introduction
It may be true that a state built on taking another’s lands can never be just. 
Neither constitutions nor politics can guarantee that justice has pervasive 
influence. Yet injustice may be mitigated, and there may be broad principles 
of justice to inform the development of nondominant and noncolonial 
political relationships that are, pragmatically, worth indigenous people 
pursuing. Such principles are imbued in the Declaration—an instrument 
that takes international human rights discourse beyond the individual to 
the collective. The Declaration’s ‘essential novelty’ (Wiessner, 2009, p. 4) 
is that it makes collective rights ‘indispensable’ (p. 41) and an essential 
consideration for indigenous political capacity. It therefore shows why it is 
unjust to think about indigenous rights as simply a subset of general ethnic 
minority rights. The conflation of indigenous claims with those of migrant 
ethnic minority populations undermines the right to self-determination. 
It overlooks the distinctiveness of indigenous claims, including that their 
source is in relation to land and culture. They may be shaped by colonial 
histories and political disadvantage and may be compounded by minority 
population status, but these are not indigeneity’s defining characteristics.
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The Declaration enunciates political capacities belonging to indigenous 
nations that are grounded in prior occupancy. Relationships to defined 
territories thus provide an important distinction with the rights of 
minorities, and, as this book explains, just terms of association require 
careful attention to those contexts.
The Declaration precludes an exclusive state sovereignty and gives 
specific context to general principles of non-discrimination. It requires 
reimagining the liberal state’s form and character and the ways that it 
manages political relationships. In showing that democratic exclusion is 
not liberalism’s inevitable or necessary form, the Declaration responds to 
the maldistribution of political authority rather than simply the egalitarian 
concerns of the indigenous poor.
The Declaration imagines forms of self-determination grounded in 
substantive indigenous agency—the political capacity to realise rights 
grounded in prior occupancy. However, its enduring value, like that of the 
Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand, is its capacity to support just terms of 
association between indigenous nations and the liberal state. It supports 
these terms of association by acknowledging that indigenous peoples 
rightly exercise the capacities of citizenship as indigenous. This could 
mean having a distinctive voice within the political system, the right to 
learn at school in cultural context or to influence the provision of health 
services with reference to cultural imperatives, among other such rights.
This chapter argues that the Declaration’s value in contemporary liberal 
states, like those that dissented from the Declaration’s adoption, lies 
not only in its challenge to prevailing political values and institutions 
but also, and ultimately, in its potential to remake public institutions 
in ways that create scope for substantive indigenous agency. The limits 
and moral shortcomings of the Declaration are examined from both state 
and indigenous perspectives in later chapters. This chapter’s purpose is to 
introduce the possibilities that the Declaration raises for a more inclusive 
state. Those possibilities are usefully assessed in relation to a liberal 
theory of indigeneity that finds practical expression in differentiated 
liberal citizenship. A liberal theory of indigeneity may, if societies wish, 
provide ways of thinking inclusively about citizenship, sovereignty and 
democracy. One of this book’s recurring observations is that reconsidering 
these concepts allows indigenous politics to think beyond an exclusive 
non-indigenous state or Crown as the sole or inevitable repository of 
public authority.
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Indigenous Peoples and the 
Liberal Paradigm
Moreton-Robinson (2003, 2004) and Watson and Venne (2012) have 
shown why indigenous peoples do not routinely look to the liberal 
paradigm to address collective claims. However, a distinctive liberal 
theory of indigeneity can be read into the Declaration. That theory shows 
that the restrictive practices that these Indigenous Australian scholars 
identify are not essential to liberal philosophy. They are practices that 
can be challenged to provide a philosophical path beyond the ‘framework 
of liberal individualism versus corporatism’ (Holder & Corntassel, 2002, 
p. 127): a framework that limits indigenous peoples’ full enjoyment of 
their universal human rights as indigenous peoples. It is at least partly 
to these ends that the Declaration sets out new possibilities for relational 
justice. For example, the Canadian Assembly of First Nations (2017) 
pursued relational justice with the state by establishing principles to 
guide political relationships and by providing ‘ways to measure and assess 
[how] states are respecting and implementing the rights of indigenous 
peoples’ (para. 1). The reports of UN special rapporteurs on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, and country and nongovernment organisation 
reports to UN bodies, such as the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, inform such efforts, which may, over time, enable 
the Declaration to acquire persuasive value in domestic legal proceedings, 
as discussed in Chapter 3.
Meanwhile, Carroll (2012) has argued that the Declaration ‘presented 
the global state community with a political litmus test that exposed … 
the unique relationships between indigenous peoples and the states into 
which they have found themselves subsumed’ (p. 143). Self-determination 
requires that these unique relationships must be developed to privilege 
indigenous political agency meaning that, in turn, Holder and Corntassel 
(2002, p. 141) err in referring to settler states as the ‘host states’ of 
indigenous peoples who occupy the same territories. In using the concept 
of ‘host’, Holder and Corntassel (2002) position indigenous peoples as the 
‘other’—as beyond the state and therefore beyond the legal entity whose 
decisions materially influence their capacities for self-determination.
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The term ‘host’ implies a voluntarily accepted relationship. One is only 
‘hosted’ if one so chooses. Agency requires a different approach—one of 
genuine democratic inclusivity broadly accepted by indigenous peoples. 
It  is to support aspirations for democratic inclusivity that one of this 
book’s principal aims is to contest the legitimacy of the idea that:
The formal theory of the unitary and exclusive sovereignty of 
the Crown-in-Parliament has endured as a vestigial orthodoxy, 
relatively unperturbed by theories denying the Crown’s unitary 
character or its formal supremacy. (Kingsbury, 2002, p. 119)
In New Zealand, this understanding of sovereignty informs a common 
Maori acceptance of a Crown–Maori, ‘them’ and ‘us’, binary, the 
implications of which are systematically discussed in Chapter 9 (see also 
O’Sullivan, 2007). This book draws an alternative and liberal political 
framework from the Declaration to transcend that binary. It does so 
by acknowledging that the Declaration provides for more inclusive 
conceptions of sovereignty, citizenship and democracy, which then makes 
it realistic to contemplate an alternative view of Crown sovereignty where 
the Crown is:
an inclusive institution [that] forges a sense of the population as 
bound together in a common enterprise. The Crown, as a mediating 
institution, is the addressee of demands and complaints made by 
different groups, enabling the country to avoid a dangerously 
ethnicised politics in which Maori and non-Maori confront each 
other directly and repeatedly. (Kingsbury, 2002, p. 119)
A liberal theory of indigeneity is a theory of autonomy, but as a theory 
concerned with democratic inclusivity, it also aims to minimise the 
circumstances under which confrontation is likely to occur. It describes 
the conditions under which indigenous peoples might acquire maximum 
independence and authority within the state, while retaining the attributes 
of independent authority in and over their own affairs. Citizenship must 
then be understood as embodying a set of political capacities that belong 
not just to individuals but also to indigenous nations. A liberal theory of 
indigeneity is concerned with the state’s political character. This is a wider 
and deeper concern than governments simply acting fairly or determining 
a ‘special duty’ owed to indigenous people. Rather, it describes the 
political conditions under which indigenous peoples might do justice to 
themselves, thereby securing what they owe to themselves as indigenous 
citizens of an inclusive liberal society. This is important because it provides 
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an indigenous political theory responsive to Benhabib’s (1996) questions 
about democracy’s character and what that character might mean for 
indigenous self-determination:
Does democracy rest on homogenising models of identity? What 
does the body of the ‘body politic’ look like? Can the ideal of 
universal citizenship accommodate difference? What institutional, 
cultural, and representational channels are there for the expression 
of difference? How much difference is compatible with the ideal of 
the rule of law under fair and equal conditions? (p. 5)
This book examines how the Declaration helps to conceptualise a state 
in which indigenous people have the same capacities as anyone else to 
influence the values and purposes that public institutions are developed 
to serve. It contrasts this inclusive ideal with the philosophical objections 
to a liberal theory of indigeneity that arise from theories of democratic 
exclusion. Under these theories, homogeneity is privileged as the 
democratic ideal. Justice is equated with sameness. The presumption is 
that culture has no place in the public realm and that substantive claims 
to restitution or recognition may not be justly entertained. If each person’s 
political rights and obligations are the same, then they are recognisable 
and exercisable only in the same ways. However, the principle of justice 
through sameness is incomplete if sameness can obstruct fairness.
If public relationships among citizens are fair, differences in context and 
aspirations will have been taken into account. Personal liberty makes such 
differences legitimate. The circumstances that distinguish any person’s 
present are shaped by the past: the consequences of the past endure. If the 
past includes the subjugation of political authority, just relationships do 
not simply emerge in the present; they can occur only as the product 
of considered choices about how people belong to the contemporary 
state. If all are to belong on equal terms, one has to consider the political 
capacities that allow equality.
The alternative may be that belonging is ‘inextricably tied to white 
possession’ (Moreton-Robinson, 2003, p. 137), which becomes the 
‘definitive marker of citizenship’ (Moreton-Robinson, 2004, p. 79). 
It is then an oversimplification of indigenous political experience and 
expectation to argue that:
the general duty of a government to do justice to all people is [not] 
trumped by any special duty it owes to those of the inhabitants 
who can claim indigenous descent. (Waldron, 2003, p. 30)
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What is needed is a political order that allows all people to exercise the 
rights and obligations of humanity in ways that are personally meaningful, 
an objective that is reflected in the Declaration itself:
1. Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to enjoy 
fully all rights established under applicable international and 
domestic labour law.
2. States shall in consultation and cooperation with indigenous 
peoples take specific measures to protect indigenous children 
from economic exploitation and from performing any work 
that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s 
education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral or social development, taking into 
account their special vulnerability and the importance of 
education for their empowerment.
3. Indigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected 
to any discriminatory conditions of labour and, inter alia, 
employment or salary. (UN, 2007b, art. 17)
In Australia, for example, respect for these human rights would 
have  prevented policies separating Indigenous children from their 
families, prevented land alienation, ensured education and health 
care equivalent to that available to other members of the community, 
prevented discrimination in criminal justice and the labour market, 
precluded the closure of remote Indigenous communities, prevented 
the Western Australian Government’s refusal to engage with Indigenous 
communities in reaching policy decisions in this context and made the 
Northern Territory Emergency Response (‘the Intervention’) impossible.1 
Instead, and as subsequent chapters discuss, the Declaration supports 
an indigenous political focus on good health, education, housing, 
employment and land rights; affirms the negotiation of treaties to mark 
formal recognition of indigenous people’s prior occupancy; and shows 
how human rights may have prevented colonisation, a process that 
undermines the political rights of all indigenous people, not just the 
material claims of the indigenous poor.
1  The Intervention was an ‘emergency’ policy response to alleged widespread sexual abuse 
of children in the Northern Territory, Australia, in 2007. There was no indigenous participation in 
developing the policy response, which required the suspension of the Commonwealth Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975.
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Prioritising concern for the indigenous poor reflects a kind of distributive 
justice that separates individual liberty from the cultural contexts and 
collective environments in which people actually live. Material disadvantage 
is a public policy outcome; it is not in itself the source of indigenous claims. 
Indigenous people might be interested in class politics, but indigeneity 
is a different politics concerned with the maldistribution of political 
authority. Indigenous peoples’ conscious democratic exclusion arises from 
‘institutionalised patterns of cultural value’ (Fraser, as cited in Fraser & 
Honneth, 2003, p. 30) that are not indigenous and that indigenous people 
may not have sufficient democratic opportunities to contest.
Exclusion contributes to policy failure (Banks, 2007), which is often 
explained  by a ‘power narrative’ (Altman, 2009, p. 43) of indigenous 
inadequacy—specifically, the failings of culture and of personal responsibility. 
By contrast, democratic inclusion might occur through what Hunt 
and Blackman (2009) call ‘active and informed participation’, resulting in 
both ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘cultural acceptability’ in policy outcomes 
(p. 9). This objective is beyond the concerns of liberal egalitarianism.
Beyond Liberal Egalitarianism
Liberal egalitarianism is concerned with poverty alleviation through the 
fair distribution of material resources. However, egalitarian justice is not 
equipped to consider claims to culture, language, collective resource 
ownership, substantive political authority or just terms of association. 
These essential constituents of a liberal theory of indigeneity explain the 
limits of undifferentiated liberal citizenship. Instead, the Declaration 
maintains that:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize 
their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right 
to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future 
manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and 
historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies 
and visual and performing arts and literature.
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, 
which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, 
religious and spiritual property taken without their free, 
prior  and informed consent or in violation of their laws, 
traditions and customs. (UN, 2007b, art. 11)
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A liberal theory of indigeneity develops these rights not as claims to 
privilege over others or a ‘birthright to the upper hand’ (Brash, 2004, 
para. 7), but as claims to relational justice within the sovereign citizenry. 
Whatever its form, sovereignty ought to serve all citizens equally, 
including those for whom an indigenous collective identity is important. 
It should not ‘reproduce a space for politics that is enabled by and rests 
upon the production, naturalization and maginalization of certain forms 
of “difference”’ (Shaw, 2008, p. 9), but should be stable, clear, ordered 
and obviously inclusive. These are determinants of the political space that 
is required for the right to self-determination to have practical meaning 
and improve the lives of indigenous peoples—determinants of a political 
space where public sovereignty is shared.
Sharing public sovereignty means that public institutions should not be 
‘theirs’, as in an ‘us’ and ‘them’ binary, but should reflect all people’s right 
to contribute to the formation of public values and the ways in which 
public institutions work. If, as Benhabib (1996) argued, the ‘claims of 
culture’ are limited by their consistency with prevailing norms and values, 
then indigenous peoples must enjoy meaningful opportunities to shape 
those norms and values. This is the assumption of New Zealand’s Te 
Kotahitanga research and professional development program for school 
teachers (see Chapter 5), which seeks to ensure that Maori achievements 
at school are not dependent on their putting their own values and ways 
of life to one side. Te Kotahitanga’s underlying pedagogic principle is that 
Maori should be able to bring their culture into the classroom and that 
culture should not be an impediment to success (Bishop, O’Sullivan & 
Berryman, 2010). This acknowledges the reality that, when people claim 
membership of a group:
What they are saying … is not just that they are strongly attached 
to this spiritual view or background; rather it is that this provides 
the frame within which they can determine where they stand on 
questions of what is good. (Taylor, 1989, p. 27)
Culture helps to frame people’s expectations of citizenship, including 
schooling and, more broadly, of what it means to be a free and politically 
equal person. Given culture’s political importance, it is idealistic to argue 
that, for the resolution of conflict, ‘there must be some standard by which 
to determine the goodness or badness’ of competing claims, and that 
‘whatever that standard is, there can be but one’ (Mill, 1843, p. 951). 
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Instead, the Declaration provides an international standard for assessing 
indigenous claims as distinctive claims, and for assessing the counterclaims 
of the state.
The Declaration precludes indigenous people—and by extension their 
cultures—from deliberate and systematic exclusion from substantive 
citizenship. While it does not prescribe the form that indigenous inclusion 
should take, the presumption that inclusion should always and everywhere 
occur if that is the indigenous wish is significant.
Admitting indigenous ways of being human into state law complements the 
native Canadian argument that the Declaration imposes a responsibility 
to ‘live up to the concept of being a self-determining human … it is a new 
way to reform and empower our traditions and versions of humanities’ 
(Henderson, 2017, p. 13).
Self-determination is present when ‘responsibility-based’ (Corntassel, 
2008, p. 123) movements reflect self-determination as a body of political 
capacities and not simply a body of rights. In this way, self-determination 
‘de-center[s] the state from discussions of indigenous political, social, 
economic, and cultural mobilization’ (Corntassel, 2008, p. 123). 
Self-determination is then a reflection of political space; specifically, the 
space ‘to function well if one so chooses’ (Nussbaum, 1987, p. 20) and in 
ways that are personally meaningful. This book shows, in the discussions 
that follow, that these aspirations are reasonable and realisable because 
‘discourses of difference … are part of the liberal tradition’ (Little, 2003, 
p. 25). In particular, indigenous values and political processes should 
influence the conduct of public affairs.
Rather than be subservient to those of the state, indigenous political 
philosophies should legitimately influence public affairs so that space is 
created ‘for [indigenous] right[s] to be distinct, on [their] own path, and 
free from interference’ (Garrow, 2012, p. 182). This argument rationalises 
differentiated liberal citizenship’s concern for protecting language and 
culture in public institutions and in traditional spheres. However, the right 
to self-determination cannot be limited to matters of culture, for culture 
is maintained only by economic security and substantive participation 
at all levels of the political process. Substantive political participation is 
both ‘instrumental and constitutive’ (Ruger, 2006, p. 298) of a fair policy 
process, including economic policies that are conducive to indigenous 
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economic security. This is democratically important because ‘at the core 
of the modern liberal democratic project … [is] the capability of persons 
to determine and justify their own actions’ (Held, 1995, p. 149).
In jurisdictions like Canada and New Zealand, inclusion remains 
contested. However, in Australia, inclusion is a new and radical 
proposition. In 2017, the UN special rapporteur criticised the Australian 
Government’s Indigenous Advancement Strategy’s shifting of service 
delivery contracts away from Indigenous providers as well as its reduced 
budget for Indigenous policy programs (UN, 2017b). The government 
defended the Indigenous Advancement Strategy (UN, 2017a) even though 
its own audit office found wider problems remained in its administration. 
The audit office report provides a brief but instructive insight into the 
nature of indigenous public policy failure:
The implementation of the Strategy occurred in a short timeframe 
and this affected the department [of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet]’s ability to establish transitional arrangements and 
structures that focused on prioritising the needs of Indigenous 
communities. (Australian National Audit Office, 2017, p. 8)
The audit office also found that:
The department’s grants administration processes fell short 
of the standard required to effectively manage a billion dollars of 
Commonwealth resources. The basis by which projects were 
recommended to the Minister was not clear and, as a result, 
limited assurance is available that the projects funded support the 
department’s desired outcomes. Further, the department did not:
• assess applications in a manner that was consistent with the 
guidelines and the department’s public statements;
• meet some of its obligations under the Commonwealth Grants 
Rules and Guidelines;
• keep records of key decision; or
• establish performance targets for all funded projects. 
(Australian National Audit Office, 2017, p. 8)
The report showed that the conditions for informed policy could not 
be presumed:
The performance framework and measures established for the 
Strategy do not provide sufficient information to make assessments 
about program performance and progress towards achievement 
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of the program outcomes. The monitoring systems inhibit the 
department’s ability to effectively verify, analyse or report on 
program performance. The department has commenced some 
evaluations of individual projects delivered under the Strategy but 
has not planned its evaluation approach after 2016–17. (Australian 
National Audit Office, 2017, p. 8)
In 2018, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet released an 
Annual Evaluation Work Plan for the Indigenous Advancement Strategy. 
Greater attention was to be paid to ensuring indigenous engagement in 
implementing the strategy and to what was known about what actually 
works in indigenous policy—there was to be ‘a culture of evidence-based 
thinking and practice’ (Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2018a, p. 1).
Implementing a regime in which effective policy is routinely and 
systematically supported by widely accepted knowledge of what works 
represents a significant procedural shift in Australian indigenous public 
policymaking. For example, the causes of preventable premature 
indigenous deaths are well known and the relative importance of each 
cause has been identified and provides policy direction in the development 
of solutions (O’Sullivan, 2015), yet budgetary allocations to supportive 
measures have been reduced (UN, 2017a).
According to Vos, Barker, Begg, Stanley and Lopez (2009), 11 risk factors 
explain the life expectancy differential of Australia’s Indigenous people: 
‘tobacco, alcohol, illicit drugs, high body mass, inadequate physical 
activity, low intake of fruit and vegetables, high blood pressure, high 
cholesterol, unsafe sex, child sexual abuse and intimate partner violence’ 
(p. 474). Another risk factor, which is consistent with surveys showing 
that up to 79 per cent of Indigenous Australians have experienced racism 
in the health system (Paradies, 2006), is people’s reluctance to seek 
medical advice. One South Australian hospital worker told Dwyer et al. 
(2011) that:
We’re seeing people here who actually haven’t accessed the system 
so their cancers are very, very advanced. We’ve seen [Aboriginal 
people] who have got… major carcinoma that’s disfiguring, just 
distorting their body shape… so they’ve obviously been in pain … 
for a long time and that suggests to me that… they’re reluctant or 
reticent or unable to access systems for whatever reason. (quotation 
is as it appears in the source, p. 18)
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One response may be to admit, systematically, that there is a right to 
be indigenous when one goes to hospital—to admit that there is a right 
to culture—which requires indigenous participation in decisions about 
how health systems operate and who works in them. This is because 
health outcomes are not the product of clinical competence alone. They 
are influenced by health workers’ philosophical dispositions towards 
providing equally effective care to indigenous patients (O’Sullivan, 2015). 
The marked presence of racism in the health system indicates that effective 
and culturally respectful care is not always the indigenous experience. 
Efficacious health care may, then, require fundamental political equality.
Towards Political Equality
The Declaration is not concerned with special rights but with the 
codification of liberal democratic rights in historical, political and cultural 
context. It is ‘one law for all’ grounded in human equality and cognisant 
of culture’s unavoidable centrality to equality. However, the Declaration 
is not a panacea for achieving just terms of association. Its limits occur 
because power is not absolute. For example, the Declaration will not 
absolutely ‘assimilate the colonizer into Aboriginal processes of power-
sharing’, as Watson and Venne (2012, p. 89) desire, yet implementing 
the Declaration does presume meaningful political recognition, 
especially—and most importantly—of the right to exercise citizenship in 
a differentiated form. The Declaration makes this possible by establishing 
that indigenous persons are ‘peoples’ and thus entitled to collective 
recognition (UN, 2007b).
The rights that the Declaration enunciates are grounded in internationally 
established norms of human equality. They give human rights a collective 
character that challenges their traditional understanding as belonging 
only to the individual. Inclusive group rights allow indigenous peoples to 
reconceptualise their view of the contemporary state not as a Leviathan-like 
entity but as a body structured, in part, on a liberal theory of indigeneity 
in which all, and not just some, people share sovereign public authority 
(O’Sullivan, 2014).
In this way, the Declaration raises the aspirations of indigenous peoples 
and states alike. For example, it represents the international community’s 
rejection of terra nullius, which presumed that indigenous societies 
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lacked the institutional, intellectual and social capacity for nationhood. 
In Australia, this rejection had allowed Justice Brennan to propose, in his 
Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) judgment, that:
It is contrary both to international standards and to the fundamental 
values of our common law to entrench a discrimination rule 
which, because of the supposed position on the scale of social 
organisation of the Indigenous inhabitants of a said colony, denies 
them a right to occupy their traditional lands. (para. 42)
The Declaration also rejects the proposition ‘that settlers are citizens 
because they possess what Indians lack: the capacities for rational 
self-government and legal institutions of private property, both of which 
define legal personhood’ (Dahl, 2016, p. 17). Dahl continued:
Insofar as citizenship is legally ‘defined through the natural right 
to own property’ and rests on the self-ownership of the possessive 
individual, Indians negatively define settler citizenship by 
representing the negation of the proprietary self in the absence 
of dominant conceptions of private property. To the extent that 
American democracy depends on the propertied independence 
of citizens, the enclosure of land in private property mirrors the 
enclosure of settler sovereignty, both of which enact the exclusion 
of Indians from citizenship. In highlighting the constitutive 
exclusions of settler democracy, Indian nullification operates 
less as an institutional feature of constitutional design than as 
a rhetorical mode that captures the foundational division of settler 
democracy, the structuring of citizenship along a settler-indigene 
divide. (Dahl, 2016, p. 17)
Its inclusive emphasis means that, even as an aspirational document 
(as opposed to an instrument of customary international law), the 
Declaration is politically and morally valuable. As well as challenging 
state hegemony over indigenous peoples, it challenges state dominance 
of international relations and reshapes the ways in which one is able to 
think about the possibilities and scope of international law and politics. 
As Mazzuoli and Ribeiro (2015) asserted, this is because human rights 
‘change the hermeneutics of international law’ (p. 1713). Taking this 
argument further, Patton (2005) argued that:
Against the background of a more comprehensive understanding 
of the nature and effects of colonial administration, reparation 
might be described simply as an attempt to constitute a moral and 
political community where before there was none. (p. 265)
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The idea of a ‘moral and political community’ is differentiated liberal 
citizenship’s ultimate purpose.
Differentiated citizenship is the condition that the Declaration may 
create—a condition that allows the politics of indigeneity to test the 
substantive and practical value of the ways in which liberal democracies 
work. The Declaration is a robust and considered framework for thinking 
about the character of differentiated citizenship, the political cultures it 
might require and the values that it might assume.
The Declaration takes the terms of indigenous peoples’ relationships 
with and within states beyond the realm of domestic law. Its principles 
endure the vicissitudes of domestic politics and prejudices of local 
laws and public policies. Under international human rights law, states 
do not have unconstrained authority. State institutions lie between the 
constraints of domestic politics and international law—they are bodies 
that sometimes exist in a state of philosophical conflict over the merits 
of self-determination. In providing a measure for the international 
evaluation of domestic policy principles, the Declaration provides a way 
through this conflict.
The Declaration confirmed all indigenous peoples’ place in international 
law. In doing so, it tried to make indigenous peoples ‘subjects rather than 
objects of international law’ (Schulte-Tenckhoff, 2012, p. 76). The effect 
was to reconceptualise debates about the right to self-determination: 
to whom did it belong, how might it be exercised and why? The 
Declaration’s extension of the right to self-determination to groups as well 
as individuals is highly significant for indigenous groups because they have 
the characteristics of peoplehood: common ancestry, common culture 
and sustained geopolitical attachments to the same place. This  allows 
a people to organise itself politically in subnational forms, as explained in 
the Declaration:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions 
in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect them. (UN, 2007b, art. 19)
The Declaration presumes that indigenous rights proceed from an 
overarching right to self-determination, belonging equally to men and 
women (UN, 2007b, art. 44), and ‘should be interpreted in accordance 
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with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, 
equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith’ (art. 46[3]). 
It proposes that the specific rights of women are matters of concern for 
both states and indigenous nations and makes no distinction between 
people residing within tribal boundaries and diaspora populations. 
The right to self-determination is held equally by all indigenous people; 
the right to belong to one’s indigenous community privileges culture over 
blood quantum.
The Declaration seeks to diminish the state’s constraining influence 
by simultaneously strengthening indigenous nations and ensuring 
substantive indigenous inclusion in the public life of the state. 
It  promotes indigenous political authority beyond the state through 
indigenous political institutions, which weakens the state by increasing 
indigenous entities’ relative power. Conversely, the Declaration proposes 
an inclusive democratic state in which indigenous peoples are guaranteed 
a substantive voice that, though it serves the state’s integrative function, 
is not assimilationist but, rather, balances the state’s authority with the 
explicit expectation that indigenous peoples can enjoy national citizenship 
in distinctive ways. This has major implications for democracy and the 
meaning of indigenous belonging to the state.
The Declaration’s challenge to liberal theories of ‘belonging’ is a ‘serious 
conceptual one’ (Gover, 2015, p. 349). It allows indigenous peoples to 
assert a culturally contextualised and politically independent belonging 
to the state. Henderson (2008) described the politics surrounding the 
Declaration as:
a cognitive struggle, a challenge to existing ways of thinking about 
humanity. It was a manifestation of shared persuasion [emphasis 
added]. The new emergent consciousness displaces the old 
discriminatory models of imperialism and colonialism based on 
racism. (p. 10)
Though nonbinding, the Declaration is a document of ‘considerable 
moral import’ (Belanger, 2010, p. 2). Binding status may eventually be 
acquired through its persuasive legal influence and practical influence as 
an instrument for public advocacy (Wiessner, 2009). In the meantime, the 
politics that might be drawn from it should be understood as significant 
rather than revolutionary—a politics responding to a ‘distinctive 
settler-state political theory’ that ‘usefully show[s] where existing liberal 
democratic theories, including those underpinning human rights 
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frameworks, “run out” and must be adapted to the particular circumstances 
of settler societies’ (Gover, 2015, p. 348). The Declaration shows how such 
adaptation is possible and why it contributes to an indigenous politics of 
liberal possibility and indigeneity. According to Anaya (2010):
the Declaration has a significant normative weight grounded in its 
high degree of legitimacy … a function not only of not only the fact 
that it has been formally endorsed by an overwhelming majority 
of UN Member States, but also the fact that it is the product of 
years of advocacy and struggle by indigenous peoples themselves 
… The norms of the Declaration substantially reflect indigenous 
peoples’ own aspirations, which after years of deliberation have 
come to be accepted by the international community. (para. 5)
Liberal Inclusivity
Rawls (1999) has argued that a complete ‘conception of justice’ is one 
that is ‘able to order all the claims that can arise’ (p. 115). However, 
it is often a self-serving desire to exclude based on the presumption of 
inherent superiority that encourages non-indigenous people to imagine 
that indigenous claims might affront what they are themselves owed in 
justice. For indigenous peoples, the state is an imposed institution of 
extraordinary coercive power. It is real, omnipresent and constraining. 
However, it is not fixed or constant in the functions it maintains nor in its 
distribution of power; it need not perpetually include or exclude the same 
people. Liberal theory can, but need not, assume that a majority is always 
and everywhere ‘more likely to be substantively right than a minority’ 
(Mansbridge, 1996, p. 57).
Liberal theory accepts that a decision is neither just nor efficacious simply 
because it is the majority position. The political process is not an end 
in itself, for its underlying values influence the fairness of its outcomes. 
The Declaration presumes that the state must include indigenous peoples 
who will, as a matter of course, influence the terms of their inclusion. 
Further, the Declaration recognises and affirms that:
indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all 
human rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous 
peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for 
their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples. 
(UN, 2007b, annex)
45
1 . THe DeCLARATIoN oN THe RIgHTS of INDIgeNoUS PeoPLeS
The Declaration assumes that liberal democracy can provide a political 
framework responsive to indigenous needs, rights and aspirations including, 
especially, a broad and comprehensive right to self-determination. From 
this perspective, the state need not be a ‘message of domination—an 
ideological artefact attributing unity, structure, and independence to 
the disunited, structureless and dependent workings of the practice of 
government’ (Abrams, 2006, p. 97). Instead, the state’s coercive capacity 
may be directed towards indigenous good. The state can sometimes rise 
above the constraints that popular prejudice might otherwise impose. For 
example, while there is deep-seated public prejudice against settlements 
for Crown breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and against the treaty’s 
policy influence, sustained leadership from both sides of the New Zealand 
Parliament has moderated this resistance.
In New Zealand today, it is unlikely that treaty settlements and guaranteed 
Maori seats in parliament would receive support in a popular vote. Similarly, 
Canada’s TRC, and Australia’s Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission’s National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, would not have 
occurred without the state confronting popular prejudice. However, these 
examples do not diminish the case for a more transformative politics to 
give postsettler states a secure and inclusive structure that recognises that 
indigenous peoples are entitled to occupy distinct political spaces within 
the liberal state. The claim of Indigenous Australians to a constitutionally 
guaranteed voice in the Australian Parliament is an example, as are claims 
in New Zealand for better protected independent institutions of Maori 
political authority. These are discussed in later chapters. In both cases, 
the possibility of success is enhanced if the proposals are shown as having 
a liberal justification and the potential to make democracy work better. 
However, as is also explored in later chapters, making democracy work 
better is not always an indigenous objective, and other kinds of political 
relationships may be understood as more consistent with the right to 
self-determination.
Nevertheless, the Declaration itself presumes that self-determination 
through differentiated liberal citizenship ought to be structured into 
domestic  political arrangements. This presumption has significant 
transformative potential. Juxtaposing liberal and indigenous political 
theories establishes differentiated citizenship as the source of a political 
language for thinking about and responding to indigenous claims. 
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The Declaration provides a comprehensive body of political principles to 
assist in the development and usefulness of that language—a standard of 
justice against which institutional arrangements can be measured.
The Declaration also provides a set of principles through which 
a postcolonial politics might recognise that ‘Our children should have the 
opportunity to live more Indigenous lives than we do’ (Alfred, as cited in 
Corntassel, 2012, p. 99). The purpose is to ensure that the indigenous 
affairs narrative is not one of victimhood, but one that promotes people 
living in self-defined equality and dignity. In this regard, the ‘hard issue’ 
the Declaration may help to address is ‘how to articulate local ideas 
of peoplehoods, on the one hand, with regional or nationwide ideas 
about citizenship, on the other’ (Bowen, 2000, p. 13). The Declaration 
addresses this issue by showing the depth of liberal democracy’s capacity 
for differentiated inclusion, thereby allowing the expression of civic 
rights and responsibilities in a culturally preferred manner. Its point of 
distinction is that it can acknowledge distinctive indigenous participation 
in public affairs without restricting the liberal rights of others.
The Declaration assists the politics of indigeneity to work out ways of 
creating ‘legitimate authorities—sovereignties—within and across spatial, 
temporal and discursive conditions that may be at odds with those 
that have  enabled modern state sovereignty’ (Shaw, 2008, p. 5). This 
means that the state alone is precluded from defining political agendas 
and entitlements. Instead, meaningful public sovereignty is inclusive, 
contestable and responsive to the geopolitically contextualised experiences 
of peoples who did not freely agree to the transfer of political authority 
to settler states. It is responsive to collective rights as constituents of 
personal liberty.
However, liberal democracy, as it prevails in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the US, can struggle to see relationships between collective 
rights and individual liberty—that is, between sociopolitical experience 
and personal freedom. Liberal democracies can also find it philosophically 
difficult to acknowledge culture’s place in shaping people’s experience of 
liberty: where, how and why liberty exists, and where, how and why it 
is constrained.
Liberal democracy may not easily admit that liberty makes sense only 
in cultural context and for culturally framed reasons. However, the 
Declaration’s liberalism is an inclusive one that positions the individual 
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as a bearer of substantive political rights and obligations in common 
with others. It places the individual in cultural context and gives effect to 
relationships between personal liberty and the cultural context in which 
liberty may be defined. Its purpose is to reconfigure the state to ensure 
that indigenous peoples are part of it, if they wish, and may influence its 
values, purpose and form.
The political objective is to transform the postsettler states in which 
indigenous peoples reside such that they lose their colonial character. 
The presumption is that all people have the right to participate in their 
government. The state ought not be perpetually the domain of non-
indigenous citizens, with indigenous citizens relegated to a less influential 
indigenous domain. The Declaration’s liberal potential is to ‘undercut 
government attempts to assert the moral high ground’ and presume 
‘coercive paternalism’ (Dorfmann, 2015, p. 13).
The Declaration provides the liberal political language for indigenous 
peoples to express their aspirations in ways that are recognisable by the 
state and consistent with international legal principles. In this way, the 
Declaration facilitates public reason as an expression of equal capacity for 
citizenship (discussed in further detail in Chapter 6). The Declaration’s 
liberalism—its assumption that liberty belongs to all and not just some 
people and that liberty is realised through both collective and individual 
human rights—is its distinguishing pragmatic value. By such means, it 
provides a conceptual and practical framework for developing a liberal 
theory of indigeneity in which indigenous people actively participate in 
determining the form and purpose of the state.
The Declaration codifies state obligations across policy domains. 
However, its most important contribution to domestic politics is that it 
brings philosophical certainty to the question of what it means for an 
indigenous person to belong to the nation-state. It seeks to ensure that 
power is distributed in ways that allow the state to become a site in which 
indigenous self-determination can substantively and systematically displace 
colonial political relationships. To achieve this, it sets out the attributes 
of indigenous political authority and its relationships with broader public 
sovereignty and shows the ways in which public sovereignty is not an 
unconstrained authority vested only in a non-indigenous government 
or Crown.
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The Declaration does not go so far as to prescribe Watson and Venne’s 
(2012) aspiration for a decolonised political order. It cannot override 
alternative political values, but it may challenge them. It may support 
Watson and Venne’s (2012) argument that:
For a real act of decolonization to occur we need to regain an 
Aboriginal centre – that is, an Aboriginal centre that engages in 
its own decolonization and repair from the effects of colonialism – 
and to enable that centre to occupy the spaces of political power, 
rather than let it become assimilated into colonial processes of 
power-sharing. (pp. 88–89)
As Corntassel (2012) argued, one must be careful not to accept the 
‘illusion of inclusion’ (p. 92) or complacently accept that the Declaration’s 
possibilities will be realised through state benevolence. Just as some policy 
actors overstate the capacity of New Zealand’s Treaty of Waitangi to 
prescribe processes and outcomes in all areas of public life (O’Sullivan, 
2007, 2008), there may be a propensity to expect more from the 
Declaration than its scope and content allow. It is important that people do 
not expect that the UN can ‘somehow “gift” rights to indigenous peoples’: 
while indigenous rights instead ‘inherently flow from customary rights’ 
(Beatty, 2014, p. 49), they must still be actively sought by indigenous 
peoples who must be clear about what they want and why.
The Declaration pays special attention to state obligations to indigenous 
citizens. However, it also allows indigenous peoples to make their own 
claims over and above the nation-state. It provides authoritative guidance 
to indigenous peoples on how rights might be asserted in both law 
and politics. Although recourse to international courts, tribunals and 
committees may not lead to legally binding rulings, their findings can 
lend  moral authority to arguments for certain claims to be accepted 
as rights.
The ‘interpretive standards’ (Trask, 2012, p. 334) that the Declaration 
provides can be used to develop legal arguments and to assist courts and 
other bodies to interpret instruments of binding effect. In bringing clarity 
and coherence to the international legal arrangements that indigenous 
peoples may use to conceptualise and assert their claims, these have the 
potential to transform the ways that relational justice and just terms of 
association are understood. It is also significant that, under the Declaration, 
indigenous peoples enjoy greater opportunity to have an act or omission 
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of the state declared a contravention of a fundamental right. For example, 
in 2016, the Australian Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act 2004 was 
amended to make specific reference to the Declaration:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples hold distinct cultural 
rights and must not be denied the right—
a. to maintain, control, protect and develop their—
i.  cultural heritage and distinctive spiritual 
practices, observances, beliefs and teachings; and
ii. languages and knowledge; and
iii. kinship ties; and
b.  to have their material and economic relationships with 
the land and waters and other resources with which 
they have a connection under traditional laws and 
customs recognised and valued.
Note: The primary source of the rights in [this section] is the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
art 25 and art 31. (s. 27[2])
Conversely, and significantly, the Human Rights Act confined its reference 
to just two of the Declaration’s articles whereas the full substance of the 
right to self-determination requires regard for the instrument as a whole. 
In Canada, this was the purpose of legislation, introduced but defeated in 
parliament, that would have required all Canadian federal legislation to be 
consistent with the Declaration (‘Bill C-262’, 2018 [Canada]). If passed, 
the legislation could have become a blueprint for the Declaration’s 
implementation, not just in Canada but also in jurisdictions like Australia, 
New Zealand and the US.
Conclusion
The Declaration is potentially transformative. While there remain 
both state  and indigenous objections to the principles it establishes 
(see Chapters 3 and 4), its drafting by indigenous peoples from all parts 
of the world gives it significant and distinctive political status. The 
Declaration positions indigenous peoples’ collective interests within 
international human rights discourses and challenges the nature of state 
sovereignty. Although it is a liberal document, it enunciates a different 
kind of liberal democracy to that used by postsettler states like Australia, 
Canada, the US and New Zealand to exclude indigenous peoples from 
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substantive and equal citizenship. The Declaration provides a framework 
for rethinking citizenship, democracy, self-determination and sovereignty. 
It supports, and is supported by, a liberal theory of indigeneity concerned 
with just terms of association and political relationships of indigenous 
agency. However, the Declaration is not a panacea for recognising the right 
to self-determination. It will not restore indigenous political authority to 
its precolonial form. Instead, it imagines meaningful indigenous political 
authority inside the state and beyond it in indigenous institutions 
operating for indigenous purposes and according to indigenous values.
As the following chapter argues, the Declaration enunciates 
self-determination as the foundational right from which all other 
indigenous rights proceed. Chapter 2 shows how self-determination, 
as normative politics, is a necessary outcome of reconciliation. 
It  also shows the significance of political trust to reconciliation and 







Self-determination presumes the spirit and substance of reconciliation; 
it supposes trust and political inclusivity. Reconciliation provides 
a  foundation for just terms of association. This foundation involves 
recognising injustice and taking steps to ensure that it does not recur. 
Reconciliation is neither simple nor uncontested. For some, it is a necessary 
condition for just political outcomes; for others, it is shallow symbolism; 
for others still, it does not propose measures of sufficient substance to 
transform political relationships in meaningful and far-reaching ways. 
For its proponents, reconciliation’s underlying presumption is that, if 
the truth is known, and the perpetrators of injustice acknowledge that 
truth, then societies may correct the consequences of injustice and accept 
a different kind of politics.
The Declaration may contribute to reconciliation by providing principles 
to inform a politics of respect including respect for self-determination 
as a right that belongs to all and not just some. Reconciliation requires 
relationships of trust, and it requires that indigenous people can find 
reasons to trust political institutions and systems. Relationships of trust 
are preliminary to the noncolonial political order that the Declaration 
seeks. These relationships require that indigenous peoples have the 
political capacity to influence the cultures, values and operations of 
public institutions to reflect their own priorities and ways of working. 
Reconciliation requires substantive indigenous inclusion, participation 
and meaningful leadership in the policy process.
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Treaties are potential instruments of trust, and their contemporary 
discussion in Australia may draw the relationship between reconciliation 
and self-determination into public discourse. Conversely, exclusive policy 
measures, such as the Intervention, along with discriminatory welfare and 
education policies, position indigenous peoples as opponents in an ‘us’ and 
‘them’ binary. Democratic exclusion is reconciliation’s powerful opposite; 
it is a philosophy of fundamental political inequality that entrenches 
mistrust and in turn prevents effective public policy. Reconciliation shows 
how democratic exclusion can be contested.
Reconciliation
For indigenous politics, reconciliation is the idea that state sorrow 
and atonement for transgressions of justice provide the foundation for 
working out new, just and durable terms of association. Reconciliation 
requires ‘awareness of the past, acknowledgement of the harm that has 
been inflicted, atonement for the causes, and action to change behaviour’ 
(TRC, 2015, pp. 6–7). Although it is acknowledged that ‘reconciliation 
will take some time’ to realise (p. vi), the Declaration provides guidance 
on what reconciliation should achieve for indigenous peoples:
States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and 
redress for:
a. Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of 
their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values 
or ethnic identities;
b. Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them 
of their lands, territories or resources;
c. Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim 
or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
d. Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
e. Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial 
or ethnic discrimination directed against them. (UN, 2007b, 
art. 8[2])
Corntassel depicted the process as one of ‘forgive and forget’ (2012, p. 92).
While reconciliation is not a matter of ‘shaming and pointing out 
wrongdoing’ (TRC, 2015, p. vi), forgiveness cannot logically involve 
forgetting. Instead, the TRC focused on ‘truth determination’ to ‘lay 
the  foundation for the important question of reconciliation’ (p. vi). 
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For the commission, the ‘important question’ centred on the Indian 
residential school system established by the state: ‘Now that we know 
about residential schools and their legacy, what do we do about it?’ (p. vi).
Reconciliation means that the ‘forgiven’ party commits to restitutive 
measures and to relational justice in future encounters. It cannot simply 
preserve or legitimise the ‘status quo’, as Corntassel (2012) feared—nor 
can it occur without reparation nor restitution. Reparation is owed:
[when] one infringes on [another’s] … right to pursue and possess 
what he values … [unfairly thwarts their] legitimate attempt to 
do or possess something … [or] makes it impossible for [them] 
to pursue a legitimate goal, even if [they] never actually attempt to 
achieve that goal. (Boxill, 1995, p. 110)
From this perspective, the only argument that can be raised against 
reparation is that the alleged transgression was, in fact, just.
It is premature to accept Wiessner’s (2008) argument that the Declaration 
is a ‘milestone of re-empowerment’ that may ‘reverse colonialism’ to make 
indigenous peoples ‘sovereign again, masters of their own fate’ (p. 1142). 
However, the Declaration is potentially an instrument of reconciliation 
and political clarity about self-determination and its possibilities 
(O’Sullivan, 2017). The TRC (2015) drew on the Declaration in its 
account of reconciliation, observing that:
[Reconciliation] requires that the paternalistic and racist 
foundations of the residential school system be rejected as the basis 
for an ongoing relationship … It also requires an understanding 
that the most harmful aspects of residential schools have been the 
loss of pride and self-respect of Aboriginal people, and the lack of 
respect that non-Aboriginal people have been raised to have for 
their Aboriginal neighbours … Virtually all aspects of Canadian 
society may need to be reconsidered. (p. vi)
The TRC was preceded by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
which proposed reconciliation as a policy aspiration. The royal commission 
‘opened people’s eyes and changed the conversation about the reality for 
the Aboriginal people in this country’ (TRC, 2015, p. 7).
Similar roles were played in Australia by the 1987–1991 Royal Commission 
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and 1995–1997 National Inquiry into 
the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their 
Families. Along with the 1992 Mabo and 1996 Wik Peoples v Queensland 
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decisions of the High Court of Australia (see O’Sullivan, 2005), they 
contributed to the emergence of the 1990s as a decade of significant 
transformation in Indigenous public policy. The inquiry into the removal 
of Indigenous children was distinctive because of its recommendation 
that state, territory and federal parliaments make apologies for the 
removals (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997). 
It focused public consciousness on Indigenous people’s place within the 
national political community. Having played a role in the removals, 
Christian churches were vocal in their support for reconciliation. For 
them, secular reconciliation flowed from the concept’s foundation in 
sacramental theology in which broken relationships between God and 
the penitent were corrected through sorrow, atonement and forgiveness, 
which was conditional on a demonstrated resolve to desist from further 
transgressions of justice. However, secular reconciliation’s momentum was 
not sustained beyond the 1990s (O’Sullivan, 2005).
There was, for example, ideological resistance to public sorrow so that, 
while each of the state parliaments accepted the royal commission’s 
recommendation to pass a motion of apology for the removals, the 
Commonwealth Parliament did not do the same until 2008. As Ian 
Anderson (2004) has argued, the Howard Government’s (1996–
2007) refusal to say ‘sorry’ reflected the wider contradictions of its 
indigenous policy:
Its disavowal of indigenous self-determination rested upon the 
denial of the ongoing existence of an indigenous polity. In part, 
this reflected an atomised understanding of society – indigenous 
people being preferably constructed as a population of individuals 
rather than socially organised, interconnected groups of families 
and clans. However, in setting indigenous health and social 
disadvantage as a policy priority, the neo-liberal state reconstituted 
the collectivity it sought to deny through the measurement of 
disadvantage and the development of institutional responses. 
(Ian Anderson, as cited in Mazel, 2016, p. 20)
The lesson for jurisdictions like Canada was that reconciliation requires 
a  strong and unbreakable connection between sorrow and policy 
outcomes—between rhetoric and substance. Reconciliation needs to make 
people’s lives better. It imagines significant political transformation, but it 
is a difficult and ongoing task grounded in relational justice. It is not clear 
or certain that one can ever say that society is forever ‘reconciled’. However, 
as Newhouse (2016) put it in relation to Canada, reconciliation requires 
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that ‘we will have to confront our history, our governance processes and 
our understandings of Indigenous peoples and their capacity to govern 
themselves’ (p. 2).
In Canada, the TRC recommended the establishment of an independent 
Reconciliation Council to report annually on policy consistency with 
reconciliation, providing a public record of the progress made towards 
implementing the commission’s 94 ‘calls to action’ to which the 
Canadian Government, led by Justin Trudeau (2015– ), had committed 
(Tasker,  2016). This commitment reflected a significant evolution in 
political thought from Pierre Trudeau’s first government (1968–1979), 
which had sought to develop federal relationships with indigenous 
nations. From a Métis perspective, these efforts were attempts to recognise 
‘special needs’ not ‘special rights’. In 2003, the Canadian Supreme Court 
overturned that philosophical premise by recognising the Métis as a ‘rights 
bearing people’ (Métis Nation, 2017, p. 2) with protections under the 
Canadian Constitution.
While significant, the Supreme Court’s decision remains distant from the 
Métis River Settlement’s aspiration in 1869 to be recognised as a separate 
province in the Canadian federation. This ‘dream for a self-governing 
Métis nation within the Canadian federation’ has ‘faded with time’, but it 
has ‘never died’ (Métis Nation, 2017, p. 1). In 2015, as part of its election 
promise, Trudeau’s Liberal Party of Canada observed that:
Canada must complete the unfinished work of Confederation by 
establishing a renewed Nation-to-Nation relationship with the 
Métis Nation, based on trust, respect and co-operation for mutual 
benefit. A Liberal government will work in partnership with the 
Métis Nation, on a Nation-to-Nation basis, to further Métis self-
government. (as cited in Métis Nation, 2017, p. 3)
Once in government, the Liberal Party affirmed its position, establishing 
a ‘Permanent Bilateral Mechanism’ with each of the First Nations, Inuit 
and Métis peoples. In 2017, the federal Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General, Jody Wilson-Raybauld, observed an important relationship 
between the Declaration and Canada’s reconciliation efforts, both of which 
required ‘a set of new laws, policies, institutions, structures and patterns of 
relationships that fit together and acknowledge and integrate Indigenous 
knowledge, perspectives and legal traditions’ (Wilson-Raybauld, 2017).
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In 2015, Justin Trudeau told the national Assembly of First Nations that:
It is time for a renewed nation-to-nation relationship with First 
Nations Peoples. 
One that understands that the constitutionally guaranteed rights 
of First Nations in Canada are not an inconvenience but rather a 
sacred obligation. (Trudeau, 2015, paras. 23–24)
Nation-to-nation relationships recognise indigeneity’s political 
distinctiveness. They establish nationhood—rather than race, ethnic 
minority status or relative material poverty—as differentiation’s purpose 
and justification. In response to Trudeau, the assembly’s national chief, 
Percy Bellegarde (as cited in Sweetgrass, 2015), remarked:
We are being heard and I believe understood like never before.
We are opening doors in Ottawa to facilitate the work of all First 
Nations, on the implementation and recognition of our rights and 
title, treaty enforcement and implementation, and realizing self-
determination for Indigenous Nations. (paras. 14–15)
Fitzgerald and Schwartz (2017) observed that Canada may indeed 
‘be  on a path toward reconciliation with Indigenous peoples’ (p. 1). 
If so, engagement with the Declaration represented ‘an opportunity 
to explore and reconceive the relationship between international law, 
indigenous peoples’ own laws and Canada’s constitutional narratives’ 
(p. 1). This engagement required a reappraisal of political relationships, 
such as the federal parliament’s retention of jurisdiction over ‘Indians and 
lands reserved for Indians’ (UN, 2014, p. 6). For example, indigenous 
jurisdiction  over social policy, especially the care and protection of 
children, competes with state assumptions of knowing better, state control 
of public budgets and the hegemonic value to the state of positioning 
indigenous peoples as deficient in the care and safety of their children. 
The Canadian Indian Act 1876, a powerful symbol of the ‘we know best’ 
position, remains an obstacle to reconciliation and thus self-determination 
(Wilson-Raybauld, 2017).
The Indian Act was intended to ‘civilise’ the indigenous populations. 
In 2014, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
recorded a series of human rights violations under the Act: ‘A rigidly 
paternalistic law at its inception, it continues to structure important 
aspects of Canada’s relationship with First Nations today, although efforts 
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at reform have slowly taken place’ (UN, 2014, p. 4). Referencing this 
paternalism, it is significant that the National Aboriginal Economic 
Development Board proposed that, in constructing nation-to-nation 
relationships, the Canadian Government refrain from a ‘we know best’ 
approach to policy development (Public Policy Forum, 2017).
Reconciliation’s ability to eliminate the marginal political status of 
indigenous people relies on substantive indigenous participation, yet the 
TRC (2015) only recommended ‘consultation’:
We call upon federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal 
governments to fully adopt and implement the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as the framework for 
reconciliation. (p. 325)
We call upon the Government of Canada to develop a national 
action plan, strategies, and other concrete measures to achieve the 
goals of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. (p. 325)
We call upon the Government of Canada, on behalf of all 
Canadians, to jointly develop with Aboriginal peoples a Royal 
Proclamation of Reconciliation to be issued by the Crown. The 
proclamation would build on the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
and the Treaty of Niagara of 1764, and reaffirm the nation-to-
nation relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. 
The  proclamation would include, but not be limited to, the 
following commitments:
i. Repudiate concepts used to justify European sovereignty 
over Indigenous lands and peoples such as the Doctrine of 
Discovery and terra nullius.
ii. Adopt and implement the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples as the framework for reconciliation.
iii. Renew or establish Treaty relationships based on principles of 
mutual recognition, mutual respect, and shared responsibility 
for maintaining those relationships into the future.
iv. Reconcile Aboriginal and Crown constitutional and legal 
orders to ensure that Aboriginal peoples are full partners in 
Confederation, including the recognition and integration 
of Indigenous laws and legal traditions in negotiation and 
implementation processes involving Treaties, land claims, 
and other constructive agreements. (p. 199)
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Reconciliation requires just terms of association in every field of public 
life. The commission was ‘convinced that [the Declaration] … provide[d] 
the necessary principles, norms, and standards for reconciliation to 
flourish in twenty-first-century Canada’ (TRC, 2015, p. 21). Further, the 
commission proposed that public institutions should operate in ways that 
are consistent with the Declaration, ‘which Canada has endorsed’ (p. 21).
Reconciliation is yet to do for Australia what the TRC urges for Canada—
that is, ‘inspire Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples to transform 
Canadian society … [to] live together in dignity, peace, and prosperity 
on these lands we now share’ (TRC, 2015, p. 8), which requires trust 
grounded in inclusive and respectful political relationships.
Trust and the Politics of Inclusion
As well as providing a foundation for just terms of association, 
reconciliation’s  purpose is to bring trust to political relationships. 
Procedural integrity is preliminary to just policy outcomes. Truth is 
important—not simply truth about the content of a given policy proposal 
but a deeper truth about the history that lies beneath political relationships. 
Reconciliation requires that parties accept the other’s legitimacy, its right 
to be present in the body politic in its own way and for purposes that 
might differ from one’s own.
Relationships of trust are difficult to achieve, though as determinants 
of a noncolonial political order, they are vitally important. As one non-
aboriginal witness to the TRC (2015) explained:
I really understand the reticence of some First Nations people 
about wanting to accept offers of friendship and possibilities of 
interaction. I understand why that is and I hope that in time we 
will be able to gain trust and some kind ways of interacting with 
one another that will be mutually beneficial. … I think we’re 
moving. … I think civil society, non-governmental organizations, 
church organizations, Aboriginal organizations are moving in the 
direction of openness … and I think we have a long way to go. 
(quotation is as it appears in the source, p. 308)
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Trust presumes substantive indigenous inclusion in decision-making. 
However, Canada is yet to develop processes to ensure that inclusion in 
national citizenship.
Citizenship and self-determination are not only bodies of rights but also 
the assurance of political capacity. For example, it is important to be 
present when decisions are made about the policy settings and budgetary 
allocations that influence self-determining opportunities. An indigenous 
presence in public institutions ‘indigenises’ the bureaucracy (Maaka & 
Fleras, 2009) by allowing indigenous people to participate at all levels 
of the policy process: from the executive to the legislative, and from the 
school to the police station. It allows indigenous people to be involved 
in setting, implementing and evaluating policy priorities. Indigenous 
presence reduces the political gap between decision-makers and those 
who experience those decisions when they engage with public institutions. 
Trust is an essential precursor to legitimacy.
The long history of indigenous mistrust of government has many 
explanatory variables—for example, the practice of approving development 
projects on indigenous lands against a community’s wishes. Beck’s (2016) 
comparison of the approaches to water management consultation of the 
governments of Alberta and the Northwest Territories in the Mackenzie 
River Basin highlighted the differences between Alberta’s minimalist 
approach to engagement and the Northwest Territories’ more participatory 
approach, and emphasised the ‘important implications for moving [free, 
prior and informed consent to development] from an international norm 
to a domestic template for action in Canada’ (p. 487). Beck’s study serves 
as an example of von der Porten, Lepofsky, McGregor and Silver’s (2016) 
claim that, in Canada:
The time of Indigenous ‘inclusion’ into state-led marine policy 
making is ending. Indigenous peoples are increasingly asserting their 
rights to primary roles in policy- and decision-making that affect the 
traditional homelands, freshwater bodies and oceans. (p. 68)
Participation implies serious and secure opportunities for indigenous 
peoples to influence the outcome of negotiations and supports 
reconciliation by providing reasons for trust.
Creating reasons for trust motivates contemporary Australian debates 
about treaties and an Indigenous voice to parliament. In 2019, the 
Victorian and Northern Territory governments engaged in treaty 
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negotiations with Indigenous nations, and the New South Wales 
Opposition (the Labor Party) indicated that it would do the same if it was 
able to form government after that state’s next election.1
One would expect such treaties to recognise prior Indigenous occupancy 
of Australia and to accept that this provides grounds for at least some 
degree of Indigenous intranational self-determination. In return, the 
state may expect recognition of its own legitimacy. The question for the 
Indigenous nations is whether and to what extent this is reasonable, and, 
if it is not reasonable, the points on which the state should concede to 
create moral legitimacy. Part of the difficulty is that there is no precedent 
for a treaty or treaties in Australia. Canada’s modern treaties and New 
Zealand’s Treaty of Waitangi were signed in such different contexts that 
the guidance they could provide may be limited.
Modern Canadian treaties are settlements of land claims not otherwise 
able to be settled. In 2014, 24 modern treaties affecting 95 indigenous 
communities and 40 per cent of the Canadian landmass were in place 
(UN, 2014). However, according to the UN special rapporteur, the 
conclusion of land settlement agreements appeared to have occurred in 
a confrontational context in which the government perceived ‘the overall 
interests of Canadians as adverse to aboriginal interests, rather than 
encompassing them’ (UN, 2014, p. 16).
Whereas in New Zealand the Treaty of Waitangi was signed before 
colonisation commenced, the Australian treaties are proposed more than 
200 years after the event. Treaty policy is well developed in New Zealand 
but not fully settled. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (2007) suggested that New Zealand ‘continue the public 
discussion over the status of the Treaty of Waitangi, with a view to its 
entrenchment as a constitutional norm’ (para. 13).
In 2017, the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council argued that 
a treaty was needed to ‘codify and provide certainty about the relationship 
between the State Government and Aboriginal peoples’ (para. 4). 
The council expected such a treaty to support ‘five key goals – protecting 
our culture and heritage, pursuing our full Land and Water rights, driving 
economic independence and prosperity, supporting our peoples and 
1  At the 2019 state election, the Liberal and National Party coalition government was returned 
and had no stated interest in pursuing treaties.
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securing our future’ (New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council, 2017, 
para. 8). While in Australia, official interest in addressing disadvantage has 
strengthened since the Howard Government’s defeat in 2007, this interest 
has been principally one of egalitarian justice rather than substantive 
self-determination justifying any redistribution of political authority, 
such as that which a treaty might secure.
Any trust generated from these egalitarian concerns is inevitably 
compromised by Australia’s otherwise poor record of achievement 
and inattention to the recognition of meaningful indigenous political 
authority. In 2017, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues could 
cite only three instances of policy success from the Council of Australian 
Governments’ Closing the Gap in Indigenous Disadvantage policy:2 
a decline in child mortality rates, an increase in final year secondary school 
completion rates and a reduction in mortality from chronic diseases 
(UN, 2017a, p. 2).
The requirement that the prime minister report annually to parliament on 
progress towards Closing the Gap policy targets ensures that there is at least 
scope for public accountability, which the UN special rapporteur argued 
ought to be complemented by a systematic process for Indigenous people 
themselves to monitor progress (UN, 2017b). In 2018, this principle 
was recognised in a small though potentially significant way with the 
appointment of the first Indigenous Commissioner to the Productivity 
Commission. The commissioner’s duty is to lead Indigenous evaluations 
of Closing the Gap. Indigenous-led policy evaluation may help to close 
the relational gap between Indigenous peoples and the policy process. 
It may also help to raise Indigenous trust and confidence in the intent of 
public policy.
Closing the gap in political disadvantage is also important. Calls for 
a constitutionally guaranteed Indigenous voice to the national parliament 
reflect the argument that democratic institutions ought to hold indigenous 
peoples’ confidence. Trust and confidence cannot be assured unless it is 
apparent to indigenous peoples that their values have the capacity to 
2  Closing the Gap is a policy measure of the Council of Australian Governments. It aims to 
close statistically measurable gaps in Indigenous disadvantage in areas such as health and education. 
It has been largely unsuccessful and critiqued for not sufficiently including Indigenous people and 
perspectives in its development. Governments have, in part, tried to address these critiques. The 
policy contrasts with the more holistic and inclusive approach to disadvantage in civil society’s Close 
the Gap policy approach; see O’Sullivan (2015) for an account of the distinctions between the two.
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influence and that their citizenship is meaningful. This contrasts markedly 
with the approach taken by the Howard Government in 2007, which 
explicitly excluded Indigenous consultation in drafting the Intervention. 
The Intervention used the military to ‘restore order’ after an official report 
identified high levels of child sexual abuse across Indigenous communities 
in the Northern Territory (Northern Territory Government, 2007). 
Its stated purpose was to address a ‘crisis of community dysfunction’ 
(Explanatory Memorandum, Northern Territory Emergency Response 
Bill 2007 [Cth], pt. 8 para. 14) and human rights obligations in respect 
of child safety.
The sense of injustice that the Intervention raised among many Indigenous 
people was grounded in the long history of public indifference towards the 
sexual violation of Indigenous women by white men. In its review of this 
history, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 
demonstrated the striking hypocrisy of the Intervention for Indigenous 
people whose:
removal as children and the abuse they experienced at the hands 
of the authorities or their delegates have permanently scarred 
their lives. The harm continues in later generations, affecting their 
children and grandchildren. (p. 4)
The Intervention required suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth), which meant that:
Persons subject to the Northern Territory Intervention are 
prevented from challenging, on the basis of racial discrimination, 
its measures through existing domestic law and are prevented from 
seeking any remedy. (Merkel, Newhouse & Schokman, 2009, 
para. 266)
Significantly, there were no Indigenous members of the Australian House 
of Representatives at the time the legislation was passed. In setting 
aside self-determination’s essential presumptions—that is, ‘the rights 
to freedom from discrimination and participation in decision-making’ 
(Cowan, 2013, p. 280)—the power of democratic exclusion was clear.
Differentiated liberal citizenship may have prevented the Intervention 
by preventing the states’ presumption of absolute power. Instead, the 
Intervention further diminished Indigenous citizenship. For example, 
welfare payments were sequestered and the Intervention became the 
catalyst for the trial of a cashless welfare card in the Northern Territory and 
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other largely Indigenous parts of Australia. Under the trial, a proportion 
of a beneficiary’s payment from the state was placed on to a bank card that 
could not be used to purchase alcohol or tobacco. In this way, some but not 
all citizens’ capacity to make their own spending decisions was removed. 
The racial make-up of a community was the criterion for inclusion in 
the trial.
The cashless welfare card trial showed that an obstacle to Indigenous 
policy development was the quality, and sometimes even the presence, 
of valid evaluative data. For example, a government report proclaiming 
the trial’s success was not independent and appeared to have been written 
to support a predetermined outcome. Clarke (as cited in Davey, 2017) 
explained that:
Surprisingly there is no use of statistical methods to test the 
significance of any observable trends, so it’s hard to know what can 
be concluded even on a descriptive level … Given the issues with 
the design, it is difficult to see how they will have evidence of the 
program’s impact on which to base an informed policy decision. 
(para. 27)
Despite extensive community consultation during the scheme’s 
development and review, the then Minister for Human Services overstated 
the case in claiming consultation as ‘an element likely contributing to 
its early success’ (Tudge, as cited in Davey, 2017, para. 32). Indigenous 
opinion was divided. However, consensus on future policy proposals is 
more likely to emerge if all concerned have access to the same robust and 
reliable evaluative data, and time and space to deliberate. The appointment 
of the Indigenous Productivity Commissioner is a step in that direction.
Mistrust and Policy Racism
The UN special rapporteur has described the legacy of Indigenous 
Australian marginalisation as a subtle form of racism (UN, 2017b). The 
failure to recognise the historical and ongoing significance of this legacy 
has had a compounding effect. In this context, the Intervention was 
not only an explicit defence of racial discrimination and justification of 
political inequality but also helped to explain why some Aboriginal people 
feel that they ‘are born with one foot in the grave’ (Axelby & Wanganeen, 
2017, para. 10).
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One cannot reduce sexual, drug and alcohol abuse, violence and/or parental 
neglect to a unidimensional explanation grounded in individual moral 
weakness (Collingwood-Whittick, 2012). Nor is it useful to examine more 
complex and multifaceted explanations unless they add to what is already 
known about likely solutions. Especially as indigenous mistrust of the 
state obstructs effective policymaking, the key is to identify institutional 
arrangements and values that lend themselves to the implementation 
of known solutions. As Canada’s TRC and Australia’s Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their 
Families show, schools, hospitals and welfare agencies have been used 
systematically and deliberately to undermine indigenous societies. This 
history continues to interfere with the development of indigenous respect 
for the state and confidence in the honour of its intentions. Given this 
context, the UN special rapporteur recommended that Australia’s Closing 
the Gap policy targets be extended to include reductions in the rates of 
imprisonment, child removal and violence against women (UN, 2017b). 
He had earlier expressed the view that Aboriginal peoples’ concerns 
merited ‘higher priority at all levels and within all branches of government’ 
(UN, 2014, p. 20).
Mistrust contributes to poor outcomes in education and health. 
In  Australia, Indigenous people discharge themselves from hospital 
against medical advice at 13 times the rate of other citizens (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2009) and many Indigenous children 
find school unsatisfactory—mistrust helps to explain why. Lee, Fasoli, 
Ford, Stephenson and McInerne (2014) explained that ‘We should not 
be surprised if even very young children find school learning programs so 
unrewarding they sometimes decide to stay away’ (p. 231).
Mistrust arises from decisions like the one to reduce bilingual schooling 
in the Northern Territory in 2008. The policy was in response to poor 
results in national school assessments. Blame was apportioned to the 
children themselves and to the bilingual nature of their schooling, yet 
there were (and are) remote schools in the Northern Territory that 
did not have a resident teacher (Lee et al., 2014). It is likely that the 
decision to reduce bilingual schooling was ideologically inspired, as only 
20 per cent of the Northern Territory’s children were schooled in bilingual 
programs. Further variables contributing to low achievement were not 
properly considered, nor was the Australian state’s proper contribution 
to indigenous language retention as a matter of relational justice brought 
into account (Lee et al., 2014). This oversight was especially striking in 
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light of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues’s proposal for an 
International Year of Indigenous Languages to draw political attention to 
language preservation and revitalisation as a matter of urgency for many 
indigenous peoples (Pop Ac, 2017).
It is inaccurate for school pedagogies to presume that English is the 
indigenous child’s first or dominant language. Standard English is not 
the principal means of communication for most Indigenous children in 
the Northern Territory, and English needs to be taught as an additional 
language (Lee et al., 2014). Although standard English is a prerequisite 
for entry into the middle class, in which access to political authority 
disproportionately lies, it cannot, efficaciously, be the school system’s only 
language. Nor, as a matter of justice, can it alone define the knowledge 
that the system legitimises. According to Devlin (2009), ‘there is a deeper 
meaning’ to bilingual schooling, as:
a tool for survival in a fast changing, often confusing world. It can 
open up new, inspiring perspectives as learners from one culture 
come to grips with the metaphors, the core concepts, the key 
insights, the poetry, the art and music of the other culture. (p. 3)
Language is the means through which culture is expressed and developed, 
and the means through which relationships and environments are 
understood. Languages are basic rights of humanity. The undermining of 
indigenous languages by the state is a routine colonial strategy.
Signalling institutional racism, Lee et al. (2014) observed that, in Australia, 
teacher training programs are not responsive to the linguistic context 
of classrooms that require Indigenous children to learn in a language 
in which they are not proficient. They argue that Indigenous children 
are not presented with the same opportunity to learn as non-native 
English-speaking migrant children for whom additional English language 
instruction is available, yet the Declaration requires that schooling give all 
citizens equal opportunity. Citizenship requires that school systems aim 
to give all school leavers the capacity for social participation.
In Australia, Year 12 completion rates are improving (Belot & Laurence, 
2017). Closing the gap in Year 12 completion rates is arguably the most 
important of the seven Closing the Gap targets, as failure against all 
others is ultimately a function of poor education; yet, and often explicitly, 
educational success has not been the system’s aspiration for indigenous 
peoples. Schooling for indigenous peoples exists in a political and cultural 
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context that distinguishes it from schooling for other citizens. Public 
schooling’s role in the usurpation of indigenous political authority and its 
cooption by the state as a coercive force in the assimilation of indigenous 
peoples gives it a morally, as well as politically, important contemporary 
role in reconciliation by contributing to the restoration and maintenance 
of self-determination.
Self-determination requires that public schools adopt a ‘culturally 
sustaining pedagogy’ (McCarty & Lee, 2014, p. 101). This has particular 
relevance in the US, where almost 90 per cent of Native American children 
attend public schools despite the existence of private charter schools 
(McCarty & Lee, 2014). Although their success is mixed, American 
charter schools are intended to support indigenous peoples’ authority to 
make decisions about their children’s education (McCarty & Lee, 2014). 
This philosophical presumption, which is absent in the Australian system, 
might help to increase indigenous people’s trust and confidence in the 
education system as one that exists for them as much as for anyone else.
The Native American Community Academy in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, is more successful than public schools in terms of student 
retention and achievement (McCarty & Lee, 2014). It has a curriculum 
based on ‘respect, responsibility, community/service, culture, perseverance 
and reflection’ (McCarty & Lee, 2014, p. 108). The school privileges 
relationships in ways that are not possible in mainstream public schools. 
As one teacher explained to McCarty and Lee (2014):
The relationship that we’re gonna have in this classroom—I’m 
gonna treat you like one of my nieces or nephews, so that it does 
not end once we are out of this class. It does not end once you’ve 
graduated from [Native American Community Academy]. (p. 109)
Relationships within schools, and between schools and their communities, 
are important determinants of scholastic achievement (Bishop et al., 
2010). Schooling ought to enhance and secure cultural identity. It should 
also help to increase indigenous access to the middle class, for that is 
where economic security and the capacity to deliberate in public affairs 
is disproportionately found. Effective schooling is also important for 
realising the demographic dividends that indigenous population structures 
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US allow.
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Demographic dividends are the opportunities that arise from a youthful 
population structure. As Jackson (2011) explained, the differential in Maori 
educational attainment may decline ‘simply because’ a disproportionate 
number of Maori are of an age at which qualifications are most likely to 
be completed. The median age of Maori is 15 years lower than the median 
age for non-Maori people. Maori aged 15–24 years comprise 31 per cent 
of the Maori working age population (Jackson, 2011), which, on its own, 
ought to contribute to a reduction in the income differential as this cohort’s 
income rises with age and experience. At the same time, participation rates 
for secondary schooling and university enrolments among Maori have 
increased. Between 2008 and 2017, the rate of university enrolment for 
Maori increased by 16 per cent, and postgraduate enrolments for Maori 
increased by 19 per cent (Universities New Zealand, 2018). Contributing 
factors included an increase in the number of Maori attaining the required 
school level qualifications for entry to university, the Maori age structure 
and increasing financial support from iwi (tribes) to their members.
Almost half the indigenous Canadian population is under the age of 
25 years. This creates opportunities of the kind and scope that Jackson 
(2011) imagined for New Zealand, in which ‘the importance of recognising 
and proactively investing in the dividend years for Maori … to transform 
them to economic windfalls cannot be overemphasised’ (p. 70). Similarly, 
from 1991 to 2016 in Australia, the number of Indigenous university 
graduates increased from fewer than 4,000 to 30,000 (Grant,  2016), 
creating scope for a significant demographic dividend. However, 
demographic dividends do not always extend to economic dividends 
(Jackson, 2011). This requires deliberate policy measures and systematic 
indigenous-led policymaking to eliminate mistrust as an obstacle to 
effective education, for example, and which an Indigenous voice to 
parliament would facilitate. Indigenous-led policy evaluation to inform 
policy development is similarly important and is the outcome that the 
appointment of an Indigenous Productivity Commissioner is intended 
to facilitate.
As the UN special rapporteur has recommended, policy processes ought to 
‘value and prioritise the [policy] leadership of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people’ (UN, 2017b, Closing the Gap and health, para. 4). This is 
fundamental to the trust that reconciliation requires and is an example of 
the participation in public affairs that self-determination requires.
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Conclusion
The Declaration ‘offers a positive framework for state-indigenous 
relations, but much more theoretical and political work remains’ (Maciel, 
2014, p. 39). This book’s purpose is to contribute to a theoretical account 
of what the Declaration might mean for the conduct of contemporary 
indigenous–state relations and for securing indigenous belonging to the 
state. Reconciliation, trust and inclusivity are essential to that discussion. 
As it is for the Declaration itself, reconciliation’s ultimate test is its capacity 
to contribute to a democratic form that raises indigenous quality of life 
and political authority.
For reconciliation to occur, indigenous people must find reason to accept 
that the postsettler state is at least capable of legitimacy. Equally, the act of 
reconciliation must be of sufficient substance to make the state worthy 
of trust—for without trust, self-determination is impossible.
Trust may follow if the Declaration is engaged to show how indigenous 
rights are not just acceptable in liberal theory but also required. In this 
regard, the Declaration’s overarching potential is to rationalise a liberal 
theory of indigeneity that may, for some indigenous peoples, give moral 
integrity to the modern state. However, trust is difficult partly because 
state acceptance of the Declaration by Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the US is reluctant and conditional.
The following chapter discusses Australian, Canadian, New Zealand 
and US perspectives on the Declaration; their shifts from opposition to 
acceptance of its value as an ‘aspirational’ document; and liberal theory’s 
capacity to support both indigenous inclusion and exclusion.
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3
The Declaration and the 
Postsettler Liberal State: 
Perspectives from Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada 
and the United States
Introduction
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US have politically assertive 
and well-organised indigenous minority populations. In each case, their 
votes against the Declaration strengthened indigenous mistrust of the 
state. These countries objected to the Declaration on the grounds that 
it could threaten the territorial integrity of the state and undermine 
liberal democratic values. The latter objection contrasts with indigenous 
reservations, raised in Chapter 4, that the Declaration would impose 
universal liberal values on societies that were not liberal and that sought 
to retain their own political systems. This chapter responds to the first 
set of objections and shows that, in the end, its acceptance by the four 
states was not so much a change of position but a ‘reading down’ of its 
contents to make it more consistent with their prevailing laws, practices 
and institutional arrangements (Gover, 2015). Presenting an indigenous 
view of this acquiescence, Astenhaienton (as cited in Holder & Corntassel, 
2002) observed that ‘It’s easy for us [indigenous peoples] to agree. The 
hard part is to get governments to see the Declaration as necessary and 
not so threatening’ (p. 141). Therefore, Wiessner (2008), who described 
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the Declaration as a ‘milestone of re-empowerment’ (p. 1142), may have 
overstated the case in suggesting that the international community had, 
in substantive terms, arrived at a consensus on the Declaration (p. 1141).
Beyond the state, some liberals objected to the Declaration’s presumption 
that it is sometimes just to treat people differently, yet as this chapter 
demonstrates, these objections reflect but one strand of liberal possibility 
and do not foreclose all others. The Declaration, in fact, gives indigenous 
aspirations the political support that comes from being able to express ideas 
in liberal terms in the prevailing language of international human rights.
The Declaration also affirms legal pluralism in the ways that disputes 
between indigenous nations and the state are resolved. Pluralism is 
a liberal principle that helps to make state systems of law and politics work 
more fairly and inclusively; it responds to self-determination’s relative and 
relational character. However, the Declaration remains a controversial 
instrument, and significant objections remain from both indigenous and 
state perspectives. This chapter sets out and responds to state objections, 
and the following chapter considers indigenous arguments and shows 
how these arguments are responses to indigenous mistrust of the state.
The Declaration and the State
Fears that the Declaration would disrupt the territorial integrity of existing 
states arose from the draft document’s definition of self-determination 
as the right of indigenous peoples to ‘freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ 
(UN, 2007b, annex). Explaining such fears, Kingsbury (1992) proposed 
that existing state indigenous policy objectives reflected a conflict 
between the values of justice and order. National integrity grounded in 
homogeneity is simple and orderly: it ensures that majority populations 
retain control of the political community. However, this kind of order 
conflicts with justice because ‘legitimacy is a function of the norm-creating 
process and of fairness and efficacy in implementation’ (Kingsbury, 1992, 
p. 493). In fact, and in contrast, order is also preserved by the limits 
that the Declaration places on self-determination’s scope. For example, 
it cannot be ‘construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent States’ (UN, 2007b, 
71
3 . THe DeCLARATIoN AND THe PoSTSeTTLeR LIbeRAL STATe
art. 46[1]). Thus, the Declaration does not threaten territorial integrity, 
but in other respects it presents a powerful challenge to state conceptions 
of order.
This book’s argument is that justice requires distinctive and secure 
indigenous shares in public sovereignty. This aspiration is expressed in 
the Declaration in liberal democratic language; yet according to Carroll 
(2012), under the Declaration, ‘the perceived place of indigenous nations 
continues to be below that of the states in which they reside’ (p. 144). 
As an instrument of the UN, the Declaration focuses on the obligations 
of the state. Its foundational positions are not the political capacities of 
indigenous peoples. Its value lies in the constraints it places on state power 
and its assumption that indigenous people have the right to participate in 
public affairs and to maintain independent political authority.
Canada argued that the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 
which drafted the Declaration, was unnecessary because existing laws and 
agreements met the just and reasonable rights of indigenous Canadians 
(Thompson, 2017). Canada found the Declaration ‘too sweeping and 
open-ended’ (Coates & Holroyd, 2014, p. 7):
Canada does not want to see the traditional concept of self-
determination used to attack the territorial integrity of a sovereign, 
non-colonial state. Since Canada is such a state, it does not agree 
that the concept of self-determination is applicable to Indigenous 
populations within Canada. (Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, as cited in Thompson, 2017, p. 30)
Positioning Canada as a ‘non-colonial’ state is not consistent with 
indigenous experience. Nor is it consistent with Gover’s (2015) 
explanation of Canada’s, Australia’s, New Zealand’s and the US’s attempts 
to legitimise the postsettler state. These countries sought legitimacy by 
giving an assimilationist interpretation to ‘the rule of law, principles of 
neutrality, equality and non-discrimination’ (p. 346).
New Zealand argued that the Declaration was inconsistent with the Treaty 
of Waitangi and undermined the individual rights of universal citizenship. 
No evidence has emerged to support this view, nor have authoritative 
Maori arguments been raised to suggest any inconsistency between the 
Declaration and the treaty. The problem, Gover (2015) argued, is that 
negotiated political settlements, such as New Zealand’s treaty settlements, 
are well advanced and sanctioned in domestic law. It was feared that the 
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intrusions of international law could undermine these arrangements 
and prevailing political relationships, which New Zealand believed were 
working well:
to accede to some expressions of indigenous ‘rights’ in international 
law, even when domestic agreements give effect to norms that are 
consistent with such rights, because of the possibility that these 
rights could disrupt or undermine local bargains, allow non-
discrimination principles to be used to challenge settled claims, 
empower settler judiciaries to enforce or refer to those rights at the 
expense of domestic executive prerogatives and obligations and, in 
so doing, perhaps bring the discursive processes of bargaining to 
a premature close. (Gover, 2015, p. 347)
In Australia, Indigenous rights have traditionally been peripheral to 
mainstream politics. The Declaration was adopted at a time when 
Indigenous policy reflected the assimilationist presumptions and rhetoric 
of the outgoing Howard Government (1996–2007). The Liberal Party’s 
1988 election campaign theme song encapsulated this rhetoric: ‘Son 
you’re Australian; that’s enough for anyone to be’ (Brett, 2005, p. 25). 
The idea that there might be subnational units of identity undermined the 
government’s view of equality grounded in sameness. The Declaration’s 
affirmation of indigenous groups as ‘peoples’ who were capable of 
nationhood challenged this deeply held view.
Australia argued that self-determination ‘is not a right that attaches 
to an undefined subgroup of a population seeking to obtain political 
independence’ (as cited in Gover, 2015, p. 367). Canada argued that 
the right to self-determination should be exercised through ‘negotiations 
between states’ and the various indigenous peoples within those states 
as a  ‘necessary component of exercising the right of self-determination’ 
(as cited in Gover, 2015, p. 367). Both countries believed that indigenous 
rights were not inherent but were the subject of political negotiation. 
Rather than self-determination, it was ‘the prospective liberalism of human 
rights and the constitutive liberalism of state-indigenous bargaining 
that could be made to co-exist in the text of [the Declaration]’ (Gover, 
2015, p. 361). Recognising indigenous rights relies on recognition that 
sovereignty is shared.
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The US argued that, rather than refer to ‘indigenous peoples’, the 
Declaration ought to address the rights of ‘persons belonging to indigenous 
groups’ (as cited in Gover, 2015, p. 365). Like the other objecting states, 
its position was that:
We strongly support the full participation of indigenous people 
in democratic decision-making processes but cannot accept the 
notion of a sub-national group having a ‘veto’ power over the 
legislative process. (as cited in Carroll, 2012, p. 144).
The idea that the Declaration provided a veto over certain policy decisions 
was shared among the four states. The veto power was read into the 
requirement that development activities on indigenous lands require 
indigenous consent (UN, 2007b, art. 10). Such power was also read into 
Article 26 of the Declaration, which attracted special objection because 
of its commitment to the indigenous right to ‘the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise 
used or acquired’ (UN, 2007b). Where this aspiration could not be met, 
the article provided for compensation by way of ‘lands, territories and 
reserves equal in quality, size and legal status’ (art. 28[2]). The problem, 
as the US explained, was that ‘almost the entirety of the United States was 
once owned, occupied or used by American Indians, Alaska Natives and 
Hawaiian Natives or within the ambit of the phrase’ (as cited in Gover, 
2015, p. 321). Therefore:
[The US could not] agree with a blanket statement that all existing 
legal rights of others to lands ‘traditionally occupied’ by indigenous 
persons at some much earlier time should in all cases be set aside 
regardless of the circumstances. (as cited in Gover, 2015, p. 371)
The four opposing states were concerned that the Declaration would 
require them to return land that was already alienated and transferred 
to private interests and that this would undermine social cohesion and 
public support for the principle of negotiated settlements.
Canada’s position was that the Declaration ‘might not fully accord 
with the norms and precedents that have been established through 
judicial decisions and negotiations on land claims and self-government’ 
(Canadian Human Rights Commission, as cited in Boyer, 2014, p. 12). 
However, the Declaration’s focus is broad. Although it implies an 
unavoidable relationship between rights and policy outcomes, as Coates 
and Holroyd (2014) asserted, judicial interpretations do not suggest that 
the Declaration will have constitutionally disruptive effects:
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While those indigenous political thinkers and leader [sic] who 
argue for full Aboriginal sovereignty have found new strength in 
the UNDRIP, it is not likely to upset or redefine the law of the 
land. (p. 9)
This is partly because, in a liberal democracy, there is no such thing as 
‘full sovereignty’. Public sovereignty is widely dispersed and constrained by 
its relative and relational character. Sovereignty is constantly reconfigured 
and reshaped.
New Zealand and Canada feared that the Declaration would give 
indigenous individuals preferential access to education (Gover, 2015). 
However, rights to language and culture, which are essential constituents 
of education, only make sense as group rights—one cannot speak to 
oneself. Indigenous rights are distinctive because human rights can only be 
exercised in context. Prior occupancy and (usually violent) displacement 
contribute to that context, which is why Schulte-Tenckhoff (2012) is 
wrong to have argued that the:
culturalization of indigenous rights … stresses cultural identity 
and distinctiveness over historical and legal-political aspects, 
such as the effects of colonialism [such that] the recognition of 
cultural rights comes at the price of the right of self-determination 
understood as a group right. (p. 67)
Culture is a group right; it is also a political right—a right that provides 
all others with their source and context.
The four UN member states who voted against the Declaration were also 
concerned that the recognition of collective land rights ‘could constitute 
racial discrimination against non-indigenous persons’ (Gover, 2015, 
p. 369). Their objections were not to collective rights per se but that these 
rights may carry benefits not available to other citizens (Gover, 2015). 
However, indigeneity is not concerned with rights or privileges over 
other citizens. Instead, it differentiates rights to make them contextually 
relevant. Rights to indigenous languages, cultures and resources carry 
no meaning for other people. Indigeneity means that indigenous rights 
belong in a distinctive form. The relationship between land and religious 
freedom is an example of that distinctiveness.
Land’s spiritual dimension occurs alongside its economic purpose. 
The two purposes are not ordinarily in conflict for indigenous peoples. 
Conflicts over rights emerge when state policies privilege the economic 
development of non-indigenous commercial interests over the spiritual 
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interests of an indigenous population. In such cases, the bounds of liberal 
toleration are put to the test and resolving the disagreement can be a mark 
of society’s acceptance of religious freedom.
There is also a relationship between participation in environmental 
decision-making and opportunities for good health, which Black 
and McBean (2016) argued creates a case for ‘the decolonization of 
environmental decision making’ (p. 1). There is a well-understood causal 
relationship between ‘socio-economic and environmental decisions’ 
(p.1), and indigenous knowledge in environmental protection can have 
important policy significance. In this sense, indigenous participation is 
a ‘need’ as much as it is a ‘right’ (p. 1).
‘Soft’ Law
Ultimately, the Declaration was acceptable to the dissenting states as 
an instrument of ‘soft’ law—as a document that would not disrupt the 
territorial integrity of the state. However, ‘soft’ law can ‘harden’ (Villeneuve, 
2016). It may be incorporated into domestic legislation and influence 
judicial interpretations of existing law. It can also influence the form and 
context of subsequent binding instruments. For example, the Canadian 
Federal Court has found the Declaration a persuasive instrument (Boyer, 
2014, p. 13). International law can then ‘substantiate’ traditional rights 
(Gupta, Hildering & Misiedjan, 2014, p. 26).
According to Gover (2015), the Declaration is not ‘a suitable basis for the 
development of a binding treaty or of rules of customary international 
law’ (p. 355). In light of this, in 2016, Australia’s position was that:
Some principles in [the Declaration] remain unsettled in 
international law, particularly those relating to self-determination 
and free, prior and informed consent. Consistent with the principles 
of [the Declaration] … Australia recognises the importance of 
engaging in good faith consultation with Indigenous peoples in 
relation to decisions that affect them. Australia argues that free, 
prior and informed consent does not include a right of veto. 
(Charge D’Affaires, Australian Permanent Mission, 2016, p. 1)
Canada reversed its initial opposition to the Declaration because it 
came to interpret the document as a ‘non-legally binding [one] that 
does not reflect customary international law nor change Canadian 
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laws’ (Canadian  Human Rights Commission, as cited in Cultural 
Survival, n.d., para. 6). One might suggest, then, that Ottawa’s initial 
fears ‘were overblown’ (Thompson, 2017, p. 33) and that the country’s 
refusal to support the Declaration was ‘incongruous’ with its previous 
policy positions (Belanger, 2010, p. 7). New Zealand’s stance was 
similarly inconsistent with its gradual developments towards Maori self-
determination, at least since the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (NZ), which 
established the Waitangi Tribunal as a judicial body to hear allegations of 
Crown breaches of the treaty. In the Canadian and New Zealand cases, 
it is important to acknowledge that their objections to the Declaration, 
followed by their conditional support, ‘does not negate [their] former 
[and subsequent] recognition of Indigenous rights’ (Belanger, 2010, p. 7).
The US agreed that the Declaration was nonbinding yet continued to 
view it as a ‘moral and political force’ (as cited in Gover, 2015, p. 55). 
The US’s revised position reflected its:
commitment to work with tribes, individuals, and communities 
to address the many challenges they face. The United States 
aspires to improve relations with indigenous peoples by looking 
to the principles embodied in the Declaration in its dealings with 
federally recognised tribes, while also working, as appropriate, with 
all indigenous individuals and communities in the United States.
Moreover, the United States is committed to serving as a model 
in the international community in promoting and protecting the 
collective rights of indigenous peoples as well as the human rights of 
all individuals. (United States of America, 2011, The Declaration 
and U.S. Initiatives, para. 1)
In 2012, the UN special rapporteur argued that the Declaration should:
serve as a beacon for executive, legislative and judicial decision-
makers in relation to issues concerning the indigenous peoples 
of the country. All such decision-making should incorporate 
awareness and close consideration of the Declaration’s terms. 
(UN, 2012a, p. 19)
In the US, the Declaration followed measures such as the Native American 
Languages Act of 1990, which, according to the UN special rapporteur, 
‘reflect[ed] a significant level of dedication on the part of the Government 
to indigenous concerns within the self-determination policy framework’ 
(UN, 2012a, p. 9). However, at other times, that dedication has not been 
apparent in a complex, contested and unsettled policy environment. 
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For  example, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act extinguished 
aboriginal title and hunting and fishing rights in favour of individual 
shares in corporations established to administer indigenous assets. Cultural 
rights and opportunities were traded for commercial shares (UN, 2012a) 
in the face of significant native Alaskan opposition. A further example 
concerns the conflict of political authority and values between the US 
and the Great Sioux Nation over the Keystone XL gas pipeline (discussed 
in Chapter 4).
Australia accepted a case for ‘internal’ self-determination, and the US 
acknowledged a right to ‘self-governance’ (Gover, 2015, p. 367). Their 
respective positions recognised that land rights:
by necessity, entails a degree of ‘de facto’ self-governance because 
the collective must decide on the intra-group allocation of rights 
among members of the group. The state must determine rules for 
the governance of transfer, succession and conservation of ‘inter se’ 
property rights.(Gover, 2015, p. 369)
However, the argument that self-determination is only an internal right 
of self-governance implies that it cannot simultaneously occur within the 
nation-state to give effect to differentiated liberal citizenship.
Self-government may presume an isolationist and unsustainable 
nationhood. It requires large and discrete population bases and politically 
cohesive institutions. This may be ideal for some indigenous populations, 
but it is often not supported by the infrastructural capacity of smaller 
communities. Nor is isolable self-government desirable for those who 
enjoy strong political, financial, personal and familial relationships outside 
the indigenous nation.
Rather than re-evaluate citizenship’s structure to make it inclusive, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US indicated that they 
would entertain ‘“special measures” intended to overcome indigenous 
disadvantage’ (Gover, 2015, p. 362). However, ‘special’ or ‘affirmative 
action’ measures are limited in scope and effect. They are concerned 
with the temporary redistribution of resources to address the immediate 
consequences of material disadvantage. They do not consider the more 
significant imperative—namely, the removal of the political causes of 
relative disadvantage.
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States adopt special measures to achieve social equity. However, to accept 
these measures as just substitutes for political equality is to set aside 
meaningful rights of prior occupancy. This is why indigeneity is not a 
theory of egalitarian distributive justice. Material prosperity does not 
diminish an indigenous person’s claim to existence as a member of 
a distinct people. Indeed, public policies grounded only in distributive 
justice are assimilationist. They require that indigenous peoples ‘forgo 
the full normative implications of their claims and … accept forms of 
assimilation into state institutions as restitution’ (Woons, 2014, p. 5). To 
prevent settler self-interest being the framer of policy debate—which is 
the risk when policies that do not address political equality are favoured—
policy negotiations should ‘begin with indigenous accounts of what is fair 
and reasonable’ (p. 5).
Liberal Objections to the Declaration
There remain liberal objections to distinctive recognition. Liberals—such as 
the former leader of the New Zealand National and ACT parties, Don Brash, 
and former Australian prime minister John Howard—have maintained, 
often to significant public approval, that liberal egalitarianism alone assures 
indigenous people of their fundamental human equality. According to 
them, distinctive recognition is unnecessary—an illiberal privilege that is 
offensive to the proper recognition of other citizens (O’Sullivan, 2007).
According to Kymlicka (1995), the tension between liberal inclusivity and 
a liberalism concerned only with the rights of the acultural individual 
comes from the view that:
ethnic identity, like religion, is something [that] people should be 
free to express in their private life, but it is not the concern of the 
state to attach legal identities or disabilities to cultural membership 
or ethnic identity. (p. 4)
Waldron (2003) gives further theoretical expression to this argument: 
from his perspective, the universal rights of liberal citizenship impose 
a common obligation on all people to act justly to one another. This means 
that one must always act with the same regard for indigenous citizens as 
for all others. The claim to special recognition then becomes unnecessary 
and unjustified.
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However, historic injustices cannot so easily be superseded by a ‘principle 
of proximity where justice is owed to all who are, as Kant puts it, 
“unavoidably side by side in a given territory irrespective of cultural or 
national affinity”’ (Waldron, 2003, p. 30). The present has emerged 
from somewhere. Justice requires attention to context. It cannot assume 
that history has endowed all citizens with equal contemporary political 
capacity. The colonial past conditions the colonial present. The present 
could potentially supersede the past, but there are numerous conditions 
that must first be met. For example, indigenous conceptions of justice enjoy 
a broader and more long-term focus than simply settling entitlements to 
land (Patton, 2005).
Relational justice is important and is only superseded when colonialism 
itself is superseded. It is erroneous to presume that, even though a right 
might be unjustly alienated, the injustice can still be extinguished with 
time and circumstance, and that no compensation is reasonably owed. 
Restitution is not, from this perspective, preliminary to the creation of 
ongoing just terms of association. For example, if a people’s disconnection 
from land as a source of economic sustenance has been replaced over 
time by some other source, then the presumption is that the claim to the 
original property right may have been superseded.
There is a causal link between the alienation of indigenous land, whenever 
it occurred, and contemporary economic disadvantage (O’Sullivan, 
2017). Restitutive justice requires measures that allow indigenous peoples 
to eliminate that disadvantage. In this way, restitutive justice is both 
preliminary to just terms of association and a condition of its continuance. 
As Justice Brennan noted in relation to the acquisition of Indigenous 
land in Australia, Indigenous people ‘underwrote the development of the 
nation’ (Mabo v Queensland [No 2], 1992, para. 82). These principles 
are recognised in New Zealand’s Treaty of Waitangi settlements. The 
first significant treaty settlement, which took place in 1995, included an 
apology from the Crown for the Invasion of the Waikato in 1863–1864 
and its ‘crippling impact on the welfare, economy and development of 
Waikato [people]’. Further:
The Crown recognises that the lands confiscated in the Waikato 
have made a significant contribution to the wealth and 
development of New Zealand, whilst the Waikato tribe has been 
alienated from its lands and deprived of the benefit of its lands. 
(Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlements Act 1995 [NZ], s. 6.5)
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In contrast, Waldron (2004) argues that supersession is just because, 
‘unlike their ancestors’, the descendants of the first colonists generally 
‘have nowhere else to go’ (p. 268). However, the possibility that restitutive 
measures could occasion injustice to colonial descendants does not 
supersede indigenous claims. The possibility ought to be proven in specific 
circumstances and each injustice balanced against the other. Colonial 
descendants’ rights to self-determination are relative and relational to the 
rights of others. They are not morally superior to the rights that indigenous 
peoples claim. Indeed, there are no cases in Australia or New Zealand 
in which these people have been required to surrender what is justly 
theirs. Indigenous peoples are not asking others to go away. Therefore, 
the question is not which rights are superseded, but which rights justly 
belong to indigenous peoples, and how are they realisable in the interests 
of a substantive and durable self-determination?
Colonialism was the underlying aggression. Consequently, it is reasonable 
that it is the colonised (not the coloniser) whose claim to self-determination 
is the first heard. To support the inverse—in which indigenous rights are 
given secondary and morally lesser consideration—would be to perpetuate 
the colonial order.
Waldron’s (2004) supersession argument is further undermined by his 
own concession to the ongoing significance of religious and cultural 
connections to land:
The claim that the lost lands form the centre of a present way of 
life—and remain sacred objects despite the loss—may be as credible 
a hundred years on as it was at the time of the dispossession. (p. 72)
Colonialism is an ongoing relational injustice. It was not a single event 
‘done’ to indigenous peoples. It is a system of political values that 
rationalise political subjugation, and a system under which justice cannot 
occur. Its essential presumption is that indigenous peoples have no claim 
to self-determination. This presumption arises from Locke’s (1887) theory 
of property, which, as noted in the introduction, holds that sovereign 
authority in relation to land is acquired only by working the land for 
agricultural production. In Australia, early British observers concluded 
that Australia’s Indigenous peoples did not work the land in such ways 
and this in itself justified their displacement.
Colonialism means that political structures, relationships and values 
exclude some people. A human desire or will to ‘do justice’ to all is not 
a value that people will always and everywhere accept. Political conflict 
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arises in situations in which there is a difference between what people 
consider just for themselves and what they accept as just for others. 
In postsettler societies, conflict arises when non-indigenous actors demand 
a standard of justice for themselves that they are not willing to extend to 
indigenous peoples.
Waldron (2004) sets aside the significance of context to justice. Moreover, 
like Hegtvedt (2005), he failed to account for indigenous peoples’ right 
and responsibility to ‘do justice’ to themselves. ‘Doing justice’ requires 
political capacity, and liberal egalitarian equality is not the same as 
self-determination’s substantive equality. It is from the perspective of 
capacity that it is best to consider what makes indigenous claims just. 
Only then can one ‘draw attention to the rightful role of the group in 
understanding justice’ (Waldron, 2004, p. 121) because, as Hegtvedt 
(2005) correctly explained:
Understanding how people perceive the boundaries of groups that 
are the recipient of benefits or burdens facilitates predictions of 
when conflict may emerge and, potentially, how individuals will 
respond to differences in what is perceived as just. (p. 41)
According to Waldron (2004), indigeneity’s focus on ‘the priority of certain 
entitlements’ (p. 6) means that the concept is ‘used to transform what 
would otherwise be a forward-looking discussion of social justice’ (p. 8). 
However, indigeneity privileges the past, such as connections to land, not 
as an end in itself but as preliminary to understanding the present. The 
past gives the present social and cultural—as well as political—context, 
which is a necessary foundation for participating in those ‘forward-looking 
discussion[s] of social justice’ that Waldron imagines.
Significantly, and in answer to Waldron’s (2004) fears, there are liberal 
protections ensuring that indigenous claims ‘on grounds of historical 
priority’ cannot ‘repudiate and marginalise the claims of others’ to create 
‘a very grave moral danger’ of ‘impervious[ness] of the needs of others’ 
(p. 26). Instead, the human rights of others may moderate the claim to 
self-determination, although not to the extent of making the claim 
ahistorical or apolitical as Waldron’s supersession thesis would suggest.
Conceptions of justice more broadly inclusive than Waldron’s (2004) 
depend on the strength of the just terms of association that indigenous 
peoples enjoy within the state. Measures of that strength may include 
the extent to which indigenous peoples enjoy a substantive deliberative 
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agency. The public recognition of language and culture is also important. 
Ultimately, however, it is indigenous peoples’ capacity to work out 
for themselves what it means to be a citizen of the state that is self-
determination’s most significant measure. That capacity is a path to 
indigenous people leading lives that they have reason to value (Sen, 1999a).
Just terms of association depend on property rights but are not guaranteed 
by that recognition alone. Broader questions of the terms of indigenous 
belonging to the state are important and inform ideas about how 
indigenous peoples might express their share in public sovereignty.
Sharing public sovereignty, or being present as a decision-maker, 
is important because:
It belongs to the excellent legislator to see how a city, a family of 
human beings … share in the good life and in the happiness that 
is possible for them. (Aristotle, 2010, p. 201)
Democracy retains neo-colonial possibilities, but these are the product of 
how societies determine democracy’s functioning; they are not inherent 
to the concept itself. Democracy can restrain majoritarian authority, 
yet states still try to limit the Declaration’s full potential.
Conversely, given that the Declaration’s principal right is the right to self-
determination, it follows that indigenous peoples—not states—ought to 
conceptualise that potential. They ought to lead political strategies for 
its implementation, with states examining liberal possibilities for ‘a more 
reparative and constitutive project—the goal of properly constituting 
a settler body politic and completing the constitution of the settler state 
by acquiring indigenous consent’ (Gover, 2015, p. 346).
Consent means that shared sovereignty is more than a democratic idea; 
it is an essential constituent of moral legitimacy. The Treaty of Waitangi 
explains a distinctive Maori view about the legitimacy of the nation-state. 
If the state’s legitimacy is accepted, thought must logically be given to 
the position that an indigenous group ideally wishes to occupy within 
the state. It is democratically reasonable that all not just some citizens 
contribute to determining ‘the conditions under which and the practices 
through which authority is constituted and legitimised, and what these 
constitutions and legitimations enable and disable’ (Shaw, 2008, p. 1).
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Consent requires all citizens’ critical engagement in public affairs. 
Inclusive democratic government ought to mean that public institutions 
are not discriminatory, which is why, as a matter of restitutive justice, state 
education systems may play an important part in language revitalisation 
and allow the coercive powers of state education to yield in some ways to 
education’s transformative capacity, as the TRC (2015) proposed:
We call on the federal government to draft new Aboriginal 
education legislation with the full participation and informed 
consent of Aboriginal peoples. The new legislation would include 
a commitment to sufficient funding and would incorporate the 
following principles:
i. Providing sufficient funding to close identified educational 
achievement gaps within one generation.
ii. Improving education attainment levels and success rates.
iii. Developing culturally appropriate curricula.
iv. Protecting the right to Aboriginal languages, including the 
teaching of Aboriginal languages as credit courses.
v. Enabling parental and community responsibility, control, and 
accountability, similar to what parents enjoy in public school 
systems.
vi. Enabling parents to fully participate in the education of their 
children.
vii. Respecting and honouring Treaty relationships. (pp. 320–321)
The commission also noted that the relationship between education 
and health has particular context for Canadian First Nations people:
We call upon the federal, provincial, territorial, and Aboriginal 
governments to acknowledge that the current state of Aboriginal 
health in Canada is a direct result of previous Canadian government 
policies, including residential schools, and to recognize and 
implement the health-care rights of Aboriginal people as identified 
in international law, constitutional law, and under the Treaties. 
(TRC, 2015, p. 322)
Gunn (2017) extended these claims beyond the expectations they create 
of the state by arguing that the Declaration’s most important legal 
implication is its insistence that ‘rights are defined according to Indigenous 
peoples’ own legal traditions’ (p. 35). However, definition is meaningless 
without participation in the implementation of rights. As Gunn (2017) 
herself observed:
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If Canada were to begin to embrace just rights of participation, 
then many more decisions (including resource development 
decisions) would take into consideration Indigenous laws on land 
and resource use. (p. 36)
However, in consideration of the problems that might arise when state 
courts attempted to interpret indigenous laws, Gunn (2017) proposed 
that ‘Indigenous law [might be treated] as foreign law in Canadian courts’ 
(p. 36). Such treatment is the antithesis of self-determination. Indeed, 
this proposition provides a strong example of the scope of influence 
that is forgone if indigenous peoples choose not to be part of the state. 
This book’s counterargument is that if there is a need for courts to 
interpret indigenous laws, then there is also a need for legal pluralism as 
a constituent of just terms of association that would include appropriately 
qualified indigenous judges and counsel.
Plurality
Legal pluralism (rather than separation) reflects self-determination’s 
character as a relative and relational power. Recognising legal 
pluralism requires:
that matters unfold through dialogue, as each source of legal and 
political authority must be persuaded to act, since ex hypothesi no 
one source of authority enjoys binding authority over all others. 
(Christie, 2017, pp. 49–50)
Benhabib (1996) argued that democracy works better when there is 
cultural contestation in public institutions and in civil society. She further 
claimed that ‘constitutional and legal pluralism’ (p. ix) can be defended 
as long as these institutions are impartial.
Legal pluralism requires indigenous access to a politically meaningful 
sovereignty. However, political and institutional arrangements are always 
preceded by ideologies—that is, by collective values that, among other 
considerations, make judgements about people’s relative worth and thus 
the relative capacities they ought to enjoy as citizens. The Declaration 
requires inclusive public institutions; it may also require transforming the 
state. It is an important tool for analysing the moral legitimacy of state 
policies and their underlying values. However, state institutions need not 
provide the only proper repositories of the people’s sovereignty according 
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to an ‘ideology of legal centralism’ (Duthu, 2013, p. 3). Instead, there is 
scope for plurality with indigenous civil society contributing as it does to 
public service delivery in health, education and other social services.
Alfred (2005) is correct to have argued, with reference to the past, 
that sovereignty was ‘an exclusionary concept rooted in adversarial and 
coercive Western notions of power’ (p. 59). However, sovereignty’s 
contemporary character depends on how it is interpreted as a relative and 
relational concept. It is not dependent on indigenous peoples matching 
‘the awesome coercive force of the state’ (p. 59), as Alfred feared, but on 
indigenous peoples sharing in the political authority of the state. This may 
occur through indigenous leadership in the development and delivery of 
state functions to give cultural focus and independence to the delivery 
of public services such as schooling and health care.
The Declaration’s capacity to influence these matters is a product of 
prevailing ideas about relationships between state power and indigenous 
self-determination across jurisdictions. For example, the UN special 
rapporteur proposed that the US Congress consider affirming the 
Declaration as ‘the policy of the United States’ (UN, 2012a, p. 22). However, 
in not outlining exactly what this meant in legal and practical policy 
terms, the rapporteur left open the possibility for locally contextualised 
interpretations of the right to self-determination (UN, 2012a).
In New Zealand, the Declaration affirms the Treaty of Waitangi. It is 
consistent with Maori accounts of self-determination but, like the treaty, 
is ‘a tool, not a panacea’ (Beatty, 2014, p. 49), yet the comparison remains 
instructive, as Maori have used the Declaration to strengthen treaty 
claims. The treaty has not become secondary to the Declaration, nor has 
the Declaration narrowed its scope. Instead, the Declaration establishes 
principles from which new policy ideas may emerge.
In Australia, the rights that the Declaration asserts extend native title’s 
significance and lend authority to broader claims of citizenship. Religious 
freedom is a further right that the Declaration upholds. This right 
adds context and purpose to land claims. It is also important because 
it was in  defence of religious freedom that liberalism developed as a 
political theory.
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According to Coates and Holroyd (2014), the Declaration has ‘had [a] 
profound impact on Canadian politics’ (p. 5). Indeed, they described it 
as ‘one of the most significant international political achievements of this 
generation’ (p. 5). However, questions remain about how the Declaration’s 
full adoption and implementation would appear in a liberal society.
The Declaration has helped to normalise indigenous claims in Canada; 
however, it has not had this effect in Australia, New Zealand or the US. 
The situation in Canada is different because ‘Canada has historically 
demonstrated a moral (if not always practical) commitment to key 
international [human rights] agreements’ (Coates & Holroyd, 2014, 
p. 7). For example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as set 
out in that country’s Constitution Act 1982 (Canada Act 1982 [UK] c. 11, 
sch. B pt. I), guarantees that:
Certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed to abrogate or 
derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms 
that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including … any 
rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements 
or may be so acquired. (s. 25)
Canada’s Constitution Act, which is contained in the Canada Act 1982 
(UK), mentions ‘The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada’ (Canada Act, sch. B pt. I s. 35). This gives constitutional 
protection to self-government agreements (Coates & Holroyd, 2014). 
The constitution protects aboriginal title and is supported by an evolving 
and comprehensive jurisprudence (UN, 2014). In doing so, it reflects 
Tully’s (1995) argument that a constitution is ideally:
an intercultural dialogue in which the culturally diverse sovereign 
citizens of contemporary societies negotiate agreements on 
their forms of association over time in accordance with the 
three conventions of mutual recognition, consent and cultural 
continuity. (p. 30)
Yet there remains a ‘political stalemate’ between the Government of 
Canada and indigenous peoples over the ways in which the Declaration 
ought to influence domestic politics (Mitchell, 2014, p. 1). The residential 
schools’ legacy remains strong. It is similarly difficult to remove the 
presumptions of the statement of the Government of Canada on Indian 
policy (Government of Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, 1969) from contemporary influence.
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On the grounds that treaties would not be relevant to exterminated 
peoples, the 1969 statement proposed terminating all treaties with 
aboriginal nations (TRC, 2015). However, under the Declaration:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, 
observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their 
successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, 
agreements and other constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing 
or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained 
in treaties, agreements and constructive arrangements. 
(UN, 2007b, art. 37)
In this way, the Declaration contributes to an established indigenous 
politics of resistance and transformation, supporting what Corntassel 
(2012) has termed ‘regenerating indigenous nationhood’ (p. 86). 
Regeneration means that:
Through our everyday acts of resurgence, our ancestors along with 
future generations will recognize us as Indigenous to the land. And 
this is how our homelands will recognize us as being Indigenous 
to that place. (p. 99)
Resurgence is a politics of ‘reconnection’ (Corntassel, 2012, p. 97). It is 
especially significant that the Declaration recognises that the ‘right to 
lands, territories and natural resources is the basis for [indigenous peoples’] 
collective survival and thus [is] inextricably linked to their right to self-
determination’ (Daes, 2008, p. 8). Corntassel’s (2012) argument not only 
supports a politics of small-scale or grassroots resistance—understood 
as a  willingness to exercise responsibility—but also recognition of the 
political capacities that responsibility requires. He asserted that:
By resisting colonial authority and demarcating their homelands 
via place naming and traditional management practices, these 
everyday acts of resurgence have promoted the regeneration of 
sustainable food systems in community and are transmitting these 
teachings and values to future generations. (p. 98)
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Conclusion
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US were the only UN member 
states to see the Declaration as a threat to their territorial integrity: a threat 
to the prevailing liberal order to which they wished to continue limiting 
indigenous access. Their objections revealed the deep conflict that exists 
over the nature of indigenous belonging in the postsettler liberal state. 
However, after ‘reading down’ the Declaration’s legal significance, the four 
states came to accept it as an ‘aspirational’ document.
Yet, in these and other jurisdictions, indigenous peoples have used the 
Declaration to help frame their political aspirations and for legal and 
political purposes. At the same time, there are strongly argued indigenous 
objections to the Declaration. As the following chapter shows, these 
are grounded in the view that human rights, and liberal political rights 
more broadly, are not consistent with indigenous understandings of self-
determination. Such objections are motivated by mistrust of the state and 
state positioning of indigenous peoples as antagonistic towards the public 
interest in matters such as mining.
The following chapter examines the creation by the state of exclusive 
public discourses in which indigenous ‘demands’ conflict with ‘reasonable’ 
public interests. These discourses exclude the indigenous from the public. 
Conversely, some indigenous people see no benefit in inclusion. They do 
not see themselves as part of the state and argue that democratic inclusion 
can be assimilationist, as it can involve the imposition of liberal values on 
nonliberal societies and can be experienced as an expression of colonial 
power. While this book does not accept these arguments, it acknowledges 
their importance because they help to explain indigenous mistrust, and, 
as Chapter 2 argued, being able to set aside that mistrust is an important 
aspiration. This is because, while indigenous nations may choose to 
position themselves beyond the liberal state, in doing so, they position 




Plurality, Human Rights 
and What’s Wrong with 
Liberal Inclusion?
Introduction
Liberal states like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US respond to 
indigenous claims with great caution. They may be accepted to a point—
until they interfere with the idea that non-indigenous interests deserve 
moral priority. Political exclusion, from which indigenous mistrust of 
the state is perpetuated, is the consequence. Arguments that the national 
interest must always trump indigenous rights to culture position indigenous 
peoples as beyond the nation—not citizens but binary opponents of the 
settler public whose demands have prior claim.
Mining and other policies concerned with natural resource use show 
states wanting to limit plurality in the distribution of political influence 
and authority. In such contexts, indigenous exclusion can be explicit and 
unapologetic. For example, to make the Declaration acceptable, the four 
dissenting states ‘read down’ the principle of ‘free, prior, and informed 
consent’ to one of limited effect, thereby transforming their view of the 
Declaration into one where the instrument was not, in fact, so favourable 
to indigenous interests. However, consent should imply a more meaningful 
political authority than consultation. It should imply an indigenous share 
in public sovereignty, meaning that indigenous interests cannot be pitted 
against the common good, because they are part of that ‘common’, whose 
collective interests economic development ought to serve. However, from 
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some indigenous perspectives, such a share in public authority is not 
worthwhile or even morally defensible nor are liberal human rights such 
as those which the Declaration enunciates.
Just as this chapter examines the state’s positioning of indigenous people 
beyond the public, it considers the reasoning of those indigenous people 
who, in fact, have no wish to be included. The chapter considers these 
matters by examining indigenous arguments against the Declaration’s 
underlying liberal foundation—in particular, that its liberal values are 
inconsistent with indigenous aspirations and therefore inconsistent with 
the right to self-determination as a collective right.
The possibilities that indigenous peoples find in the Declaration are 
largely considered elsewhere in the book. However, this chapter’s focus 
is to critique and contest the argument that liberal human rights per se 
are inconsistent with indigenous rights and to critique and contest 
the argument that, when human rights privilege the individual, they 
undermine the collective indigenous good. The chapter shows how 
indigenous arguments against individual rights have been used to defend 
sexual violence against women through contested, and often self-serving, 
interpretations of cultural values. Finally, the chapter shows that the 
denial of individual human rights means that cultural values are not 
open to internal contest and may only reflect the will of the physically 
more powerful. In doing this, it demonstrates the value of international 
human rights to the right to political voice within the state and the 
indigenous nation.
Mining and the Politics of the 
Liberal ‘Public’
Liberal states have worried that the right to free, prior and informed 
consent constitutes a veto over land development or resource extraction. 
Indeed, this reservation was an important factor in the initial reluctance of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US to support the Declaration 
(Banks, 2007). State mining policy often relies on separating indigenous 
peoples from the ‘public’ through an overly simplified binary politics in 
which the ‘public’ interest favours mining and indigenous interests oppose 
it. However, indigenous peoples do not speak with one voice on this issue: 
there are differences of opinion within indigenous nations on mining and 
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other natural resource proposals. There are many examples of resource 
development and extraction occurring after informed indigenous consent 
and with significant benefit to indigenous communities (Langton & 
Longbottom, 2012). However, as the UN special rapporteur has noted in 
relation to Canada, these presuppose that land title is secure and that the 
indigenous group is able to participate in negotiations for consent with 
genuine authority.
Indigenous resistance to extractive industries contests the presumption of 
terra nullius that allowed colonial states to do as they pleased. Keim and 
Reidy (2015) argued that Australia’s Native Title Tribunal responds to this 
indigenous resistance with a jurisprudence maintaining that ‘a  healthy 
mining industry is synonymous with the public interest’ (p. 1). This 
argument separates indigenous people from the public and discounts the 
possibility that resistance may be to the specific characteristics of a proposal 
rather than to mining per se. It also discounts differing opinions within 
the indigenous nation on the merits of a given proposal.
In Australia, mining incomes have contributed to the rise of an Indigenous 
middle class and have extended greater prosperity to unskilled and 
manual workers (Langton & Longbottom, 2012). Yet it is also the case 
that Australian governments have allowed mining in some areas without 
Indigenous consent. The corporate imperative to maximise profit as 
quickly as possible means that there is not automatically an alliance of 
common interest between miners and indigenous land owners. There are 
alliances of principle that must also be worked out, and when these are 
not possible, there can be no consent. However, if there is no requirement 
for consent, the indigenous property right is not of the standing that 
liberalism would ordinarily defend. Fundamentally, the displacement 
of an indigenous people to accommodate a mining venture from which 
they derive no benefit is unjust. It is reasonable that indigenous peoples 
are cautious about another party’s attempt to use their lands for their 
own benefit when land alienation is the underlying cause of cultural 
dislocation and relative material poverty. Coercion, by the will of a more 
powerful section of the community, is a routine experience for many 
indigenous citizens.
Indigenous resource rights are, for example, vulnerable unless they are 
acknowledged through formal and enforceable agreements (Gupta 
et al., 2014, p. 26). Yet the former UN special rapporteur James Anaya 
argued that consent was not in fact a veto. He may be correct when good 
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faith negotiations prevail; however, if an indigenous property right is 
a substantive one, the possibility of veto must always exist, even though it 
cannot be exercised until good faith negotiations have failed.
Consent raises the standard from consultation to participation. 
Consultation allows indigenous peoples to react to others’ proposals, 
whereas participation allows them to raise their own.
Robust mining impact assessments are required to inform indigenous 
consent. Indigenous people have the right to expect some benefit from 
a project—to be part of the public whose interests mining apparently 
always and everywhere serves (UN, 2016a). Conversely, Boutilier (2017) 
argued that ‘the duty to consult and accommodate is the closest thing to 
[free, prior and informed consent] in Canadian constitutional law’ (p. 5). 
Consent is justified because ‘a law exists only for the one who has made 
it himself or agreed to it; for everyone else it is a command or an order’ 
(Rousseau, 1984, p. 97).
Yet the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that aboriginal consent for 
development is not required when development is in the ‘public interest’:
the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric 
power, the general economic development of the interior of 
British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered 
species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign 
populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that 
are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the 
infringement of aboriginal title. (Delgamuukw, 1997, para. 165).
In New Zealand, the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 represented the most 
significant usurpation of a Maori property right in at least a generation, 
bringing the question of property rights from historic conflict into the 
political present. The then New Zealand prime minister Helen Clark, 
with the opposition’s support, positioned herself on ‘New Zealand’s side’ 
in a battle against ‘haters and wreckers’ (‘Clark defends refusal’, 2004). 
This rhetoric positioned Maori and New Zealand as holding distinct 
and irresolvable conflicting interests. The presumption was that the New 
Zealand ‘public’ was morally more deserving than Maori, who were 
positioned as outsiders—beyond the public and beyond the political. 
In contrast, the UN special rapporteur argued that the Foreshore and Seabed 
Act was not ‘in line with international standards regarding the rights of 
indigenous peoples to their traditional lands’ (UN, 2011, p. 16). The Act 
was repealed in 2011, shortly after New Zealand reversed its opposition to 
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the Declaration in 2010. However, the Act’s repeal did not reverse all its 
discriminatory aspects, leading the UN special rapporteur to remind ‘the 
[New Zealand] Government that the extinguishment of indigenous rights 
by unilaterally, uncompensated acts is inconsistent with the Declaration’ 
(UN, 2011, p. 16). It was inconsistent with a politics of consent.
The Politics of Consent
The UN’s guiding principles on business and human rights insist that states 
are responsible for ‘ensuring a regulatory framework that recognises an 
indigenous peoples’ rights over lands and natural resources’ (UN, 2016a, 
p. 4). The regulatory framework ‘requires legislation or regulations that 
incorporate international standards of indigenous rights’ (UN, 2016a, p. 4). 
The maintenance of such a framework requires indigenous participation. 
Liberal democracy privileges personal agency over the possibility that the 
state will simply act benevolently to secure indigenous rights.
The Keystone XL pipeline in the US is an example of the indigenous 
right to consent being set aside in ways that contravene the Declaration 
and broader human rights norms. The pipeline was intended to carry oil 
from Alberta, Canada, to Nebraska, US, where it would join an existing 
pipeline to oil refineries on the US Gulf Coast. As well as contravening 
Article 26 of the Declaration (see Chapter 3), the pipeline contravenes the 
following articles:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions 
in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect them. (UN, 2007b, art. 19)
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal 
seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to 
future generations in this regard. (UN, 2007b, art. 25)
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and 
protection of the environment and the productive capacity of 
their lands or territories and resources. States shall establish 
and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples 
for such conservation and protection, without discrimination.
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2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or 
disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or 
territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and 
informed consent.
3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as 
needed, that programmes for monitoring, maintaining and 
restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as developed 
and  implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, 
are duly implemented. (UN, 2007b, art. 29)
The Standing Rock Sioux community in the US received international 
indigenous support for its opposition to the pipeline. This international 
indigenous solidarity has been politically important. For example, the 
Sami Parliament of Norway’s intervention contributed to the decision of 
pension fund Kommunal Landspensjonskasse (KLP) to divest its shares in 
companies contracted to build the Dakota Access Pipeline. KLP’s decision 
was ‘due to an unacceptable risk of contributing to serious or systematic 
human rights violations’ (KLP, 2017, p. 1). Its further reasoning was that 
the pipeline required the flooding of land, protected under the 1851 
Treaty of Fort Laramie, from which the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe had 
been improperly alienated, according to the US Supreme Court (p. 3). 
The pipeline was intended for the transportation of oil; however, Sioux 
people argued that it would interfere with access to sacred sites and 
safe drinking water. The UN special rapporteur found that the pipeline 
had been approved without ‘adequate social, cultural or environmental 
assessment’. It was also approved in ‘the absence of meaningful consultation 
or participation by the tribes’ (UN, 2017c, para. 11).
The Great Sioux Nation objected to the negotiations on the US’s behalf 
being  conducted by junior officers of the Army Corps of Engineers. 
It viewed their lack of seniority as an affront to Sioux sovereign nationhood 
(KLP, 2017). The UN special rapporteur identified significant dishonesty 
in the Army Corps’s environmental assessment; in particular, that 
negotiations were not conducted in good faith. For example:
Maps in the draft environmental assessment omitted the 
reservations, and the draft made no mention of proximity to the 
reservation or the fact that the pipeline would cross historic treaty 
lands of a number of tribal nations. (Heim, 2017, para. 7)
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For its part, KLP (2017) placed ‘significant weight on the UN Special 
Rapporteur’s assessment of the situation’ (p. 8). KLP noted that the 
requirement under US law for ‘government-to-government consultation 
had not occurred’ (p. 9). The pension fund was further influenced by 
Article 32.2 of the Declaration, which provided that:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions 
in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and 
other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 
(UN, 2007b, art 32.2)
KLP’s approach highlighted the Declaration’s moral persuasiveness.
In Australia, mining requires the negotiation of land use agreements 
between mining companies and native title holders. Agreements must 
be registered by the Native Title Tribunal. However, the tribunal is not 
required to satisfy itself that the agreements represent the wishes of native 
title holders, nor is it required to consider whether the collective wish 
has been determined in a fashion acceptable to the group. Agreement by 
way of an accepted process is the intent, though not always the practical 
application, of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth):
acts that affect native title should only be able to be validly done if 
… every reasonable effort has been made to secure the agreement 
of the native title holders through a special right to negotiate. 
(preamble, para. xi)
However, it is procedurally unjust for a mining company to define the 
negotiating process. Therefore, the Declaration sets out principles to 
strengthen indigenous negotiating positions:
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open 
and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous 
peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, 
to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples 
pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including 
those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this 
process. (UN, 2007b, art. 27)
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Further:
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to … just and 
fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with 
States or other parties, as well as to effective remedies for  all 
infringements of their individual and collective rights. Such 
a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, 
rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and 
international human rights. (UN, 2007b, art. 40)
While some land use agreements elicit significant benefits for native title 
holders (Langton & Longbottom, 2012), the Native Title Act does not 
require an equitable negotiation process. Agreements do not necessarily 
satisfy the requirement for free and informed consent.
Indigenous consent to Adani Australia for its proposed Galilee Basin coal 
mine was (and is) contested. As a matter of justice, saying ‘no’ should be a 
simple and straightforward process. It is true that economic development 
is in the national interest; however, Australia’s economic development 
does not depend on a single project. It is a false dichotomy to present 
that national imperative as a matter of conflict with the Indigenous right 
to culture. They may be mutually exclusive in some cases, but, in a large 
and diverse First World economy, the two do not always and necessarily 
need to conflict.
The international mining industry is developing standards for the 
acquisition of consent. It would be hugely ironic if the mining industry 
were to take more seriously the moral argument for free, prior and 
informed consent than nation-states. However, Adani is not a member 
of the International Council on Mining and Metals and thus has not 
committed to the international mining industry’s view that free, prior and 
informed consent means that the industry ought to:
• respect the rights, interests, special connections to lands and 
waters, and perspectives of indigenous peoples, where mining 
projects are to be located on lands traditionally owned by or 
under customary use of Indigenous Peoples
• adopt and apply engagement and consultation processes 
that ensure the meaningful participation of indigenous 
communities in decision making, through a process that is 
consistent with their traditional decision-making processes 
and is based on good faith negotiation
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• work to obtain the consent of Indigenous Peoples where 
required by this position statement. (International Council on 
Mining and Metals, 2013, Overview, para. 1)
The Adani case is an extreme one; its environmental and cultural 
impact is profound, and its economic case is weak. By December 
2017, 25  commercial banks had declined loans to support the project 
(Slezack, 2017).
Good reasons to consent are culturally informed and politically 
contextualised by colonialism, which is a unique determinant of political 
experience. The Declaration not only imagines safeguards to protect 
indigenous interests but also values arrangements that give meaning to the 
withholding of consent by indigenous peoples. The ability to withhold 
consent is a matter of political capacity. According to the UN (2016b), 
‘consultation and consent are not a single event, but should readily occur 
at all stages of a project from exploration to production to project closure’ 
(p. 5). This is because consent without deliberation could reflect a genuine 
lack of interest in a policy decision. It could also reflect an individual’s lack 
of confidence in the prevailing decision-making arrangements.
The criteria for reaching publicly reasonable decisions are substantive as 
well as procedural. Arguments are valid only ‘in terms of whether they 
advance the common good of citizens and the justice of the political 
society’ (Christiano, 1997, p. 243). Therefore, denying indigenous 
peoples’ authority over their lands requires one to argue that such denial is 
in the interests of the common good, including the good of the indigenous 
people to whom the argument is being directed. The test is high: ‘my 
proposal P is justified only if, supposing all members of the public were 
rational, all would accept it’ (Gaus, 1997, p. 209). If a prejudicial position 
must be defended and open to challenge by the reasonableness of others, 
its intellectual foundation will be exposed.
Democracy might then reappraise public sovereignty to include 
indigenous peoples and perspectives in the national public. The 
relationship between the distribution of political capacity and political 
outcomes makes participation a requirement of justice. The Declaration 
helps liberal postsettler societies find ways of ensuring the influence of 
indigenous conceptions of fairness and rationality in the deliberative 
process. Mitchell (2014) suggested that one would not find conflicts over 
the commercial exploitation of indigenous natural resources if the right to 
self-government was secure. This does not mean that resource extractions, 
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or other usages, by non-indigenous corporations could not occur; rather, 
that there would have to be benefits to indigenous landholders, and 
that the landholders themselves would decide the acceptability of any 
associated costs. Secure land rights would ensure indigenous landholders’ 
decision-making capacity. Decisions would be made with respect to the 
landholders’ conceptions of the common good, with themselves part of 
the ‘common’.
To presume that indigenous interests are always and everywhere 
inconsistent with those of a separate public, and that commercial 
resource exploitation is always and necessarily in the public interest, is 
erroneous. As Bohman and Rehg (1997) argued, ‘the political process 
involves more than self-interested competition governed by bargaining 
and aggregative mechanisms’ (p. x). Indigenous conflict with resource 
development is not inevitable. However, conflict is always likely to occur 
when the ‘public interest’ is exclusively defined and when it presumes that 
development always and everywhere serves a non-indigenous interest with 
moral priority.
Article 28 of the Declaration contests the presumption of non-indigenous 
moral priority. However, its far-reaching implications, and postsettler 
states’ rejection of these, have caused some indigenous people to be wary 
of the Declaration’s value. Like all articles in the Declaration, Article 28 
is aspirational. The knowledge that it is unlikely to be implemented may 
compromise its value to indigenous people seeking self-determination’s 
fuller expression. It states:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that 
can include restitution or, when this is not possible, of a just, 
fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, 
occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and 
informed consent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, 
compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and 
resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary 
compensation or other appropriate redress. (UN, 2007b, 
art. 28)
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The Declaration and Liberal Human 
Rights: Indigenous Objections
Indigenous scholarly objections to the Declaration sometimes understate 
the relative and relational character of self-determination. While some 
emphasise an isolationist politics, others privilege polemic arguments 
against universal human rights as a concept of value to indigenous cultures. 
The latter follow Kulchyski’s (2013) presumption that self-determination 
is incompatible with a liberal human rights framework and insistence 
that a ‘human rights agenda must inevitably dismiss aboriginal cultural 
distinctiveness’ (p. 73). Such critics of the Declaration presume that rights 
discourses compromise indigenous aspirations by locating them within 
a state-centred politics. These objections do not accept liberalism’s capacity 
to create a politics of nondomination. They make indigeneity contingent 
on a political status of perpetual victimhood rather than aspiring to make 
domination a temporary state.
Later chapters will show that there is a larger and broader indigenous 
scholarship that more readily finds value in the Declaration as an 
instrument of political authority. They will show that there are strong 
indigenous alternatives to the view that ‘nothing in this Declaration is 
likely to shift power imbalances [that] exist, and [that] continue to 
determine the future of Indigenous Peoples’ (Watson & Venne, 2012, 
p. 91). For example, there is a body of scholarship on indigenous 
potential that rejects the presumption of perpetual victimhood. Instead, 
it recognises the power of resilience and agency and presents indigenous 
peoples’ claims to self-determination in ways that help people to create 
lives that they have reason to value (O’Sullivan, 2017). The counterpoint 
is that such discourses run the risk of ‘seeking political and/or economic 
solutions to contemporary challenges that require sustainable spiritual 
foundations’ (Corntassel, 2008, pp. 115–116). Further, Garrow (2012) 
asked whether the Declaration should be used at all to support indigenous 
claims to the restoration of political authority. In his view, the Declaration 
lacks legitimate purpose because, as an instrument of Western human 
rights law, it does not acknowledge indigenous accounts of sovereignty.
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Howard-Hassman (2014) described the Declaration’s value as limited 
because it is not a treaty. With reference to Canada, Maciel (2014) 
suggested that an ‘ontological conflict’ between the state and indigenous 
claims obstructed the Declaration’s implementation. In the Australian 
context, Mansell (2011) argued that:
The fundamental values that make up Australia are based on the 
belief of white supremacy … that notion is likely to ensure the 
Declaration does not become part of domestic law. (p. 659)
Other indigenous commentators reject the Declaration’s capacity for 
meaningful implementation: ‘To the extent that we litigate our right to 
sovereignty through this legal framework, we have lost the true essence of 
our sovereignty’ (Coffey & Tsosie, as cited in Carroll, 2012, p. 146). This 
is because ‘The politics of recognition in its contemporary form promises 
to reproduce the very configurations of colonial power that Indigenous 
peoples’ demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend’ 
(Coulthard, 2007, p. 437).
Champagne (2013) proposed that, rather than being an instrument of 
self-determination, the Declaration is a ‘sophisticated form of assimilation’ 
(p. 9). It ‘treats indigenous peoples either as citizens of nation-states or as 
ethnic minorities with certain collective political, cultural and economic 
rights and historical claims’ (p. 11), thereby redefining ‘indigenous peoples 
into citizens and ethnic groups’ (p. 11). For Ward (2011):
The only substantive result ensuing [from the Declaration] is 
that the very structure of relations Indigenous peoples sought to 
challenge through the processes of the UN have been legitimated 
in law, the terms of the law itself having been subverted to 
accommodate legitimation. (p. 549)
Carroll (2012) also read an assimilationist effect into the Declaration, 
arguing that its inability to:
recognize formally indigenous political institutions or to 
restructure indigenous peoples’ political relationships with ‘the 
States’ reinforces the established construction of geographical scale 
(and indigenous nations’ place on this scale) at international law. 
(p. 146)
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Going even further, Corntassel (2012) described the Declaration’s 
consideration of resource rights as assimilationist: ‘the word resource 
is a  way of commodifying and marketizing Indigenous homelands; in 
contrast Indigenous peoples view their homelands and communities as 
a complex web of relationships’ (p. 92, emphasis in original).
Watson and Venne (2012) argued that the Declaration focuses not on 
‘the rights to self-determination under international law’ but on indigenous 
rights as ‘human rights issues within their respective colonised states’ (p. 90). 
Indigenous peoples are therefore ‘further encumbered: rather than retaining 
the rights of peoples as emphasised in the UN Charter, [indigenous peoples] 
have become objects of local human rights issues’ (p. 90). In their view, self-
determination is meaningless if it is concerned only with ‘gaining political 
space without indigenous content’ (p. 88). They argue that the Declaration’s 
inattention to political space makes it a ‘human rights instrument rather 
than an instrument [that] would provide a mechanism for advancing 
Indigenous Peoples’ rights as nations and peoples’ (p. 91).
Watson and Venne (2012) questioned whether the Declaration’s dual 
focus on human rights and collective rights means that the ‘individual 
identity position works to erode that of the collective’ (p. 93) and argued 
that ‘[i]n an important way, human rights diminish the collective rights 
of Indigenous Peoples because they concern individuals within the 
paradigm of the particular state’ (p. 96). They worried that allowing 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child to take priority over the 
Declaration gave states, rather than indigenous peoples, the authority to 
determine the child’s best interests. The final Declaration did not include 
the draft declaration’s statement preventing ‘the removal of indigenous 
children from their families and communities under any pretext’ 
(Iorns, 1993, ‘Draft declaration’, pt. II art. 6).
The context is clear: in the past, the pretext for removal has been 
genocidal. However, the final Declaration’s seventh article does provide 
strong safeguards against the removal of children on that pretext:
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and 
mental integrity, liberty and security of person.
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, 
peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected 
to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including 
forcibly removing children of the group to another group. 
(UN, 2007b, art. 7)
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Watson and Venne (2012) objected to Article 7, claiming that it elevated 
‘the rights of the individual over the collective’ (p. 97). However, as 
a  work of indigenous peoples internationally, the Declaration remains 
an authoritative expression of indigenous peoples’ political aspirations. 
Despite not gaining universal approval, its level of indigenous support 
shows a strong confidence in human rights as both a legal concept and 
political philosophy.
Watson and Venne (2012) also objected to the Declaration’s equal 
application to men and women because equality undermined male and 
female distinctiveness in indigenous cultures and undermined an indigenous 
culture’s capacity to define that distinctiveness for itself. Article 44 of the 
Declaration is explicit: ‘All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are 
equally guaranteed to male and female indigenous individuals’ (UN, 2007b, 
art. 44). Elsewhere, the Declaration maintains that:
1. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs 
of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons 
with disabilities in the implementation of this Declaration.
2. States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous 
peoples, to ensure that indigenous women and children enjoy 
the full protection and guarantees against all forms of violence 
and discrimination. (UN, 2007b, art. 22)
In a perspective that contrasts with Watson and Venne’s, Kuokkanen 
(2012) argued that self-determination movements pay inadequate 
attention to violence against women and that:
One can only conclude that it is prevailing and persistent gender 
injustice in both indigenous and mainstream societies that lies at 
the heart of the problem of indigenous women’s human rights, 
not the conflict between individual and collective (or between 
universal and local) rights. (p. 237)
In the Australian context, violence against women is the most common 
offence for which Indigenous men are imprisoned (Australian Human 
Rights Commission, 2017). In the US, one in three indigenous women 
are raped. In 86 per cent of cases, the perpetrator is a non-indigenous 
man on a reserve and his non-indigenous status prevents prosecution by 
reserve authorities (Kuokkanen, 2012). Violence logically and necessarily 
obstructs women’s self-determination (Kuokkanen, 2012; Raya, 2006; 
Smith, 2013); this shows the importance of self-determination as a right 
of individuals as much as for groups.
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The National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples consciously attends 
to women’s self-determination by ensuring equal male and female 
representation. In contrast, in the Northern Territory, Australia, in 2012, 
in what the Chief Justice described as an ‘extremely difficult case’, the 
Supreme Court accepted cultural values as a mitigating factor in a 55-year-
old man’s nonconsensual sexual encounter with a 14-year-old girl:
You [the defendant] believed that traditional law permitted you 
to strike the child and to have intercourse with her … The Crown 
accepts that you believed that intercourse with the child was 
acceptable because she had been promised to you [at the age of 
four] and had turned 14 … The Crown also accepts that, based 
on your understanding and upbringing in your traditional law, 
notwithstanding the child’s objections, you believed that the child 
was consenting to sexual intercourse. (Chief Justice Martin, 2005, 
para. 17)
In accepting the defendant’s explanation of his actions, the Court accepted 
the complainant’s lesser humanity and lesser right to participate in the 
settlement of a contested cultural value. The claim that sexual contact is 
a  cultural right that extinguishes the need for explicit consent can only 
hold if there is uncontested agreement about the practice in the indigenous 
nation in which the claim is made. In this context, the view that collective 
values are prior to individual values is no more than an argument that 
physical force determines cultural values. Neither principle nor broad 
acceptance is relevant to the construction of a cultural practice. In contrast, 
a liberal theory of indigeneity is concerned with all persons as repositories 
of a right to self-determination and with all persons’ right to deliberate in 
the formation of shared values. Self-determination does not make sense if 
it is the preserve of the physically more powerful at the exclusion of the 
collective values and preferences of other members of a community.
If an indigenous person is prevented from claiming priority for their own 
culture—if they cannot say ‘your cultural value is not mine’—their equal 
humanity is effectively denied. It follows that if one accepts unequal 
human worth in an indigenous community, one must accept the logic 
that justified colonialism: a hierarchy of human worth.
In the absence of an individual right to self-determination, the powerful 
are able to dominate others and frame their domination as reflecting the 
collective will—the collective construction of the values by which all 
must live. However, one cannot object to colonialism’s inherent violence 
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then also claim extant cultural values in defence of one’s own violence. 
Indeed, a report on violence by the International Indigenous Women’s 
Forum argued that ‘it is not “culture” that lies at the root of violence 
against women, but practices and norms that deny women gender equity, 
education, resources, and political and social power’ (Raya, 2006, p. 30). 
When the self-interested cultural conceptions of the physically powerful 
are privileged:
analyses can run the risk of an idealised cultural determinism, 
especially if they focus exclusively on the semantics of cultural 
translation and provide wholly cultural answers to what are 
fundamentally political questions. (Wilson, 2008, p. 310)
It is unjust and illogical for violent men to propose that it is they alone 
who determine the cultural practices that all must share.
Pauktuutit, the Inuit women’s association of Canada, made violence 
its most important priority. Commenting on the need for such 
measures, Kuokkanen (2012) noted, ‘It appears that, for indigenous 
self-determination, violence against women is considered neither an 
indigenous rights issue nor a human rights issue’ (p. 238). Violence is 
a contravention of another’s capacity for self-determination. Borrows 
(2017) observed that ‘[i]t would be tragically ironic if nation-states began 
recognising and protecting the rights of Indigenous individuals, while 
Indigenous governments did not take the same action’ (pp. 25–26).
As Kuokkanen (2012) argued, to suppose conflict between collective 
and individual indigenous rights ‘is spurious as it appears to apply only 
to women’s rights’ (p. 227). The supposition is grounded in essentialist 
and grossly simplified accounts of Western and indigenous political 
philosophies. It requires an absolute and simplistic distinction between 
the two. Indeed:
since Native women are the women most likely to be killed by 
domestic violence, they are clearly not surviving [as peoples]. So 
when we talk about survival of our nations who are we including? 
(Smith, 2013, para. 5)
In Maori thought, sexual abuse is more than violation of the individual, 
it is violation of all ‘past and future generations’ (Pihama et al., 2016, 
p. 9). Although its significance is broader than a human rights discourse 
can admit, this does not make the right to personal safety invalid 
or culturally alien.
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The right to protection from violence is not a private affair. The argument 
that individual rights are inconsistent with, and subservient to, collective 
rights is a self-serving one used by individuals claiming moral authority 
for their own interests by claiming them as the uncontested values of the 
collective. Violence against women is an important case study in human 
rights discourse. One must take care not to remove the indigenous from 
the human in developing conceptions of self-determination. Recognition 
of the rights of indigenous women means that one must ‘conceive both 
indigenous peoples’ rights and indigenous women’s rights as human rights 
[that] exist in a continuum’ (Kuokkanen, 2012, p. 249) where ‘securing 
indigenous women’s rights is inextricable from securing the rights of the 
peoples as a whole’ (p. 236).
Watson and Venne’s (2012) view that ‘the rights of the individual are 
often at odds with those of the collective’ (p. 96) diminishes the reciprocal 
nature of individual–collective relationships. If the collective does not 
serve its members, it has no purpose and thus no durability. For these 
reasons, Watson and Venne’s argument illustrates why the liberal rights 
of citizenship are worth claiming. For most people, the transfer of power 
from the state to indigenous elites is not self-determination.
Like Watson and Venne (2012), Boldt and Long (1984) failed to 
convincingly address the question of which liberal human rights people 
would deny themselves as incompatible with, or obstructive of, their 
values. Boldt and Long described the individual as the:
repository of responsibilities rather than … a claimant of rights. 
Rights can exist only in the measure to which each person fulfils 
his responsibilities towards others. That is, rights are an outgrowth 
of every person performing his obligation in the cosmic order. In 
such a society there is no concept of inherent individual claims to 
inalienable rights. (p. 166)
It is important not to overemphasise indigenous objections to the 
Declaration. Wider indigenous support suggests that such objections reflect 
a minority view. At the same time, such objections are philosophically 
interesting for the questions they raise about relationships between the 
nation and the person. They are also important because, as McIvor 
(2004) argued, discrimination against women is by necessity an obstacle 
to indigenous self-government: ‘after 135 years of sex discrimination by 
Canada, we were afraid of self-government. Why would neo-colonial 
Aboriginal government, born and bred in patriarchy, be different from 
Canadian governments?’ (p. 128).
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Until 1985, indigenous Canadian women’s Indian status was revoked 
upon marriage to a non-indigenous man. Yet the reverse did not apply: 
not only could Indian men retain their status on marriage, but their non-
Indian wives were also automatically accorded membership of the Indian 
nation (Kuokkanen, 2012). The state, not indigenous peoples, determined 
who was or was not Indian. The test of indigeneity was not a cultural one 
determined according to indigenous norms and values but one enshrined 
in state law to foster the destruction of indigenous communities. 
As  Kuokkanen (2012) explained, ‘For Indian women, “marrying out” 
literally meant a reality of exile from the communities, and hence from 
their rights and ties to their families, cultures, and identities’ (p. 233).
In 1974, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected a challenge to the validity 
of the Indian Act (Attorney-General of Canada v Lavell, 1974). However, the 
Act was subsequently amended after the UN Human Rights Committee 
found that revoking indigenous women’s status on marriage violated their 
human rights. This established an important international precedent 
for appealing to authorities beyond the state. However, the amendment 
still precluded those who had ‘married out’ from passing on their Indian 
status to their children. Indigeneity was not to be a matter of culture or 
ancestry but the marital status of one’s mother. Further appeals saw minor 
amendments to the law (Kuokkanen, 2012). The indigenous women who 
mounted these cases and their supporters were ‘harshly criticized for being 
anti-Indian and accused of betraying the self-determination struggles 
and of cooptation into colonial, Western discourses of individualism’ 
(Kuokkanen, 2012, p. 235). However, such objections can only hold 
if women have no legitimate voice in the construction of collective 
self-determination.
Cultural maintenance cannot occur in women’s absence. The codification 
of the right to self-determination in liberal terms is especially significant 
for women and children. The Declaration’s presumption of equality is the 
underlying value that makes it an instrument of self-determination.
On the other hand, liberal democracy conflicts with the view that ‘our 
[indigenous] rights are unconditional, not subject to mediation, and not 
susceptible to being settled by legislative or adjudicative mediation or 
compromise’ (Garrow, 2012, p. 195). International human rights may 
then require a political trade-off that some indigenous peoples are not 
willing to accept. Human rights may override certain collective rights 
and conceptualising rights within a liberal paradigm may expose them to 
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political contest in a non-indigenous arena. However, the alternative may 
be that indigenous peoples wish to exist in closed communities beyond 
the nation-state as holders of a singular citizenship pursuing an isolable 
self-determination. In contrast, as Chapter 6 explains, the First Peoples 
of Fiji may find it problematic that they are excluded from prevailing 
international definitions of ‘indigenous’ and thus from the provisions and 
protections of the Declaration.
Conclusion
Plurality in the distribution of political influence and authority is an 
essential constituent of the right to self-determination. It is the basis for 
indigenous inclusion in the sovereign public and for the participation of 
men and women in the development and evolution of cultural practices.
Mining policy provides insight into the political values motivating state 
resistance to substantive indigenous inclusion in public decision-making. 
It demonstrates an ‘us’ and ‘them’ binary that inaccurately portrays 
mining as always and everywhere in the public (i.e. non-indigenous) 
interest and always and everywhere opposed by indigenous people. This 
exclusive binary shows the political importance of indigenous inclusion 
in the sovereign whole as self-determining liberal citizens as well as the 
relevance of indigenous rights to human rights.
This chapter’s critique of indigenous objections to the Declaration 
demonstrates the self-serving nature of some indigenous arguments 
against human rights as a contribution to discourses of self-determination, 
and supports the book’s recurring argument in favour of a liberal theory 
of indigeneity requiring substantive and equal indigenous citizenship 





Power and the Practice
Introduction
Self-determination may, but does not usually, imply disrupting the 
territorial integrity of the state. However, it always presumes that the 
state cannot exercise singular or unilateral authority. Self-determination 
is a contested and complex concept. Quane (2011) has described it as 
‘notoriously difficult to pin down’ and has argued that there is ‘little if 
any guidance as to what it means in actual practice’ (p. 69). Yet, neither 
of these characterisations are wholly correct nor, as this chapter will 
show, is Kingsbury and Grodinsky’s (1992) observation that ‘the right 
to self-determination is at present, a rather blunt … and underinclusive 
instrument’ (p. 393).
The Declaration does not define self-determination; however, it does 
provide general principles for developing the concept into policy practice. 
Consequently, one may think not of the right—but of the power—of 
self-determination. The power of self-determination includes, but is not 
limited to, an indigenous nation’s self-government of its own affairs. It is 
a power that depends on political influence wherever decisions are made, 
which means that self-determination within the state is also fundamentally 
important to a meaningfully shared sovereignty.
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Indigenous political authority within the state is not diminished by 
distinctive indigenous nationhood. The two sites of political authority are 
mutually reinforcing and provide opportunities for indigenous peoples to 
contest the coercive powers of the state. Self-determination rationalises 
shared political sovereignty.
Shared sovereignty affirms the indigenous citizen’s political equality. 
It presumes that it is just for indigenous people to influence the aspirations, 
values and workings of the state. In this way, the state at least potentially 
expresses, rather than curtails, indigenous political aspirations. Shared 
sovereignty is a decisive statement against assimilation and coercion. 
It can be reflected in various ways; for example, through guaranteed 
representation in parliament or a voice to parliament, as is being claimed 
in Australia.
The Declaration helps societies to conceptualise what further capacities 
and powers shared sovereignty might entail and offers protections against 
the uncertainties of majoritarian democratic exclusion. Shared sovereignty 
is present when indigenous values substantively influence public policy. 
Shared sovereign authority reflects self-determination by presuming 
indigenous people’s fundamental equality. It presumes that their cultural 
values and political aspirations rightly influence the conduct of public 
affairs. For example, as Justice Williams, the first Maori appointed to the 
New Zealand Supreme Court, argued:
Fundamentally, there is a need for a mindset shift away from 
the pervasive assumption that the Crown is Pākehā (Anglo-
Celtic), English-speaking and distinct from Māori rather than 
representative of them. Increasingly, in the 21st century, the 
Crown is also Māori. If the nation is to move forward, this reality 
must be grasped. (Waitangi Tribunal, Te reo Māori, 2010, p. 51)
Describing her experience as a moot court judge, Stephens (2017) 
explained what this remark could mean in practice:
Of the six mooters, four of the students mooted in Māori. Each of 
them was able to move fluidly between an unconscious ownership 
of the legal system and of tikanga Māori, and a blistering critique 
of the same systems. Just one small symbolic and up-ending 
moment of something better. There are other such moments 
waiting to coalesce. (The Crown is also Māori, para. 5)
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This illustrates the sentiment that ‘we are all here to stay’, or alternatively 
that Maori are not going to assimilate.
This chapter defines self-determination as political capacity or power, 
rather than simply a body of rights. It does so with reference to cross-
jurisdictional examples, and examples from across policy domains, to 
show the political importance of indigenous peoples pursuing self-
determination both within the state and within the indigenous nation. 
The examples also show what some indigenous policy actors imagine 
contributes to the self-determination of communities. Through these 
examples, this chapter demonstrates that there is both clarity on the 
meaning of self-determination and well-developed arguments to support 
its assertion.
Defining Self-Determination
In Canada, the right to self-government recognises an indigenous right to 
self-determination over matters ‘internal to their communities, integral 
to their unique cultures, identities, traditions, languages and institutions, 
and with respect to their special relationship to their land and their 
resources’ (Government of Canada, 1995, Part I – Policy framework, 
para. 1). The Declaration affirms this policy objective:
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their rights to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating 
to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for 
financing their autonomous functions. (UN, 2007b, art. 4)
However, self-government does not reflect self-determination’s full scope. 
Self-government is not, for example, the same as shared sovereignty. 
Neglecting self-determination within the state restricts indigenous 
political influence—an influence that, for meaningful self-determination 
to occur, must be exercised wherever policy decisions are made.
Self-determination arises from geopolitical attachments. There are ways 
in which self-determination can only be realised with respect to those 
attachments. However, geopolitical rights to land, culture and independent 
political authority are not the sum of the right to self-determination. 
These rights over a defined territory do not diminish the claim to a share 
in national public sovereignty. As Kingsbury and Grodinsky (1992) 
observed, it serves no purpose to make self-determination a ‘one-shot 
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right, vindicated and exhausted by liberation from domination’ (p. 393). 
It is self-determination—not self-government—that justifies guaranteed 
indigenous parliamentary representation and full participation in setting 
policy priorities, for example.
Self-determination within the state allows indigenous peoples to defend 
their independent authority against public intrusion. For example, 
in Canada, it allows indigenous people to defend against the effective 
veto that the minister of Aboriginal affairs and northern development 
enjoys over the decisions of a First Nations government (UN, 2014). This 
effective ‘veto’ includes reporting requirements to the federal minister 
that First Nations perceive as overly zealous and that perpetuate negative 
stereotypes. As the UN special rapporteur noted, indigenous nations are 
then positioned as ‘inconsistent and corrupt … [which] … undermine[s] 
rather than promote[s] public support for self-government’ (UN, 2014, 
p. 14).
The special rapporteur’s observations parallel arguments used to discredit 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in Australia. 
ATSIC was a public body exercising capacities of self-determination. 
The Howard Government (1996–2007) abolished it in 2005 because it 
‘separated’ Indigenous people from the national body politic; though, 
in practice, Indigenous peoples had never been so included (O’Sullivan, 
2017). Had Howard sought to further include Indigenous people, rather 
than abolish ATSIC, he would have listened to the strong political 
voice in favour of retaining the commission, or some other institution, 
to maximise Indigenous authority over their own affairs. It is for this 
reason that this book’s central argument is that self-determination can 
only occur through independent indigenous nationhood if it also occurs 
within the state—that is, if indigenous peoples are included to share 
national sovereign authority.
Self-determination implies order and philosophical certainty. 
Its foundational principles insist that indigenous peoples have the capacity 
to decide what is morally important and to determine the  political 
objectives they wish to pursue. Such decisions cannot be made by 
a  guardian (in a guardian–ward relationship) or by the senior partner 
in a bicultural project. As Dodson has argued:
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at the heart of all the violations of our human rights has been the 
failure to respect our integrity, and the insistence on speaking for 
us, defining our needs and controlling our lives. Self-determination 
is the river in which all other rights swim. (as cited in Scott, 1996, 
p. 814)
Self-determination is a state of political capacity. It is the freedom to 
determine one’s identity and significant because ‘Autonomy and self-
realisation are the key concepts for a practice with an immanent purpose, 
namely, the production and reproduction of a life worthy of human beings’ 
(Habermas, 1997, p. 41). The right of self-determination is important 
because it is preliminary to recognising and strengthening the broader 
human rights that indigenous people hold in common with all others. 
The scope of political freedom must be the same for all people.
Corntassel’s (2012) understanding of self-determination is that 
‘By focusing on “everyday” acts of resurgence, one disrupts the colonial 
physical, social and political boundaries designed to impede our actions 
to restore our nationhood’ (p. 88). However, Corntassel (2008) has also 
argued that self-determination is much more than political struggle. 
He explained that ‘resurgence means having courage and imagination to 
envision life beyond the state’ (Corntassel, 2012, p. 89) and having the 
capacity to make distinctive and substantively equal contributions to its 
public life. Further, it means that:
evolving indigenous livelihoods, food security, community 
governance, relationships to homelands and the natural world, 
and ceremonial life can be practised today locally and regionally, 
thus enabling the transmission of these traditions and practices to 
future generation. (Corntassel, 2008, p. 119)
When people are self-determining, the state cannot be all powerful and 
singularly constraining. Self-determination limits the state’s political 
jurisdiction by placing moral limits on the exertion of power and recognises 
that the state is neither a neutral entity nor one with a natural tendency 
towards benevolence. Self-determination cannot satisfy itself with state 
affirmative action policies for indigenous peoples but must advance an 
inherent right to participate in public affairs.
Self-determination does not threaten state sovereignty; instead, it threatens 
the exclusive presumptions that have traditionally positioned indigenous 
peoples beyond the public in whose name sovereignty is exercised and 
by whom its character is determined. The contemporary Indigenous 
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Australian claim to a voice to parliament is a claim to self-determination 
through a more substantive participation in state sovereignty. Just 
outcomes presuppose just decision-making processes.
Self-determination is not a private right; therefore, the ‘project of 
indigenous self-determination … [is not] a phenomenon outside of 
general political structures’ (Kuokkanen, 2012, p. 226). The state ought 
not be an institution that ‘consults’ with indigenous peoples but an entity 
in which they actively and substantively participate. Sovereignty is thus 
shared, and political arrangements ought to allow the just and orderly 
distribution of that sovereignty. The Declaration provides a framework for 
the distribution of political authority because:
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other 
peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any 
kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular 
that based on their indigenous origin or identity. (UN, 2007b, 
art. 2)
The Declaration provides a framework for thinking about self-
determination as not just a body of rights but also a body of capacities 
and powers.
Self-Determination—Beyond the Right, 
Towards the Power
Self-determination’s translation from a right to an effective and substantive 
power is politically important. The point that matters is indigenous peoples’ 
intertwining capacities for self-determination and citizenship. To that end, 
one may define self-determination with reference to Nussbaum (2008) 
and Sen’s (2002) theory of human capabilities, which presumes that:
Human beings live and interact in societies, and are, in fact, 
societal creatures. It is not surprising that they cannot fully 
flourish without participating in political and social affairs, and 
without being effectively involved in joint decision-making. (Sen, 
2002, p. 79)
The right to self-determination is affirmed as one that belongs 
simultaneously to individuals and to peoples. According to Taylor (1994), 
self-determination’s character and purpose ‘requires that it be sought in 
common’ (p. 59).
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The right to self-determination is one of procedural justice. It flows from 
relational justice between the state and indigenous entities as well as 
relational justice within the state. It presumes a state in which indigenous 
people participate as free and equal citizens, not consigned to perpetual 
victimhood (MacDonald & Muldoon, 2006) but to substantive respect 
through collective and individual citizenships that are responsive to 
immediate political context and actively shaped by indigenous peoples. 
The Declaration says that:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop 
their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to 
be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence 
and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional 
and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and 
development are entitled to just and fair redress. (UN, 2007b, 
art. 20)
Further:
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop 
priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development. 
In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively 
involved in developing and determining health, housing and 
other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far 
as possible, to administer such programmes through their own 
institutions. (UN, 2007b, art. 23)
Deliberative capacity is important. According to Anaya (2009), 
self-determination’s:
essential idea … is that human beings, individually and as groups, 
are equally entitled to be in control of their own destinies, and 
to live within government institutional orders that are devised 
accordingly. (p. 187)
Rights are recognised by the state, but they are neither claimed nor 
provided by its benevolence. As the Organization of American States put 
it in 1948, ‘the essential rights of man are not derived from the fact that 
he is a national from a certain state, but are based upon attributes of 
his human personality’ (para. 2). Following on from this, Anaya (1993) 
explained:
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Self-determination is not separate from other human rights norms; 
rather, self-determination is a configurative principle or framework 
complemented by the more specific human rights norms that in 
their totality enjoin the governing institutional order. (p. 323)
Self-determination is the opposite of an assimilationist order in which 
indigenous aspirations are excluded and indigenous people are positioned 
beyond the political on the presumption of deliberative incapacity. 
Self-determination’s distinctive moral quality is that it offers indigenous 
peoples protection in justice—if not always in practical politics—against 
the vagaries of majoritarian democracy.
Self-determination is diminished if one site of indigenous authority is 
privileged over the other. While ‘the perceived size and nature of the 
respective spaces vary’ (Broderstad, 2014, p. 72), the two spheres are 
mutually reinforcing of the other’s authority. For example, in New 
Zealand, the Tuhoe iwi’s desire to increase its scope of activity, influence 
and authority through taking responsibility for state welfare policy is 
intended to reduce the incidence of welfare dependence, raise educational 
attainment and reduce unemployment (Moore et al., 2014, p. 42). A 
gradual increase in the relative size of the Tuhoe middle class would be 
one of the outcomes that occurs over time—a further determinant of self-
determination and general wellbeing.
The Crown and Tuhoe have formally acknowledged each another’s mana 
(status and authority; Moore et al., 2014) to reflect a relationship between 
independent Maori authority and the state as one of ‘quasi-international 
quality’ (Gover, 2015, p. 346). This relationship is one in which state 
power is constrained by negotiation, the obligation to act in ‘good faith’, 
judicial intervention and Maori recourse to the moral persuasiveness of 
international norms of justice. The Tuhoe proposal aspires to fulfil many 
of the functions of the modern state. The intended relationship is also 
one of participatory parity, in which ‘no political matter may be decided 
other than by the people, lest that matter (no matter how obvious or true 
or right) become a source of domination over the people’ (Bellamy, 2007, 
p. 5).
A relational account of self-determination, and also of politics itself, 
‘encourages the view that indigenous peoples must seek influence 
in a  variety of different political forums in which they have become 
integrated with non-indigenous communities and governments’ (Murphy, 
2008, p. 203). In contrast with the Tuhoe approach, which offers some 
117
5 . SeLf-DeTeRmINATIoN–THe PoWeR AND THe PRACTICe
promise as an example of differentiated citizenship (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 8), the right to self-government in Canada, being only concerned 
with the right to political authority inside the indigenous nation, is limited, 
especially when set apart from opportunities for indigenous people to 
express a distinctive citizenship of the Canadian state. The policy requires:
1. The restoration of indigenous presences on the land and the 
revitalization of land-based practices;
2. An increased reliance on traditional diets among Indigenous 
people;
3. The transmission of indigenous culture, spiritual teachings 
and knowledge of the land between Elders and youth;
4. The strengthening of familial activities and re-emergence 
of indigenous cultural and social institutions as governing 
authorities within First Nations; and,
5. Short-term and long-term initiatives and improvements in 
sustainable land-based economies as the primary economies of 
reserve based First Nations communities and as supplemental 
economies for urban indigenous communities. (Alfred, 2009, 
p. 56)
Self-government allows nation-to-nation relationships between 
indigenous groups and the Canadian state to develop. These relationships 
remain points of principle in Canadian politics. However, the Trudeau 
Government’s (2015– ) rhetorical support for wider self-determination is 
still to find policy substance. For example, in 2016, the Canadian Human 
Rights Tribunal found systematic discrimination against indigenous 
children that governments ought to have addressed. The case exemplified 
the absence of indigenous self-determination within the state as a factor 
contributing to disputes over the nature and quality of child welfare 
services. This example of Canadian self-determination’s weak structural 
capacity highlights its inability to consider indigenous aspirations beyond 
territorially defined communities and shows that it ‘would be careless 
to assume that colonialism in Canada has ended’ (Richmond & Cook, 
2016, p. 10).
Self-determination’s concern with the large and complex task of realising 
indigenous authority within and over the tribe, nation or iwi is important 
in its own right; however, these bodies are also regulated and influenced 
by state policy and legislation. This, in turn, affects the lives of indigenous 
people as citizens of the nation-state. Conversely, indigenous people are 
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justifiably wary of the state and its tendency to assimilate. The state is 
only sporadically a force for indigenous good; yet, it is also the case that 
political systems and values evolve with time. Liberal democracy means 
that people should not expect perpetual exclusion from a share in public 
sovereignty. Alertness for new and different opportunities is part of what 
it means to be a self-determining people able to influence ‘the nature and 
levels of interactions with the non-indigenous world’ (Thornberry, 2002, 
p. 9).
No conception of justice is fixed, and the moral persuasiveness of 
instruments such as the Declaration must be allowed the opportunity to 
influence public values. It is only in accepting self-determination’s relative 
and relational character—in recognising the significance of one people’s 
engagement with another—that self-determination becomes politically 
worthwhile. It is a matter of reasonable democratic expectation that 
indigenous peoples ‘increase their influence through their increased ability 
to collaborate with the wider community through close relations with 
non-indigenous people’ (Broderstad, 2014, p. 73). Indeed, the strength of 
these relationships is a principal determinant of self-determination and is 
also preliminary to developing relationships of ‘respect and trust’ (p. 73).
Self-Determination as Political Capacity
Chief Percy Guichon of the Tsilhqot’in people understood 
self-determination as a relative and relational capacity:
We do live side-by-side and we need to work on a relationship 
to create or promote a common understanding among all our 
constituents … we need to find the best way forward to consult 
with each other, regardless of what legal obligations might exist. 
I mean, that’s just neighbourly, right? … We share a lot of common 
interests in areas like resource development. We need to find ways 
to work together, to support one another on these difficult topics. 
(quotation is as it appears in the source, as cited in TRC, 2015, 
p. 301)
The capacity for self-determination is intertwined with the capacity to 
share sovereignty. While self-determination can constrain state sovereignty, 
indigenous self-determination can also be part of that sovereignty so that 
sovereignty is reconciled with a liberal democratic indigenous citizenship. 
Alternative, strictly compartmentalised views about the nature and 
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location of political power exclude indigenous peoples from public affairs. 
The state is then prevented from dealing with difference. An important 
omission because:
Dismissing others’ norms out of hand, or refusing to engage them 
seriously, or giving up easily and declaring stalemate quickly all 
negate the cosmopolitan spirit of the proximity principle because 
such actions deny that one must inevitably share with others the 
circumstances of living … Another group’s social practices are 
just as much ‘a repository of human wisdom’ as one’s own, and 
cosmopolitan moral responsibility demands that each person try 
to enrich her own ‘parochial’ claims by entertaining these alternate 
sources of wisdom and modifying one’s practices in light of others’ 
persuasive standards of conduct. (Klausen, 2014, p. 37)
The question of great policy importance that self-determination asks is: 
how might people simultaneously ‘stand in the dreaming, and in the 
market’ (Grant, 2016)? How do they stand in the market as indigenous 
citizens of a plural democracy—whether it be the market for housing, 
education or work, or the market for culturally cognisant health care? 
Standing in the market as a self-determining citizen might also presume 
policing concerned with protection rather than victimisation, and markets 
for schooling that do not treat culture as foreign and troublesome.
If the right to self-determination requires authority over policy 
development and delivery, it is not simply an abstract claim but one 
that requires institutional arrangements designed specifically to give 
effect to that authority at all levels of the policy process. For example, 
Durie (2001) argued that, in New Zealand, self-determination means 
that Maori might ‘live as Maori’ or, as Bishop et al. (2010) framed it 
in an educational setting, achieve as Maori. For these reasons, the Maori 
Statistics Framework draws on Sen’s (2002) capabilities approach to 
development to propose Maori wellbeing as a ‘function of the capability 
of Maori individuals and collectives to live the kind of life that they want 
to live’ (Wereta, 2001, p. 5).
Launched in 2010, the New Zealand social policy measure Whānau Ora 
develops a form of self-determination in which whanau (families) can:
• be self-managing
• live healthy lifestyles
• participate fully in society
• confidently participate in Te Ao Māori [the Maori world]
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• enjoy economic security and successful involvement in wealth 
creation
• be cohesive, resilient and nurturing
• be responsible stewards of their living and natural environments. 
(Kukutai, Sporle & Roskruge, 2017, p. 17)
As Kukutai et al. (2017) explained, ‘This whānau capacity model 
emphasises progressive advancement rather than the management of 
adversity, and focuses on functional capacities’ (p. 18).
Contemporary studies of Maori wellbeing show a desire to participate in 
public affairs. This means that the state cannot be positioned as ‘theirs’ 
in a ‘them’ and ‘us’ relationship. The state might then acknowledge that:
From a Māori worldview, western concepts of wellbeing that are 
founded on the presumption of universality and the primacy of 
the individual, have limited relevance for contemporary measuring 
and monitoring of well-being for Maori. (Kukutai et al., 2017, 
p. 15)
Wellbeing reflects cultural epistemology. For Maori, ‘there is not a strict 
dividing line’ (Kukutai et al., 2017, p. 15) between individual and whanau 
wellbeing.
Whānau Ora is concerned for whanau capacity to care for members 
whose wellbeing is afflicted by ill health or unemployment and presumes 
that the individual’s wellbeing is the whanau’s collective moral concern. 
The Whānau Rangatiratanga Framework’s capability dimensions are:
• Sustainability of Te Ao Māori
• Social capability
• Human resource potential
• Economic self-determination. (Social Policy Evaluation and 
Research Unit, 2016, p. 12)
Its whanau rangatiratanga principles are:
• Whakapapa/Thriving relationships
• Manaakitanga/Reciprocity & support
• Rangatiratanga/Leadership & participation
• Kotahitanga/Collective unity
• Wairuatanga/Spiritual & cultural strength (Distinctive 
Identity). (p. 5)
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As Kukutai et al. (2017) explain, Boulton and Gifford’s study of whanau 
resilience found that Maori people emphasised:
• the desire that their children experience a better life than theirs
• the importance of establishing a foundation for their children
• providing children with stability and security
• providing a ‘decent’ environment for them to grow up in
• instilling cultural values
• having role models and maintaining healthy attitudes and 
lifestyles
• having good personal health
• maintaining balance between mental, physical and spiritual 
wellbeing
…
• the importance of happiness in everyday life
• having a clear sense of belonging or identity, and active 
participation in Te Ao Māori and mainstream contexts
• a duty of mutual care and support within each whānau
• whānau solidarity and intergenerational connectedness
• financial security
• spiritual wellbeing
• a sense of future success and potential (Boulton & Gifford, 
2014). (Kukutai et al., 2017, p. 21)
Ratima et al.’s (2007) related proposal to increase the size of the Maori 
health workforce shows that, while self-determination can be incredibly 
complex, it can also be very simple. Increasing the size of the Maori health 
workforce does not reflect the constitutional or structural transformations 
that many indigenous scholars and policy actors seek; however, it does 
reflect political values and practices that influence people’s capacity to live 
lives that they have reason to value. According to Ratima et al. (2007), 
the distinguishing characteristics of a policy to increase the Maori health 
workforce include:
• Māori led, focused and targeted interventions;
• consistent investment over a prolonged period;
• emphasis on the development of dual cultural and clinical 
competencies;
• integration of student support programs within a university 
environment;
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• provision of comprehensive support to tertiary students, 
including financial assistance, access to Māori mentors and 
peer support, and inclusion in communities of learning;
• congruence with industry needs;
• supported transitions into and between study and work;
• attention to the broader determinants of Māori health 
workforce participation; and
• action across the workforce development pipeline (including 
secondary schools). (p. 543)
In Ratima et al.’s work, self-determination prefigures a postcolonial order 
despite—as Watson and Venne (2012) put it in the Australian context—
‘the road back to country’ being ‘long and filled with colonial encounters’ 
(p. 87). However, the point of that long road is usually remarkably clear. 
For Brands (2014), self-determination means that, in Australia, by 2030, 
there would be:
• [t]rue reconciliation—a treaty, constitutional recognition, 
resulting in [an] Australian society in which Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people and cultures have pride of place
• [r]eal community control in [the] community controlled sector
• [s]ignificant improvement in health outcomes and life 
expectancy
• [r]eal cultural equity, no racism
• incorporation of Aboriginal knowledge into the mainstream 
(i.e. ‘Nunga streaming’ not ‘mainstreaming’)
• foregrounding and privileging of Aboriginal models of health 
(e.g. spirituality)
• greater control of, and informed choice about, education and 
employment
• celebration of diversity and difference
• integration of Aboriginal values [into] the landscape
• no ‘othering’
• Aboriginal representation at all levels of government 
and society
• Aboriginal people … influencing decisions, across all dimensions 
of society
• a return to values and ethics (individual and community), 
meaning less focus on consumerism and capitalism, and [more 
on] sustainable and ecological ways of living. (p. 12)
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Anderson (2014) imagined displacing Australia’s neo-colonial order with 
a post- or even noncolonial one. Accordingly, by 2030, a representative 
29-year-old Indigenous Australian woman would:
• [have] higher education qualifications [and be] … technically, 
socially and culturally savvy
• [be m]entally and socially in touch with community 
and family
• [be a n]on-smoker, [and have a] good BMI [Body Mass Index] 
[and] no drinking problem
• [be in a s]table relationship
• [have] choice and control over fertility, childcare 
and employment
• [be w]orld-aware but with a sense of individual purpose
• [be w]ell-travelled [and have] global visions
• [be e]conomically independent
• [be g]rounded in mixed cultures
• [build] on family history for positive outcomes. (Brands, 2014, 
p. 13)
Alternatively, ‘we can imagine an Australia [that] turns its back on diversity, 
[that] increases the divide between rich and poor, and [that] sees little 
or no real improvement in the health and wellbeing of its First Peoples’ 
(Anderson, 2014, pp. 4–5). The representative 29-year-old woman’s life 
would then be distinguished by:










• [having a] family and community deeply affected by her loss. 
(Brands, 2014, p. 13)
‘We ARe ALL HeRe To STAy’
124
Anderson’s view of self-determination defines the conditions of equality. 
Since equality is not a neutral concept, it is not understood by all people 
in the same ways and for the same purposes. Rather than an abstract state, 
equality is a political value whose functions and proper distributions are 
culturally contextualised.
There are examples of Indigenous Australians exercising self-determination 
in policy development and implementation. Indigenous-led peak bodies 
have influence across policy domains. However, ‘the Government could 
achieve significant progress in realising the rights of indigenous people 
if it consulted and worked much more closely with these organisations’ 
(UN, 2017b, para. 5). In this context, it is significant that the National 
Congress of Australia’s First Peoples ‘has been dismally disregarded by the 
Government’ (para. 6). Conversely, Aboriginal community–controlled 
health organisations (ACCHOs) show that people think about the right 
to health as a right that is realised through citizenship-as-capacity—that 
is, through self-determination.
The first Aboriginal medical service was established in Sydney in 1971. Its 
purpose was to support ‘self-determination through community control 
… initiated, designed and controlled by Aboriginal people’ (Foley, 1991, 
p. 4). Almost 50 years later, ‘[ACCHOs] are leading the way in our 
community, in translating what [the Declaration] means, in practice, 
through community control’ (Davis, 2013, p. 12). ACCHOs give the 
Declaration practical application. As Davis has observed, they pursue 
‘self-determination through the right to health’ (p. 11) and, in doing so, 
provide a model that the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has 
advanced as a model of international best practice.
Australian self-determination is not the ‘failed experiment’ of the Howard 
Government’s (1996–2007) rationale for abolishing ATSIC in 2005. 
Instead, it is a contemporary aspiration that Australian Indigenous 
peoples actively pursue as far as prevailing policy paradigms will allow. 
Among the constraints that ACCHOs face is that, like New Zealand’s 
various tribal bodies, they may influence public policy but are not usually 
able to make it. In 2016, the National Health and Medical Research 
Council’s (NHMRC) Translating Research into Policy and Practice 
Forum facilitated significant and substantive Indigenous contributions to 
policy debate. However, it had no formal capacity to develop these ideas 
to give them official sanction. The forum showed that, while there were 
mechanisms for Indigenous voices to be heard, they were unable to hold 
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influence. Its recommendations and priorities emphasised citizenship 
as an underlying political theme that must be considered as part of the 
policy process.
The capacity to influence depends on the strength of one’s citizenship. 
The remedial nature of contemporary policy priorities reflects citizenship’s 
historic weaknesses. The forum’s overarching aim was to ‘identify evidence 
gaps … and policy gaps, informed by … systematic reviews’ (NHMRC, 
2016, p. 1). The forum stressed ‘Community grounded responses to social 
and emotional well-being’ (p. 2). Its principled recommendation for 
pregnancy and childbirth was a plea for the opportunity to make personal 
choices equivalent to that which urban dwelling women take for granted: 
‘policies should reflect and respect women’s choice to stay in community 
and to decide who can be present at the birth’ (p. 2).
The forum’s report of proceedings is a claim for citizenship. It is not 
a claim for privilege or additional rights, nor is it a claim for differentiated 
citizenship. It is simply a plea for public policy to work effectively for 
Indigenous members of the Australian nation. As a further example, in 
terms of access to data and bureaucracy, the report stressed that the focus 
was on ‘better sharing of data, particularly across portfolios, and its use by 
bureaucrats’ (NHMRC, 2016, p. 4). Acutely aware of what had eluded 
the bureaucracy in the past, the forum identified a connection between 
broad principles, aspirations and data ‘to prioritise needs and policy, and 
identify research gaps and needs’ (p. 4).
The inadequate collection of population data weakens the relationship 
between policy and self-determination. According to the forum, it is 
important to know how ‘existing data can be better used to improve 
understanding of, and provide insight into, the health and wellbeing 
(and the health care needs) of young Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Australians’ (NHMRC, 2016, p. 3). The forum identified housing, 
criminal justice and education as determinants of health and proposed 
better policy integration. The absence of a specific ‘Aboriginal community 
controlled education sector’ (p. 3) was also noted.
Education is the only Council of Australian Governments Closing the 
Gap target in which progress is consistently made (Commonwealth 
of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2018b). 
Its importance as an underlying determinant of self-determination means 
that education warrants constant policy attention. Education is also the 
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underlying determinant of indigenous access to the middle class, which 
is itself a  determinant of better health, housing and general wellbeing 
(O’Sullivan, 2017). Much is known about success in indigenous 
education, yet there are also many instances of policy failure. Just as 
Indigenous peoples in Australia have clear expectations of the health 
system, there is clarity of thought among Indigenous actors on what they 
expect education to provide to them as Indigenous citizens of the state.
The National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples (2018) argued that the 
Declaration and the right to self-determination should inform education 
policy. However, it also noted that ‘Our children continue to be denied 
access to culturally appropriate and effective education, which prevents 
them from flourishing later on in life’ (p. 2). Earlier, the congress 
summarised the principles that informed its expectations of schooling: 
‘The maintenance and advancement of our cultures and full participation 
of our Peoples in national economic, political and social life’ (National 
Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, 2013, p. 7). It argued that schools 
that help to achieve these objectives will:
• Foster a genuine shared sense of responsibility with the 
communities they serve, and a respectful and committed sense 
of partnership;
• Recognise and value the diversity of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander cultures and languages;
• Value and foster the maintenance of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander cultures by incorporating Indigenous knowledge 
in their curriculum;
• Are free from discrimination and hold institutionally-
supported high expectations for students;
• Have a high quality, experienced, skilled and stable workforce. 
(National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, 2013, p.7)
In New Zealand, the Waikato-Tainui people has a well-developed strategy 
to inform its people’s education (see Waikato-Tainui, 2015). Its influence 
is important but ultimately constrained by its lack of capacity to operate 
schools and determine what and how they will teach. The Key (2008–
2016) and English (2016–2017) governments’ charter schools policy 
was intended to facilitate such capacity. Charter schools were established 
in New Zealand in 2011; however, the model was heavily criticised for 
failing to meet the stated policy expectations (Thrupp, 2016) and was 
abolished by the Ardern Government in 2017. The educational quality of 
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charter schools was potentially compromised, as they were not required 
to employ registered teachers nor to follow the national curriculum 
(Jenkins, 2018). Yet, according to some Maori commentators, neither of 
these things—teacher registration and national curriculum—routinely 
supported Maori achievement. They claimed that charter schools, unlike 
public schools, provided opportunities for Maori to exercise authority 
over their education. An ethnic divide on the policy was noticeable within 
the government’s senior coalition partner, the Labour Party. Its decision to 
abolish charter schools was not supported by Maori members attracted 
to their self-determining potential (Paterson, 2017).
Charter schools were intended to improve student achievement, with 
a particular focus on children who had not succeeded in the state system. 
Maori featured disproportionately among the policy’s target group—
namely, those who had:
1. Low academic baselines and lack of core skills for learning
2. Histories of disengagement from education
3. Complex socio-economic and health needs that create barriers 
to education
4. Lack of education role models to support economic and 
educational success. (Jenkins, 2016, p. 9)
The flexibility that charter schools enjoyed was intended to promote 
innovation. However, their focus on Maori children with histories of 
underachievement in mainstream schooling meant that there was no 
scope for teaching according to Maori pedagogies and epistemologies 
for the benefit of any Maori citizen who wished to be educated in that 
way. Charter schools were an admission of state failure and a haphazard 
and incomplete response that did not obviously add to the provisions 
for schooling in the Maori language and culture that were already well 
established within the state system.
Indigenous education systems are important expressions of the right to 
self-determination; however, so too is mainstream education’s cultural 
responsiveness and ability to serve indigenous aspirations. For example, 
Te Kotahitanga, a successful project to improve Maori achievement in 
secondary schools, was developed on the presumption that it is important 
for education systems to understand indigenous peoples and their cultures. 
Its philosophy of Maori policy leadership presumed that the solution to 
entrenched Maori educational failure lay not with the system itself but 
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with the people the system determined as lacking in the capacity to define 
and pursue success, and their capacity for self-determination (Bishop 
et al., 2010). Te Kotahitanga shows the importance of Maori policy and 
professional leadership inside the state because, in the case of Maori 
education, non-Maori state schools are the places where most Maori 
receive their early formal education. It is through schooling that people 
develop many of their capacities for citizenship and the relationships 
and skills to work out the terms of their membership of the political 
community.
Conclusion
The capacity to engage with others is an essential constituent of the 
right to self-determination. Indigenous peoples must contribute equally 
to working out the terms of their membership of the nation-state and 
must also have the capacity to exercise self-determination within their 
own political structures. Self-determination is not absolute autonomy. 
As Kuokkanen (2012) explained:
The aboriginal political discourse regarding self-determination 
would be more useful to communities if it incorporated an 
understanding of the individual as relational, autonomous 
and self-determining. That is, they developed a perspective of 
individual self-determination as necessary to move collective 
self-determination beyond rhetoric to a meaningful and practical 
political project that engages aboriginal peoples, and is deliberately 
inclusive of indigenous women. (p. 237)
Self-determination recognises that ‘real power’ lies in ‘inherent 
responsibilities’ (emphasis in original, Corntassel, 2012, p. 91). It does 
not constitute reconciliation as a ‘politics of distraction’ (p. 91) but as 
a politics of possibility. One knows that self-determination is occurring 
when indigenous peoples find that there is a reconfiguration of state 
power opening new and meaningful spaces of political opportunity. Those 
spaces are opened when public sovereignty is truly the people’s authority 
and when all people—not just some—share that authority and have 
a meaningful say in determining what it means to be a citizen—what it 
means to be one who deliberates.
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Possibilities are opened further when indigenous peoples work out for 
themselves what it means to be an indigenous citizen; in particular, when 
they work out the institutional values and arrangements that are needed 
for indigenous people to deliberate in ways that make sense to them and 
that recognise their distinctive aspirations. Chapter 7 uses sovereignty as 
a theoretical framework for discussing these questions and examining what 
it means to argue that greater self-determination requires a different kind 
of sovereignty. It follows Chapter 6, which examines self-determination in 
selected jurisdictions that were not opposed to the Declaration when it was 
adopted in 2007 but have not necessarily committed to its comprehensive 




The Declaration in 
Comparative Context
Introduction
Self-determination is universally important as a relative and relational 
political authority. It is also important as a body of political capacities. 
This chapter examines the ways in which the right to self-determination 
has been interpreted in various jurisdictions that voted in favour of the 
Declaration or, in the Russian Federation’s case, abstained from the vote. 
The comparison is instructive both in respect of the scope of the right 
to self-determination (including the matter of defining what constitutes 
an indigenous people) and in understanding the effect that prevailing 
political values and broader conceptions of human rights may have on 
self-determination’s substantive form.
Unlike Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US, Bolivia and Ecuador 
incorporated the Declaration into their constitutions, which, for Gussen 
(2016), makes them ‘technically postcolonial’ (p. 871). However, like 
Belize and the Scandinavian states—especially Sweden and Finland—
they display an inconsistent practical regard for the Declaration. In none 
of these jurisdictions are indigenous peoples satisfied that it is being 
implemented. Their view is supported by UN special rapporteurs on the 
rights of indigenous peoples and by independent civil commentators, 
as discussed in this chapter. In these jurisdictions, indigenous rights to 
culture are generally accepted along with sometimes significant pluralism 
in public affairs. However, the extent of such rights is variable, and 
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plurality can be limited and conditional. As in the four dissenting states, 
the most significant point of contention is over the scope of the principle 
of free, prior and informed consent.
The question of whether self-determination belongs to indigenous peoples 
only in relation to their own institutions, or whether it also belongs to 
indigenous peoples within the state as part of a substantive differentiated 
citizenship, is also contested, though not to the extent of there being no 
examples of effective indigenous voice as part of an inclusive national 
polity. In this respect, this chapter’s comparative focus draws out lessons 
that expand or limit the bounds of political possibility.
This chapter’s discussion of authoritarian states—the Russian Federation, 
Fiji and Malaysia—demonstrates the importance of prevailing political 
values in terms of self-determination and shows that disagreements over 
the meanings of self-determination and indigeneity occur amid wider 
uncertainty about the concept of human rights itself. The chapter discusses 
definitional problems in working out the rights of indigeneity and notes 
the limits of conflating indigenous and minority rights; such conflation 
sets geopolitical and cultural relationships aside as the foundational point 
in indigenous peoples’ identity. For the same reason, this chapter contests 
the notion of indigenous peoples as necessarily subjugated or dominated, 
as this conception makes indigeneity a temporary political status rather 
than a permanent cultural one.
The distinction between indigenous and minority ethnic status is an 
important feature of Ainu politics in Japan. The chapter uses Ainu 
experience to show the importance of international cooperation among 
indigenous peoples in asserting the claim to self-determination. It discusses 
the importance of an indigenous people’s self-recognition as indigenous, 
as well as the importance of mutual recognition by the state to indigenous 
people’s capacity for full and meaningful participation in public affairs.
Participation, Inclusion and 
Self-Determination
‘Sovereign’ indigenous peoples share public authority in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia. They coexist as many nations under one state and 
under a  new and inclusive constitution. The Constitution of Bolivia 
was approved at a public referendum in 2009 and attracted 60 per cent 
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support. Coincidentally, Bolivia’s constitutional review, which occurred as 
the Declaration was being developed, was proposed under the leadership 
of an indigenous state-president (Rice, 2014).
Bolivia’s Constitution recognises 36 indigenous languages. It guarantees 
proportionate indigenous representation in the parliament and provides 
for indigenous ‘autonomies’ as units of local government (Constitución 
Política del Estado [Political Constitution of the State] 2009 [Bolivia]). 
Rice  (2014) described these local government arrangements as 
‘plurinational constitutionalism’ (p. 59).
Bolivia’s Constitution includes clauses that closely parallel articles in the 
Declaration. For example, its second article, which corresponds with 
the  Declaration’s fourth, asserts that the right to self-determination 
‘[consists in the indigenous] right to autonomy, self-government, 
their culture, recognition of their institutions, and the consolidation 
of their  territorial entities’ (Constitución Política del Estado, art. 2). 
Meanwhile, the Declaration affirms that:
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating 
to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for 
financing their autonomous functions. (UN, 2007b, art. 4)
Bolivia has the world’s most developed public recognition of the 
Declaration and its principles, yet its full application remains constrained 
and contested.
Indigenous peoples in Bolivia used the Declaration for the first time in 
2011 to resist a highway development that was ultimately approved in 
2017. This result notwithstanding, the objection was ‘an important test 
of the state’s internationalization of indigenous rights norms’; according 
to Rice (2014), ‘by framing their claims in the Declaration’s terms, 
indigenous groups’ went some way towards ‘narrowing the gap between 
legislation and practices’ (p. 59).
Conversely, however, Bolivia does not protect non-renewable resources on 
indigenous lands. The state accepts no obligation to acquire indigenous 
consent before resource extraction occurs. Therefore, the Bolivian 
Constitution does not ‘fully change power relations between the state 
and indigenous peoples’ (Rice, 2014, p. 61). Similarly, autonomies are 
unable to operate according to indigenous decision-making processes. 
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These  restrictions do not support Rice’s further contention that, in 
taking ‘the rights and responsibilities of municipalities’, these units of 
government are ‘in essence subverting indigenous governance to the logic 
of the state’ (p. 60).
An alternative explanation is that this kind of independence, which 
works to undermine notions of an exclusive settler state in binary conflict 
with indigenous institutions, is a step towards an inclusive plurinational 
polity in which public institutions are arranged to support independent 
indigenous participation in decision-making. From this perspective, 
a more important constraint is that autonomies can only be established in 
rural areas with majority indigenous populations. Although it is a model 
available to just half the indigenous population (Rice, 2014), it is one 
with potential for expansion in respect of geographic coverage, domains 
of responsibility and culturally cognisant modes of operation. It is also the 
case that countries such as Ecuador, which has an indigenous population 
comprising 25 to 30 per cent of the total population, voted for the 
Declaration because it creates no new rights.
Ecuador saw the Declaration as ensuring the extension of existing human 
rights norms to indigenous peoples. The country claims to recognise 
indigenous rights especially in relation to language and land (UN, 2013). 
The 2008 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (Constitución de la 
República del Ecuador) recognises indigenous rights to culture, land 
and language, and allows legal pluralism in public affairs. Therefore, in 
contrast to Rice’s (2014) objection in relation to Bolivia, Gussen (2016) 
argued that, in Ecuador, autonomous indigenous local governments 
establish the principle of subsidiarity that provides self-determination 
with an important philosophical foundation.
Subsidiarity complements indigenous participation in national state 
affairs. It is the idea that decision-making authority is best located as close 
as possible to the point of policy impact. It informed devolution policies 
in New Zealand during the 1980s and rationalised the creation of iwi 
authorities to contract with government to deliver public services with at 
least some reference to cultural preferences in policy delivery (O’Sullivan, 
2007). The principle was imperfectly implemented as contracts were often 
burdened by excessive reporting requirements and insufficient funding for 
the work required (Boston, 1996). Nevertheless, the idea that indigenous 
people should, as far as possible, have the capacity to take responsibility 
for their own affairs is essential to self-determination.
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Subsidiarity is a logical expression of the right to self-determination 
in Ecuador. As Gussen (2016) noted:
The fact that there were already international instruments that 
provided guidance on Indigenous rights meant that the most 
efficient way forward (as far as obtaining consensus is concerned) 
was to import these instruments into municipal law, and give 
a constitutional weight to ensure their implementation. (p. 898)
However, as in other jurisdictions that claimed an advanced commitment 
to the Declaration, there were broader domestic values that shaped its 
translation into substantive political practice. In 2013, Ecuador introduced 
restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association. These 
restrictions contravene Articles 16 and 19 of the Declaration. There are 
also examples of the harassment of indigenous political actors and of the 
right to free, prior and informed consent being overridden (Cultural 
Survival, 2016). Rather than recognising a right to offer or withhold 
consent, Gussen (2016) explained that Ecuador recognises the right to 
‘free, prior and informed consultation’ (p. 897). Consent and consultation 
are different concepts. Gussen’s example does not unequivocally establish 
that what is elsewhere regarded as an aspirational goal has ‘actually become 
part of the enforceable domestic law in Ecuador’ (p. 898).
Ecuador attempted to justify its use of consultation (as opposed to consent) 
in response to a UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR) recommendation from Germany. However, Ecuador’s explanation 
only served to highlight the political inadequacy of consultation in terms 
of substantive and meaningful participation as part of the state:
The Constitution of the Ecuadorian State establishes consultation 
as a right of all Ecuadorians, but particularly for communities, 
peoples and nationalities, a previous, free and informed 
consultation, but not their consent. Additionally, it is necessary 
to indicate that Ecuador recognizes the existence of Indigenous 
Peoples living in voluntary isolation, with the consequent 
obligation of guaranteeing their lives, of respecting and making 
others respect their self-determination and will to remain in 
isolation, and defend the validity of their rights, which turns 
unviable obtaining their consent. (as cited in Cultural Survival, 
2016, p. 5)
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Ecuador’s argument was that indigenous rights are qualified and belong 
only to groups who choose to live in isolation. Such rights are not full 
and comprehensive rights to self-determination. The country’s position 
demonstrates the importance of the distinction between self-government 
and self-determination as discussed in Chapter 5.
An alternative approach, and one that is more significant in terms 
of the breadth of possibilities it creates for interpreting the right to 
self-determination, is to read the Declaration in conjunction with other 
instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UN,  1948). This foundational document shows the scope of the 
rights that indigenous peoples share with other citizens within the state:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his 
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his 
country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or equivalent free 
voting procedures. (UN, 1948, art. 21)
These points are not diminished by the greater—though not exclusive—
attention that the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples places 
on rights beyond the state. Nor are they diminished by the Declaration’s 
primary focus on state responsibility rather than indigenous capacity, 
though it is in this respect that the UPR’s recommendations to Ecuador 
did not reflect the breadth of the Declaration’s possibilities.
Focusing on states ‘doing justice’ to indigenous peoples is important, but 
it is not the same as creating space for indigenous peoples to do justice to 
themselves. The following illustrative recommendations were supported 
by Ecuador (parentheses indicate the recommending state in the UPR; 
UN, 2012b):
Take targeted measures to address the situation of girls and the 
challenge of ensuring the accessibility to registration for indigenous 
peoples and people of African descent as well as for migrant 
families. The right of every child to a name and nationality should 
be guaranteed (Finland). (s. 135.33)
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Ensure that community activists and indigenous leaders can 
exercise their right to peaceful assembly and protest and that anti-
terrorist legislation is not misused to inappropriately censure such 
activities (Canada). (s. 135.37)
Develop a mechanism to gather statistics on education of indigenous 
groups. (s. 135.55)
Adopt special measures for the realisation of collective rights of 
indigenous peoples and the adoption of mechanisms to ensure their 
right to be consulted (Hungary); Undertake effective measures 
to further strengthen the existing mechanisms for consultation 
with the indigenous population on issues which have an impact 
on the economic and social aspects of the indigenous population 
(Malaysia); Continue to improve the promotion and protection 
of the rights of indigenous peoples, in particular the respect of 
their cultural and linguistic diversity, and further think about 
programmes and policies for indigenous peoples, particularly 
focusing on women and children (Morocco); Institutionalize the 
right to consultation of the indigenous population and involve civil 
society and indigenous groups in the elaboration of a functioning 
consultation mechanism in line with Ecuador’s commitments 
under ILO [International Labor Organization]-Convention 169 
(Norway). (s. 135.57).
Adopt legislation to guarantee the fulfilment of the collective 
rights of the indigenous population and Afro-Ecuadoreans, so 
as to increase affirmative actions in favours of racial and gender 
equality (Paraguay). (s. 135.58)
The following illustrative recommendation was not supported by Ecuador:
Establish clear consultation procedures in order to implement the 
right to free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples as 
contained in the Constitution (Germany). (UN, 2012b, s. 136.3)
Belize is another example of a state that supports the Declaration but 
habitually contravenes its provisions. It does this even though its own 
Supreme Court found that:
This Declaration, embodying as it does general principles of 
international law relating to indigenous peoples and their lands 
and resources of such force that the defendants, representing the 
Government of Belize, will not disregard it. Belize, it should be 
remembered voted for it. (as cited in Boyer, 2014, p. 13)
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In its 13-page report to the Human Rights Committee of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Maya Leaders Alliance (2018) 
of Belize argued that:
Despite orders from its own Supreme Court and the Caribbean 
Court of Justice to do so, the government of Belize has failed 
to delimit, differentiate, and title the Maya territory, or to 
meaningfully consult with Maya peoples to protect Maya land 
rights. The government’s failures have resulted in the violation of 
the Maya peoples’ rights to be free from discrimination, rights to 
self-determination, and rights to property. (p. 1)
The report recommended solutions that were consistent with the 
Declaration and did not threaten the integrity of the state. They included 
recognition of a representative body to engage in state policy formation 
and the full implementation of court orders affirming indigenous claims 
that are consistent with the Declaration (Maya Leaders Alliance, 2018).
The Maya Leaders Alliance (2018) also argued for the recognition of 
customary rights, customary systems of government, repair of environmental 
damage due to logging and other non-Maya commercial activity on Maya 
lands. In line with the Declaration, it called on the state to:
refrain from acting, or permitting or tolerating third parties to act, 
in ways that might affect the existence, value, use, or enjoyment 
of the property located within the geographic area occupied and 
used by the Maya peoples, until such time as it has developed a 
mechanism to delineate, demarcate, or otherwise protect Maya 
lands. (Maya Leaders Alliance, 2018, p. 13)
In Scandinavia, Sami peoples, cultures and traditional livelihoods are 
constitutionally protected. There are structured opportunities for Sami 
participation in the public affairs of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
all of which voted for the Declaration. In 2017, together with Finland 
and Iceland, these states reaffirmed their support for the Declaration: 
‘The  Nordic countries strongly support the Declaration, including its 
emphasis on the right to self-government and participation. These are 
central to ensure that the rights of indigenous peoples are respected’ 
(Hattrem, 2017, para. 2).
The Norwegian Government established the Sami Rights Commission in 
1980. Its ‘positive rights’ interpretation of Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN, 1966a) contributed 
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to the establishment of the Sami Parliament (Sámediggi), which has 
become an important institution and distinctively indigenous part of 
the state (Broderstad, 2014). Sami self-determination in Norway is best 
understood from a relational perspective. Broderstad (2014) argued that, 
while contemporary arrangements are an improvement on the benign 
interpretations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
that undermined Norwegian assimilationist policies, they do not embody 
the active protection of distinctive indigenous rights that the covenant 
imagined, namely:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, 
or to use their own language. (UN, 1966a, art. 27)
A ‘consultation agreement’ establishes the terms of the relationship 
between the Sami and Norwegian parliaments. The agreement proceeds 
with reference to Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization 
on indigenous and tribal peoples and its principles of relational justice: 
‘the rights of indigenous people to consultation, negotiation and real 
participation in decision-making processes’ (Broderstad, 2014, p. 84). 
According to Broderstad (2014), the ‘enhanced recognition of rights 
expresses both a principle of autonomy and close relations between the 
Sami and wider political community’ (p. 84).
The right to autonomy is an expression of subsidiarity, and the emphasis 
on relationships with the wider community reflects principles of 
differentiated citizenship. However, the Norwegian model is limited in 
the sense that the right to autonomy is restricted to Sami homelands. 
If the right to self-determination belongs to all peoples, it ought not be 
restricted in this way.
Broderstad (2014) is careful not to position the agreement as one that 
guarantees justice. Even in these Nordic jurisdictions, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples argued that it is necessary:
To explore ways to ensure that there is policy coherence between 
the positions they take in international human rights forums and 
those they take at home … the standards of the final [policy] 
outcome should not be lower than those to which all three states 
have committed in endorsing the Declaration. (UN, 2016b, p. 6)
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The special rapporteur recommended that the Norwegian Sami Parliament 
be granted a role in the ‘oversight and evaluation of Sami  education 
programs and their quality’ (UN, 2016b, p. 20). The rapporteur also 
recommended better support for Sami languages of which there are 
nine—each of them ‘threatened’ or ‘extremely threatened’ (p. 6).
The special rapporteur made similar recommendations to the Swedish 
state. Critical of that country’s Sami language policy, she was blunt in 
her ‘encouragement’ of Sweden ‘to introduce reforms to ensure that the 
Sami Parliament has greater independence from State institutions and 
authorities’ (UN, 2016b, p. 20). She urged Sweden to review the Sami 
Parliament’s statutory status and function in relation to government 
institutions and to ensure that adequate funding was allocated for the 
parliament to carry out its work as a popularly elected body (UN, 2016b).
The special rapporteur had earlier recommended that Norway strengthen 
mechanisms for assessing land and resource claims, and had proposed 
more effective consultative measures and arrangements for the settlement 
of these claims. She also proposed stronger measures to protect indigenous 
interests in relation to commercial mining licences, arguing that Sami 
interests ought to be managed consistently with contemporary human 
rights values (UN, 2016b). Norway is yet to adopt the recommendations 
(UN, 2016b). Nevertheless, it is an important measure of relational justice 
that, under the Norwegian consultation agreement, most of the 40–50 
consultations that occur each year lead to concurrence on legislation. 
The agreement makes consensus possible in ways not achievable in 
Australia, for example, because, as objections to the idea of a guaranteed 
indigenous voice to parliament show, there is no political agreement that 
an entrenched procedure for meaningful participation should in fact exist.
The Norwegian and Swedish Sami parliaments are popularly elected; 
however, they differ in their broader structures and capacities to influence 
national public policy. The Norwegian Sámediggi was established to 
‘enable the Sami people in Norway to safeguard and develop their 
language, culture and way of life’; by contrast, the Swedish Sámediggi was 
established as a ‘special government agency’ (Josefsen, Mörkenstam & 
Saglie, 2015, p. 37). In Norway, the Sámediggi may consider ‘any matter 
that in the view of the Sami parliament particularly affects the Sami 
people’; in Sweden, the Sámediggi’s authority is to ‘monitor issues related 
to Sami culture’ in that country (Josefsen et al., 2015, pp. 37–38). The 
parliaments provide voices to government—not voices in government. 
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In relation to Australia, this distinction may be instructive as the country 
works out the functions of its proposed Indigenous voice to parliament 
(see Chapter 7).
The UN special rapporteur found that, relative to Norway, Sami 
opportunities for self-determination in Finland were severely restricted. 
The rapporteur’s recommendations to the Finnish Government were 
comprehensive and concerned elementary breaches of the right to self-
determination. There were unresolved differences between the state and 
Sami people on the functions that the Sami Parliament ought to enjoy, 
and Sami interests in relation to mining were inadequately protected. 
According to the special rapporteur, Sami people in Finland were not 
properly included in decision-making over the use of forestry lands, which 
has significant implications for the right to culture. It also has significant 
implications for the provision of education. The special rapporteur 
argued that Finnish public education did not adequately contribute 
to the linguistic and cultural aspects of the right to self-determination 
(UN, 2016b).
The special rapporteur stressed the importance of people being able 
to make decisions about the distribution of adequate resources. 
The  importance of this capacity for self-determination appeared in the 
observation that the ‘solution’ to cultural and linguistic revitalisation 
lies in further strengthening indigenous peoples’ ability to develop and 
implement their own programs for economic development and job 
creation, education, preservation and development of cultural expression 
and knowledge, and public order, including the protection of women and 
children (UN, 2016b).
In January 2017, Sami peoples and Finland, Norway and Sweden 
concluded negotiations on a common framework for the implementation 
of the right to self-determination. However, the resulting Sami Convention 
was contested and, by December that year, had been returned to the Sami 
parliaments for further negotiations. The Norwegian National Human 
Rights Institution was not convinced that the convention, which privileges 
the right to consultation over the right to full democratic participation 
complied with the Declaration.
According to the Sami parliaments, the states’ consultative efforts 
reflect the limits of consultation as a pathway to self-determination. 
Nevertheless, as a reflection of the inconsistencies and uncertainties 
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that universally distinguish indigenous public policy, all three states are 
working to strengthen consultation’s legal basis (International Work 
Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2018). Also, in marked contrast with 
Australia, the Sami Convention recognises free, prior and informed 
consent as an essential constituent of the right to self-determination. Like 
Canada, the Norwegian Parliament has established a Truth Commission 
to consider the effect of state assimilation policies. Sweden and Finland 
are contemplating similar measures. Broderstad (2014) argued that 
‘by making use of the political rights of citizenship’, Sami people in 
Norway have ‘had significant breakthroughs in terms of their political 
influence and ability to self-govern’ (p. 74). Subsequent chapters of 
this book develop theoretical arguments on the relationship between 
self-determination and public sovereignty, exploring possibilities for 
noncolonial expressions of citizenship, sovereignty and democracy, and 
concluding that the Declaration provides important moral and political 
guidance on the strengthening of these relationships.
The Right to Self-Determination and the 
Politics of Definition
The Russian Federation is the only nonliberal state that exists over Sami 
territory. Significantly, it did not participate in discussions on the 
Sami Convention and abstained from the vote to adopt the Declaration. 
It does not routinely acknowledge indigenous fishing and other natural 
resource rights or the principle of free, prior and informed consent 
(International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2018). The state’s 
general restrictions on political expression further compromise the right 
to self-determination. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination observed that:
Russia had again failed to provide disaggregated data on the 
socio-economic status of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable 
groups, something that had been explicitly requested by the 
committee in the previous concluding observation. It also noted 
with concern the broad application of the term ‘extremism’ to 
silence indigenous and other organisations … Further concerns 
and recommendations were noted regarding indigenous land 
rights, specifically Russia’s failure to create federally protected 
Territories of Traditional Nature Resource Use, irreparable harm 
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caused to indigenous land by extractive industries and denial 
of hunting and fishing rights. (International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs, 2018, p. 47)
In 2013, the Russian Federation informed the UN special rapporteur 
of the politically significant fact that indigenous peoples in that country 
had not been colonised. The special rapporteur agreed that this was 
true but argued that they shared with indigenous peoples elsewhere 
‘marginalisation and other struggles arising from their minority status’ 
(UN, 2013, Interactive dialogue, para. 4). This argument understated the 
significance of geopolitical associations, and also of indigeneity itself, as 
geopolitical associations are inescapably determinants of what it means to 
be indigenous.
Newcomb (2011) similarly understated the meaning of indigenous by 
adopting ‘dominated peoples’ (p. 578) as his definition of indigeneity. 
The indigenous experience in Fiji, for example, shows this definition’s 
inherent and far-reaching limits. Indigenous Fijians comprise more than 
50 per  cent of their country’s population and are not dominated by 
another ethnic group. However, their contemporary politics is shaped by 
colonial experience, state rejection of many of the claims that they make 
by virtue of prior occupancy, and conflict over land and natural resource 
use. These claims of indigeneity are usefully evaluated with reference to 
the Declaration (O’Sullivan, 2017), which will not ‘overturn’ domination 
as Newcomb (2011) observes, but may, over time, influence the ways 
people think about the configuration of the state and the place that 
indigenous peoples occupy within it. Certainly, it is a gross overstatement 
to argue that ‘not one of the [Declaration’s] 46 Articles … addresses the 
issue of domination’ (Newcomb, 2011, p. 579).
Fiji’s vote in favour of the Declaration was conditional. It noted 
that the Declaration may not have been adopted if the UN General 
Assembly had insisted on consensus on the full scope of the right to self-
determination (UN, 2013). It did not accept that an indigenous right 
to self-determination was applicable in its own jurisdiction. For Fiji, 
demography (i.e. the indigenous population’s majority status) trumped 
culture and geopolitical attachment in its definition of indigenous. Nor 
could Fiji accept a definition of self-determination if it threatened the 
territorial integrity of any state and rejected the idea that prior occupancy 
could justify ethnic privilege for indigenous people (UN, 2013).
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Ethnic privilege is an argument often raised to discredit indigenous claims. 
It has some justification in Fiji where there is a history of interpreting 
indigenous ‘paramount’ political authority as creating political rights 
depending on others’ exclusion by, for example, limiting appointment 
to the offices of president and prime minister to indigenous Fijians 
(O’Sullivan, 2017). Similarly, while the three coups and putsch that have 
overthrown governments since 1987 were vastly more complex than 
a politics of ethnic struggle, all but the most recent were expressed by the 
perpetrators as claims to the rights of indigeneity (O’Sullivan, 2017).
Conversely, ethnic privilege is raised to discredit land rights claims in 
Australia. In 2018, member of the Australian Parliament and leader of the 
One Nation Party Senator Pauline Hanson said that she ‘gets really upset 
when people say this is Aboriginal land’ (Khalil, 2018, para. 2). Ethnic 
privilege is also used to justify the narrow and exclusive liberalism of people 
like the former Australian prime minister John Howard (see Chapter 3).
The Declaration’s ultimate concern is the codification of rights, not 
the codification of privilege. The distinction between rights and 
privileges would nevertheless be especially helpful to Fijian indigeneity’s 
conceptualisation of a just and robust body of political capacities and 
responsibilities. It would also help to conceptualise and express just 
claims against the state (O’Sullivan, 2017). The Declaration shows that 
indigenous claims to distinctiveness—to live and participate in public life 
as indigenous—need not be claims to privilege.
Doubts about the Declaration’s applicability to Fiji deprive that country of 
a moral and legal framework likely to contribute to a more just and stable 
political order (O’Sullivan, 2017). The Declaration would assist the Fijian 
politics of indigeneity to develop theoretical consistency and cohesion as 
well as a pragmatic account of the self-determination that Fijian people 
seek, which neither majority population status nor the ethnicity of the 
prime minister or president can achieve.
To take the argument further, Bowen (2000), in questioning whether 
‘a reversal in political fortunes could create newly “indigenous” peoples out 
of formerly dominant ones’ (p. 13), exposed the problem with defining 
indigenous with reference to domination. The politics of indigeneity’s 
defining purpose is to achieve substantive and enduring self-determination; 
in other words, nondomination. A people does not cease to be indigenous 
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when it ceases to be dominated. From this perspective, Martinez Cobo’s 
(1981) widely accepted working definition of an indigenous people is 
limited and limiting:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those [that], 
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial 
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their 
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, 
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions 
and legal systems. (p. 379)
The question of domination or nondomination is shrouded in greater 
complexity than Martinez Cobo’s definition can address. Peoples’ 
perceptions of rights are culturally conditioned. Fiji’s majority indigenous 
population, for example, views indigeneity as a source of political rights 
for much the same reasons as the minority indigenous populations of 
Australia and New Zealand (O’Sullivan, 2017).
Domination and subjugation can only describe a contemporary 
circumstance, yet the Declaration’s point is to establish an enduring politics 
of nondomination. The Fijian case shows the contested nature of the meaning 
of domination and the different perspectives that indigenous people hold 
of the relationship between domination and substantive self-determination. 
Nor does an indigenous group dominating others, as has occurred in Fiji, 
guarantee its self-determination (O’Sullivan, 2017). Power relationships are 
not so simple; their complexities need to be understood and the limits of—
as well as the possibilities for—self-determination worked out. As the Fijian 
case shows, the desire to lose the status of nondominance does not suggest 
losing the status of indigeneity because indigeneity describes a political 
status only after it describes a cultural one.
The indigenous chief executive of Fiji’s Citizens’ Constitutional Forum, 
Akuila Yabaki, argued that the Declaration would contribute to indigenous 
Fijians’ self-determination by recognising:
our right to be different, and to act as an individual or as part 
of a community as we choose. It encourages participation in 
matters [that] affect us all such as education, social welfare, 
health, environment and governance without discrimination. 
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From it we should learn that multiculturalism is what makes us 
all part of the common heritage of mankind. We are all entitled 
to exercise and practice our beliefs, cultures and religions, and 
should not interfere in the rights of other people to do the same. 
(Yabaki, 2011, para. 10)
This account of political authority allows corporate indigenous membership 
of a single national polity alongside the rights and responsibilities of 
indigenous citizenship. A further distinction with Canada and New 
Zealand is that, in those jurisdictions, the rights of citizenship are liberal 
political rights. While institutional racism impedes their realisation, 
political rights are not constitutionally limited as they are in Fiji. Indeed, 
the Declaration indicates that the relationship between individual liberty 
and group rights is circuitous and interdependent, with each being equally 
important missing constituents of the Fijian right to self-determination 
(O’Sullivan, 2018a).
There should be no question of the Declaration’s applicability to Fiji. 
As UN special rapporteur James Anaya (2008) explained:
The basic normative justification of the Declaration is stated in the 
sixth preambular paragraph, which acknowledges that ‘indigenous 
peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter 
alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories 
and resources, thus preventing them all from exercising, in 
particular, the right to development in accordance with their own 
needs and interests’. (p. 16)
Indigenous Fijians fit Watson and Venne’s (2012) description of peoples 
who ‘have not been able to decolonize’ (p. 93). Although they have 
recovered their majority population status and have been able to dominate 
national political institutions, they have not been able to translate power 
into meaningful opportunities. The reasons are complex and multifaceted 
(O’Sullivan, 2017, 2018a). They show that indigenous politics is not 
distinguished by what Carroll (2012) described as the ‘imperial binaries’ 
of ‘assimilation or secession’ (p. 156).
The extension of the Declaration’s terms and provisions to Fiji is legitimate 
and efficacious. The withdrawal of colonial power has not removed 
the constraints placed on postcolonial indigenous self-determination 
(O’Sullivan, 2017, 2018a). The native Fijian experience as a people 
excluded from normative definitions of ‘indigenous’, and thus from the 
Declaration’s provisions, provides a point of contrast.
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Durie (1998) explained why, from a Maori perspective, one cannot accept 
indigeneity as a temporary status belonging to a people while they are 
‘oppressed’ but not once they have successfully contested that oppression:
A firm Māori identity … [requires] access to whānau, hapū, and 
iwi and confirmation that future generations of Māori will be able 
to enjoy their lands and forests, rivers and lakes, harbours and the 
sea and the air. These goals underlie the significance of Māori self-
determination. (p. 239)
Ainu experiences in Japan also show indigenous peoples making 
geopolitics—rather than just politics—fundamental to their identity 
and ensuing political claims. Ainu attach great significance to public 
recognition of their status as indigenous people as distinct from an 
ethnic minority.
Rights and Recognition
Although Japan voted for the Declaration, its recognition of the distinction 
between Ainu as an indigenous population and Ainu as an ethnic minority 
has been mixed and conditional. Its vote for the Declaration occurred in 
a climate of philosophical inconsistency, and, by 2007, it had not ratified 
the International Labor Organization’s convention (Convention 169) on 
indigenous and tribal peoples (International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs, 2018).
From 1899 until 1997, Ainu policy was managed under the Hokkaido 
Former Aborigines Protection Act. In 1997, a proposed ‘New Ainu Law’ 
became a point of contention between Ainu people and the state. The 
UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance was concerned 
that the proposed law focused only on narrowly defined conceptions of 
culture, and argued that:
The Ainu want to see included in this law the recognition of their 
status as indigenous peoples, the promotion of their indigenous 
rights in conformity with international law, and the fight against 
the discrimination they face. However, the Government has not 
acceded to this request … They are among the few indigenous 
peoples in the world who have no land recognized as their 
indigenous land. (UN, 2006a, para. 49)
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Indigenous claims against the state are supported by an international 
indigenous politics that predates cooperation on the Declaration. The 
Ainu claim to self-determination benefited from the globalisation of 
indigenous political thought and practice that occurred during the 
1970s. International cooperation propelled Ainu political activity ‘into 
large-scale social movements’ (Tsutsui, 2018, p. 42). Most importantly, it 
created a political focus ‘beyond dependence on the government toward 
a more full-throated assertion of their rights as indigenous people’ (p. 42). 
For a people whose indigeneity was denied by the state, the evolution of 
new internationally sanctioned norms of justice was especially significant. 
Recalling a visit to a Canadian First Nation in 1978, an Ainu observed:
To my complete amazement, when I stepped out of the gate at the 
Vancouver airport, I was greeted by a group of indigenous people 
performing their traditional dance in their traditional costume. 
It was shocking to me that an indigenous people could exhibit its 
traditional culture with such pride in a highly modernised setting 
of an international airport … The leader of the indigenous people 
told us that they are trying to organise a conference on indigenous 
peoples and the UN and encouraged us to be a part of it. To us, the 
UN was like a different world and it just didn’t seem realistic that we 
could be part of such a conference. (as cited in Tsutsui, 2018, p. 47)
This story of the normalisation of indigenous culture in the public 
space, and of indigenous political expression, documents a step towards 
indigeneity’s mainstreaming—a contested and tortuous, but nevertheless 
important, process.
Mainstreaming indigeneity is important because it contributes to recasting 
‘otherness’ from political marginalisation to the positive assertion of 
distinctive presence (O’Sullivan, 2017). It is a statement that we are 
among the ‘all’ who ‘are here to stay’. Its intent is to bring the human 
rights of indigenous peoples into the mainstream of political thought. The 
Declaration contributes by providing indigenous peoples with nonstate 
benchmarks and value systems against which to define their claims in 
language that, in liberal societies at least, makes sense to the state. At the 
same time, domestic indigenous politics is exposed to new ideas about 
what is just and how justice might be pursued.
Human rights are not conditional on conforming to externally imposed 
values and modes of behaviour; yet it is indigenous peoples’ reluctance 
to conform to the values and expectations of majority populations that 
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leads to social isolation and political exclusion. The tension between 
group rights and individual rights is a significant demonstration of this 
reluctance. The indigenous desire to privilege collective rights to land as 
a source of material sustenance and spiritual meaning contrasts with views 
of land as an exploitable commodity.
In 1980, Japan told the UN Human Rights Committee that ethnic, 
religious and linguistic minorities do not exist in that country. However, 
by 1987, international and domestic pressure led Japan to change its 
position. The government told the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations that it ‘does not claim that Japan is “a mono-ethnic state” nor 
does it deny the existence of Ainu people’ (Tsutsui, 2018, p. 58). Its vote 
for the Declaration was followed by parliamentary recognition of Ainu 
indigeneity in 2008.
However, recognition does not always lead to meaningful political 
influence. The broader political context in which indigenous claims are 
made are also important. Just as the Russian Federation’s authoritarian 
political culture limits all people’s fundamental freedoms, Malaysia’s 
recognition of 13.8 per cent of its population as indigenous does not 
set aside state hegemony. Malaysia voted for the Declaration, and its 
constitution protects native customary rights, yet the provisions of both 
are routinely violated (Cultural Survival, 2018). In its 2018 submission to 
the UN Human Rights Council UPR, the international nongovernment 
organisation Cultural Survival (2018) argued that Malaysia continues to 
‘initiate’ contraventions of land rights; disregard the right to free, prior 
and informed consent; and not take adequate measures to confront 
violence against women.
In Sarawak, indigenous peoples faced (and continue to face) displacement 
due to dam construction. Though a number of dams forming part of 
a proposed 12-dam project were discontinued, partly due to indigenous 
resistance, others were planned that would add to human displacement 
(Cultural Survival, 2018). Conversely, in 2015, the federal Cabinet 
established a committee for the land rights of indigenous peoples, 
which prioritised improvements to land administration, infrastructural 
development, education and training for young people, increasing 
sustainable economic activity, assistance for people in the bottom two 
income quintiles and improvements in public service delivery (Human 
Rights Commission of Malaysia, 2017).
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Such tensions between the general authoritarianism of states like Malaysia 
and the Declaration’s human rights principles are important. The Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples told a committee of the 
UN General Assembly in 2013 that ‘Without greater awareness of 
the human rights values and concerns encompassed in [the Declaration], 
its implementation would be “difficult, if not impossible”’ (UN, 2013, 
para. 1).
Different perspectives on what ought to comprise the minimum rights 
of indigenous peoples reflect different perspectives on the source of those 
rights. Are rights the state’s to confer as an expression of its sovereignty or 
do they belong inherently by virtue of humanity? Are they contextualised 
by virtue of one’s indigeneity? If human rights belong inherently and are 
not the gift of state benevolence, one strengthens the capacity for self-
determination to develop as a worthwhile relative and relational politics. 
However, authoritarian states carefully safeguard sovereignty, not just 
against external interference but also against the claims of people living 
under their rule. They can rationalise voting for the Declaration to satisfy 
the interests of international diplomacy while giving it minimal domestic 
recognition on the basis that it is simply aspirational.
The Indigenous Peoples Network of Malaysia (2013) represents 62 
indigenous communities and organisations. Its simple but profoundly 
important opening argument to the UPR in 2013 was that:
Collectively our peoples count as among the most poor in 
Malaysia, due to marginalisation from the mainstream society on 
account of the non-recognition of our rights as contained in both 
national and international customary law. (‘Context’, para. 1)
The submission identified violations of the Declaration in respect of 
land; free, prior and informed consent; self-governance; intimidation and 
harassment by public authorities; and violations of the right to citizenship. 
Interestingly in terms of this book’s arguments for indigenous political 
authority inside the state, the submission also requested UN advocacy 
and capacity-building assistance that would ‘contribute to expanding 
opportunities for indigenous peoples to participate meaningfully in the 
development of Malaysia, while maintaining our laws, customs, and 
identity’ (Indigenous Peoples Network of Malaysia, 2013, Needs of 
Malaysia and role of UN, para. 3).
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China is another authoritarian Asian state that voted for the Declaration. 
In contrast to its prevailing approach to human rights, it ‘stressed’ in 
2013 to a committee of the UN General Assembly that the international 
community has a duty to ensure that indigenous peoples share the ‘fruits 
of socioeconomic development, to protect their basic human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and to preserve their natural environment and the 
traditional cultures essential for their survival’ (UN, 2013, Statements, 
para. 12). In 2016, Taiwan apologised to indigenous peoples for previous 
policy positions and, in 2017, passed legislation giving indigenous 
languages official status. Taiwan’s formal recognition of 14 other indigenous 
groups, who are guaranteed representation in parliament (International 
Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2018), casts as politically extreme the 
Australian suggestion that a guaranteed indigenous voice to parliament 
would threaten national political cohesion (Belot & Laurence, 2017).
The office of the Taiwanese president had also established a broadly 
representative committee:
to check into violations against indigenous peoples throughout 
history; to formulate measures to provide compensation for 
deprivation of indigenous rights; to implement [the Declaration] 
and the relevant international rights convention; [and] to collect 
and review information regarding indigenous historical justice and 
transitional justice. (International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs, 2018, p. 276)
According to Conway-Long (2016), indigeneity poses the same 
fundamental questions to all states, whether liberal or illiberal:
Can international law [and politics] be utilized to free indigenous 
people both politically and culturally, now that the UN has 
declared its interest? … Can indigenous issues bring pressure 
upon the system of international law to help transform it from the 
Eurocentric vision of states’ rights rooted in the Westphalian Peace 
it now has? (p. 116)
This transformation is precisely the politics of indigeneity’s point. The 
comparison between liberal and illiberal states is also instructive in moving 
beyond a theoretical to a practical understanding of self-determination 
that is ultimately concerned with a people’s capacity ‘to live well and 
humanly in their own ways’ (Conway-Long, 2016, p. 116).
‘We ARe ALL HeRe To STAy’
152
Liberal states constrain indigenous aspirations to protect both their own 
integrity and what majority populations hold in common. However, as 
Corntassel (2012) explained, this does not foreclose opportunities for self-
recognition, which is an essential condition of self-determination. The 
Ainu experience illustrates this point: it shows self-recognition as a form 
of political expression that does not exist in nonliberal states that view 
protecting their own authority as an overriding state political objective. 
Self-recognition precedes liberal mutual recognition, which, though 
usually unequal for indigenous peoples in postsettler liberal states, still 
assures indigenous peoples of at least some capacity for political influence. 
For example, as Chapter 9 shows, the Canadian state requires at least some 
cooperation with indigenous citizens to pursue its economic aspirations.
In jurisdictions like Ecuador, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Russian Federation, 
state recognition is essential. Structural limits on an indigenous people’s 
political capacity to claim their indigeneity by and for themselves limits 
the Declaration’s transformative potential. In spite of the examples of 
Taiwanese respect for the Declaration noted in this chapter, there remain 
indigenous peoples in Taiwan—the Pingpu population of 400,000—
who have not received state recognition of their indigeneity even though 
‘recognition is fundamental … to the enjoyment of a number of specific 
rights under Taiwanese and international law’ and is viewed as safeguarding 
‘the cultural identity of aboriginal tribes and individuals’ (van Bekhoven, 
2016, p. 202).
Although liberal societies share the practice by which the ‘law determines 
the indigenous status of communities and individuals that claim this 
status’ (van Bekhoven, 2016, p. 202), indigenous peoples in those 
jurisdictions have recourse to a political framework more conducive to 
resistance, and they use it to assert their self-determination. In contrast, 
the limited capacity for self-recognition in a jurisdiction like Taiwan 
allows the state to be more successful in assuming an ‘exclusive concept 
of being “indigenous”’ (p. 202). The ensuing ‘artificial indigenous 
identity … results in a persisting colonial dominance of the State over 
the aborigines’ (p. 202). In contrast, human rights are the capacities of 
citizenship. They are intended to raise political agency. As human rights 
are vested in people, they make people prior to the state with the capacity 
to contest state authority.
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There is no normative internationally accepted conception of the 
balance between human rights and state rights; therefore, the minimum 
standards reflected in the Declaration represent an extraordinary political 
achievement and comprehensive blueprint for thinking about political 
relationships and reasonable policy outcomes. However, the Declaration 
is still more heavily focused on the obligations of states rather than the 
capacities of people. A conception of rights that is truly grounded in 
the inherent dignity of the human person would reverse this order.
Conclusion
The Declaration is inconsistently interpreted by states that voted for 
its adoption. Those states also contest the scope of the right to self-
determination. The incorporation of principles that correspond with 
the Declaration into national constitutions does not necessarily mean 
that the rights of indigenous peoples are better respected than in other 
jurisdictions. Nor does a generally authoritarian political culture mean 
that indigenous rights are completely set aside.
In general, states are inclined to accept rights to culture; however, most 
view the principle of free, prior and informed consent as too much 
of a  constraint on state sovereignty. The impasse between states and 
indigenous peoples on this point is resolvable only within the broader 
conceptions of sovereignty, citizenship and democracy that this book 
advances. These conceptual discussions are also important to questions 
of whether the right to self-determination is confined to indigenous 
institutions that exist in isolation from the state or whether it is also 
a  right reasonably exercised within the state. The nature of indigenous 
participation in public affairs varies widely across jurisdictions.
The definition of indigenous, which is important in establishing the 
source and purpose of indigenous claims, is also contested. This book’s 
argument that minority status and political domination are not essential 
criteria for recognition as indigenous informs its conception of the rights 
of indigeneity. It also informs its evaluation of the Declaration’s usefulness 
to contemporary indigenous politics. The book’s further argument is that 
accepting a majority indigenous people—like that in Fiji—as indigenous 
is also essential to a consistent account of indigeneity as first and foremost 
a cultural status.
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In short, self-determination’s possibilities are shaped by domestic practices 
of sovereignty. As the next chapter argues, the right to self-determination 
means that all people are entitled to share in the public authority of 
the communities in which they live. Sovereignty is not an absolute, 
inflexible and unchanging site of political authority. It is widely dispersed 
among individual and institutional actors—the following chapter shows 
how and why. It also shows how rethinking the nature of sovereignty 






Self-determination flows from sovereignty’s character, shape and form. 
It comes from the political values and institutional structures that determine 
where power lies: the values that influence the nature of one’s belonging 
to the state and one’s opportunities for distinctive indigenous citizenship, 
deliberating according to values and processes that make cultural sense.
Sovereignty was originally a defence against outside interference in one’s 
affairs, yet, for indigenous peoples, it can be an instrument of colonial 
subjugation. As an instrument, it is commonly confused or overstated. 
Sovereignty is not simply a body of rights once exclusively exercised by 
indigenous peoples, taken by settlers and reclaimed through indigenous 
resistance. Politics is more complex. The Declaration helps to make sense 
of sovereignty’s character, limits and potential.
The meaning of Maori vis-a-vis Crown sovereignty has been a point 
of contention in New Zealand politics since the signing of the Treaty 
of Waitangi in 1840. This chapter introduces what it means for New 
Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal to find that the treaty did not signal the 
cession of Maori sovereignty. This finding invites the exploration of new 
theoretical possibilities, including the proposition that, if sovereignty 
is the people’s collective authority, indigenous ethnicity can never be 
grounds for democratic exclusion.
Discourses of sovereignty open and close different political and theoretical 
spaces for thinking about who belongs to the political community, the 
terms of belonging and how and by whom those terms are set. Examples 
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from Australia and the US are also used to show how and why, and 
to contribute to the chapter’s argument that sovereignty is not a static 
concept; it is not always interpreted in the same ways nor for the same 
reasons. People’s changing values and the shifting nature of what is and is 
not possible change people’s ideas about sovereignty—in particular, about 
the ways in which they think about conflicts between sovereignty as it is 
and as they would like it to be. The Declaration proposes new spaces of 
inclusion for indigenous peoples—a different kind of liberal sovereignty 
that makes the concept a potential instrument of self-determination 
through differentiated liberal citizenship.
Differentiated citizenship means that, in New Zealand for example, 
Maori are both part of the Crown and separate from it. The Crown and 
iwi and hapu (subtribes) exercise relative and relational political powers, 
which means that Maori are not junior partners in a bicultural project 
(O’Sullivan, 2007) but equal participants and shareholders in public 
sovereignty. Equal participation in public affairs provides the foundation 
for the development of noncolonial political relationships.
The powers of state sovereignty are diminishing. However, power 
imbalances remain a defining characteristic of indigenous politics. 
Sovereignty still provides a political and theoretical framework for 
responding to those imbalances. This is because sovereignty is part of 
the language that both states and indigenous peoples use to explain the 
powers that they think they justifiably hold and through which each 
makes its claims and counterclaims against the other. However, if one 
sees sovereignty as a relative and relational power—not absolute and 
incontestable—then one can think more broadly about the political 
significance of difference. ‘Otherness’ need not be a way of framing 
people negatively and outside the political system but a way of indigenous 
peoples asserting their differences positively and for their own purposes. 
Difference can be asserted as legitimate in the formation of public values 
and institutions, and the logic of participatory parity can be established. 
Not only indigenous people, but also indigenous epistemologies, may 
then contribute to public affairs with substantive authority.
With sovereignty thus reconfigured, when the Declaration gives the state 
priority over indigenous peoples in the event of conflict, the power of settler 
populations is mediated by indigenous people being able to participate 
in the development of the state’s position on every political issue that 
requires deliberation. This is an essential part of the substance of shared 
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sovereignty. This chapter provides examples of the ways in which different 
indigenous peoples conceptualise sovereignty. While such conceptions 
contest settler hegemony, they nevertheless provide a foundation from 
which settlers and indigenous peoples can acknowledge that ‘we are all 
here to stay’ and that indigenous peoples are here to stay as indigenous. 
This chapter’s consideration of sovereignty foreshadows the next chapter’s 
discussion of a political order in which public decisions are made with 
reference to public reason and participatory parity, where the indigenous 
citizen is one who deliberates with substantive equality.
Contemporary Discourses of Sovereignty: 
New Zealand
In 2014, New Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal found that the Treaty 
of Waitangi was not a Maori agreement to transfer sovereignty to the 
British Crown. The finding did not fundamentally change the claim to 
self-determination, but it did lend moral and political urgency to the 
question of contemporary sovereignty’s attributes. It also contextualised 
discussion of what sovereignty meant for the nature of indigenous nations’ 
belonging to the postsettler state.
Further conceptual clarity on the meanings of sovereignty is still required, 
focusing on meanings that are just, pragmatic and politically valuable to 
self-determination and to indigenous peoples being ‘sovereign in their 
own right yet sharing sovereignty with society at large’ (Maaka & Fleras, 
2005, p. 5). It was, in fact, the same search for shared sovereignties that 
has distinguished New Zealand politics since the treaty’s signing in 1840.
The treaty provides context to that search, although not always in 
ways that contribute coherently to public discourse. As Apirana Ngata, 
a government minister, noted in 1923, the Treaty of Waitangi ‘is on the 
lips of the humble and the great, of the ignorant and of the thoughtful’ 
(as cited in Hill, 2004, p. 129). In 2004, another government minister, 
Trevor Mallard, remarked that the treaty is ‘both bigger and smaller than 
many people think’ (Mallard, 2004, para. 22). Public debate on the treaty’s 
meanings and utility reflect evolutions in political and jurisprudential 
thought from it being a ‘simple nullity’ (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, 
1877, p. 78) to an instrument of important policy significance in 
contemporary times (Tawhai & Gray-Sharp, 2011).
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The 2014 tribunal finding reinforced sovereignty as a site of critical 
inquiry concerned with fundamental questions of who belongs to the 
national polity, on whose terms and on what terms. Drawing sovereignty 
meaningfully and purposefully into contemporary politics is more complex 
than understanding the concept as a body of authority that Maori once 
held and that the Crown usurped and retains exclusively. Yet, as Chapter 9 
shows, it is from this (over)simplified account that contemporary debates 
about sovereignty tend to occur.
The Waitangi Tribunal (‘He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti’, 2014) found that:
• The rangatira who signed te Tiriti o Waitangi in February 1840 
did not cede their sovereignty to Britain. That is, they did not 
cede authority to make and enforce law over their people or 
their territories.
• The rangatira agreed to share power and authority with 
Britain. They agreed to the Governor having authority to 
control British subjects in New Zealand, and thereby keep the 
peace and protect Māori interests.
• The rangatira consented to the treaty on the basis that they 
and the Governor were to be equals, though they were to have 
different roles and different spheres of influence. The detail of 
how this relationship would work in practice, especially where 
the Māori and European populations intermingled, remained 
to be negotiated over time on a case-by-case basis.
• The rangatira agreed to enter land transactions with the 
Crown, and the Crown promised to investigate pre-treaty land 
transactions and to return any land that had not been properly 
acquired from Māori.
• The rangatira appear to have agreed that the Crown would 
protect them from foreign threats and represent them in 
international affairs, where that was necessary. (p. 529)
The New Zealand Government did not accept this finding; however, for 
Ngapuhi—who took the claim to the tribunal—and other Maori iwi, it 
vindicated their long-held position that the treaty was not a cession of 
sovereignty (Waitangi Tribunal, ‘He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti’, 2014).
The minister for Treaty of Waitangi negotiations, Chris Finlayson, 
argued that:
There is no question that the Crown has sovereignty in New 
Zealand. This report doesn’t change that fact … The Tribunal 
doesn’t reach any conclusion regarding the sovereignty the Crown 
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exercises in New Zealand. Nor does it address the other events 
considered part of the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty, or how 
the Treaty relationship should operate today. (as cited in Kenny, 
2014, paras. 5–6)
This claim to exclusive Crown sovereignty may be interpreted as 
a statement of appeal to non-Maori reactionary sensitivities rather than 
wider political possibilities. However, the finding raises the important 
political question of whether sovereignty must belong to Maori or the 
Crown alone, or whether it is a fluid and evolving descriptor of political 
authority widely dispersed and exercised.
Sovereignty is complex, complicated and contested. It is challenged as 
public attitudes to power and authority change. These attitudes evolve 
with time and context, with people’s values, and with political and 
economic constraints and opportunities. A more flexible interpretation 
than Finlayson’s may position the state and indigenous nations as 
repositories of a relative and relational power that is not fixed in time, 
context or capacity.
Contemporary Maori politics and economic development strategies 
reflect the state’s diminishing importance. As Habermas (1997) argued, 
‘the integrative capabilities of the state continue to diminish under 
the presence of regional movements, on the one hand, and worldwide 
corporations and transnational organisations on the other’ (p. 37).
The state and the indigenous nation are fluid entities. They evolve, 
sometimes in ways that strengthen their political capacities and 
sometimes in ways that do not; sovereignty’s strength and character is 
thus also fluid. Claiming a share in national sovereignty alongside an 
independent indigenous sovereignty is politically worthwhile because of 
what sovereignty is (as opposed to what it is not).
Britain entered into treaty negotiations in 1840 intending to acquire 
sovereignty and therefore the power to make and enforce laws over both 
Maori and Pakeha; however, it did not explain this intention to the 
rangatira (chiefs). Instead, it was proposed that Britain be given the right 
to exercise authority over its own settlers. In the Maori-language version 
of the treaty, this authority was described as kāwanatanga (governorship). 
Rangatiratanga, or chieftainship over their own affairs, was to remain as 
the chiefs ‘full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and 
Estates, Forests, Fisheries and other properties’ (New Zealand History, n.d., 
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Article the Second, para. 1). Cession of sovereignty cannot be read into 
this translation of the Maori version of the Treaty of Waitangi. Its reading 
into the translation is contested (Orange, 1987), and while the British 
governor, William Hobson, proclaimed sovereignty over the North Island 
by virtue of the treaty, his claim to the remaining islands was by ‘right 
of discovery’. It was some time after the treaty’s signing that the Crown 
acquired ‘substantive sovereignty’ (Orange, 1987, p. 13).
Sovereignty’s capacity to recognise distinctive Maori claims, not as 
junior partners in a bicultural treaty ‘partnership’ (O’Sullivan, 2007) but 
as equal participants in a commonwealth, is important. It means that 
political thought need not be constrained by the bicultural presumption 
that sovereignty rests with the Crown acting as the Pakeha polity, 
conditioned by an obligation, read into the Treaty of Waitangi, that 
sovereignty be exercised in partnership with a homogenous Maori polity 
(O’Sullivan, 2007). In New Zealand, self-determination is not ‘granted’ 
by biculturalism’s ‘Pakeha state’; it is not the gift of a benevolent ‘partner’ 
but an inherent and extant right of prior occupancy that the Declaration 
affirms. The distinction is important, for a partner is not a substantively 
equal member of the sovereign polity (see Chapter 9).
This limited and limiting account of political authority diminishes self-
determination’s transformative potential. The underlying distinction 
is whether one understands sovereignty as a power that belongs 
independently to the state or whether it is exercised by the state as the 
agent of the people’s shared political authority. Is sovereignty ‘exercised 
from the people’ or ‘over them’ (McCue, 2007, p. 22)? Are indigenous 
peoples part of the state or are they excluded as the ‘other’—a people 
outside the state who are not entitled to a democratic voice?
If sovereignty was neither ceded nor pragmatically returnable to Maori 
as an absolute and incontestable embodiment of political authority, one 
must reframe debates about where political power belongs, and why, 
to include the possibility that it might be shared and to consider what 
recourses there might be ‘for thinking about the possibilities of a non-
colonial relation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples’ (Tully, 
2000, p. 50). Rethinking the Crown as a commonwealth, rather than as 
a binary opponent, would significantly transform political possibilities. 
Recognising the Crown as not simply the Pakeha polity allows a shared 
liberal sovereignty in which the Crown is also Maori, as Justice Williams 




whether the right of self-determination can operate as a chapeau 
for the self-governance provisions of the Declaration and so serve 
as a justificatory basis for those corporate rights, even if they are 
not supported by any equality-based justifications. (p. 366)
However, the possibilities of shared liberal sovereignty are broader than 
this legal framing suggests. The politics of indigeneity are ‘an attempt to 
come to terms with how discourses and practices of sovereignty … set 
the conditions under which indigenous and other forms of “marginal” 
politics occur at all’ (Shaw, 2008, p. 8).
Sovereignty and Power
Sovereignty’s positioning as either an absolute and unconditional 
indigenous authority, or as an absolute and exclusive Crown authority, 
contrasts with Palmer’s (1995) argument that:
Notions of sovereignty are collapsing all over the world … Far 
from being the indivisible omnipresent concept that Hobbes made 
it in Leviathan, sovereignty is more like a piece of chewing gum. 
It can be stretched and pulled in many directions to do almost 
anything. Sovereignty is not a word that is useful and it should be 
banished from political debate. (pp. 153–154)
However, sovereignty is real and powerful when one does not share it 
and when it is used as an obstructive force, though its dispersed location 
sometimes means that it is like the New Zealand constitution—one 
‘can’t find it’ (Palmer, as cited in Espiner, 2017). However, this makes 
sovereignty no less worth finding and reconfiguring. Otherwise, Alfred 
(1999) was correct to propose that ‘Native communities will occupy 
a  dependent and  reactionary position relative to the state’ (p. 59). 
If,  instead, sovereignty is a way of describing power and authority (and 
where they are vested vis-a-vis where they might alternatively be vested), 
it is a very useful analytical tool.
Removing sovereignty from political discourse does not remove the 
centrality of power to relationships among peoples. Nor does it remove 
the  unequal relationships that exist between coloniser and colonised, 
although it may diminish the language one has to think about these 
concepts and experiences. Shaw (2008) used Hobbes’s account of 
sovereignty to explain liberal democracy’s capacity for exclusion:
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The structure of sovereignty that Hobbes produces is enabled and 
authorized through the production of a shared ontological ground, 
and identity. This identity, in turn, rests upon the necessary 
exclusion of Indigenous peoples at several different levels, not least 
through the explicit marking of Indigenous peoples as ‘different’ 
as ‘Other’. What is more crucial in determining the character of 
contemporary Indigenous politics, however, is that Hobbes renders 
the construction of this exclusionary identity, the process through 
which authority is produced and guaranteed, as pre-political, as 
necessary and natural rather than contingent and violent. (p. 9)
Sovereignty reflects a society’s ideas about the origins, nature and proper 
location of political power within a political system. It can be used to 
position indigenous peoples as a political ‘other’—beyond the state and 
beyond the political. These powerful constraints on political capacity may 
devalue humanity as the basis for membership of the political community 
and belonging. Such accounts of public authority make difference 
a  political problem—they do not acknowledge liberalism’s capacity to 
manage differences in human expectations of the good life.
Sovereignty, then, describes the location of public power and authority, 
the source of that authority and the manner of its exercise. A liberal 
theory of indigeneity may instead broaden liberal democratic practice 
to allow indigenous peoples to frame ‘otherness’ in their own ways and 
for their own purposes (O’Sullivan, 2014). ‘Otherness’ is not necessarily 
problematic as long as indigenous people are free to define the ways in 
which they will differ from the assimilationist paradigm’s homogenous 
ideal. They might frame ‘otherness’ in ways that allow them to work out 
for themselves the terms of their inclusion in the postsettler liberal state. 
Difference then ceases to be the basis of political disadvantage. It becomes 
the basis on which indigenous peoples retain their identities and political 
structures to manage their own affairs.
Difference also becomes the basis on which indigenous peoples contribute 
to the formation of the values and systems that inform public policy 
decisions. It becomes a legitimate basis from which to enjoy influence 
over policy debate through asserting a substantive participatory parity 
(Fraser & Honneth, 2003).
Participatory parity presumes that the citizen is a person who deliberates 
(Aristotle, 1988). It supports differentiated citizenship as an alternative 
to an isolationist interpretation of indigenous self-determination and 
recognises King’s (2012) view that ‘The fact of Native existence is that 
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we live modern lives informed by traditional values and contemporary 
realities and that we wish to lead lives on our terms’ (p. 302). Participatory 
parity is important because indigenous claims:
are not only about compensation or reparations, but also about 
the terms of association between them and the colonial state. The 
injustice of expropriation of Aboriginal lands, for example, is not 
only about the dispossession of property … but the violation or 
denial of just terms of association. (Ivison, 2002, p. 100)
As Bohman and Rehg (1997) argued, ‘deliberative democracy evokes ideals 
of rational legislation, participatory politics and civic self-governance’ 
(p.  ix). However, people participate with culturally framed conceptions 
of what is rational. If all are to deliberate, political systems need ways of 
admitting plural perspectives and rationalities.
Equal capacity to influence depends on a desirable but not always 
attainable condition: ‘that each citizen be able to advance arguments that 
others might find persuasive’ (Knight & Johnson, 2011, p. 295). Indeed, 
Rawls (1997) argued for the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ rather than the 
‘fact of pluralism’ per se (p. 765). Cohen (1997) maintained that, rather 
than pursuing ‘ideal fairness’, one should pursue ‘ideal deliberation’ in 
public institutions (p. 70). This is because nobody ‘is required to defer to 
the expert authority of another’ (Estlund, 1997, p. 173) in conceptualising 
what is just nor in determining what weight should be given to justice in 
arriving at a decision.
Participation as a deliberator (Aristotle, 1988) with equal capacity implies 
opportunities for culturally grounded influence. Its precondition for 
equality is that ‘first, citizens must be equal and, second, their reasons 
must be given equal consideration’ (Bohman, 1997, p. 321). Participatory 
democracy is fundamentally different from exclusive majoritarian 
democracy. Therefore, it is not democracy per se that excludes indigenous 
people and their distinctive perspectives, but its structure.
Public reason guarantees voice in ways that other democratic forms do 
not require. Benhabib (1996) argued that deliberative democracy is 
theoretically well equipped to admit cultural claims alongside ‘democratic 
inclusiveness and legitimacy’ (Williams, 2004, p. 338). However, public 
reason presumes that all of the claims to be prioritised are morally just. 
Public reason is not equipped to manage unjust claims because these are, 
by definition, ‘unreasonable’.
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Participation through differentiated liberal citizenship—not distinctive 
nationhood alone—is preliminary to realising the Declaration’s full 
potential as an instrument of self-determination. Nevertheless, there remain 
structural barriers to indigenous peoples’ inclusion in policy development, 
including insufficient human capacity within both indigenous and state 
agencies (Quitian & Rodríguez, 2016). Policymakers need to know how 
indigenous people and institutions think about effective public policy. 
It is reasonable for indigenous people to expect this knowledge through 
their own presence and participation in the policy process. Indigenous 
workforce development strategies are important across all sectors of the 
economy. However, they are especially important in the public sector 
where they help to secure indigenous policy participation, contribute 
to indigenising bureaucratic policymaking (Maaka & Fleras, 2009) and 
the mainstreaming of indigenous thought. Indigenous research also 
contributes to the mainstreaming of indigenous policy by contributing 
to the politics of presence (Phillips, 1995)—that is, the presence of 
indigenous ideas in the national cultural and economic realms. Brayboy, 
Fann, Castagno and Solyom (2012) observed that:
Native [university] faculty serve as activists, advocates, and change 
agents … by challenging dominant, racist, and discriminatory 
scholarship, practices and perceptions; by stimulating research in 
Indigenous issues; by developing and improving curriculum that 
is inclusive of Native perspectives and scholarship. (p. 93)
Indigenous intellectual presence means that, just as governments ought 
not focus on ‘doing’ justice ‘to’ indigenous peoples, policy ought not focus 
on doing things ‘for’ (or even ‘with’) them, as has become fashionable in 
Australia. Instead, as Cook (2017) explained in the New Zealand context, 
one might aspire to policy grounded ‘on the richness of the Māori “way of 
thinking”’ (We cannot forget the past, para. 1). Indigenous presence is an 
expression of shared sovereignty, a condition that helps liberal democracy 





The Declaration helps to align shared sovereignty with the liberal 
presumption that government should occur by the people’s consent. 
It allows discourses of sovereignty to contribute to capacities for citizenship 
that allow people to enjoy lives that they have reason to value (Sen, 1999a).
The first section of Article 46 of the Declaration (cited in Chapter 3) 
confirms the power of the nation-state. Its second section qualifies 
that power:
In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be 
respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration 
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law, 
and in accordance with international human rights obligations. 
Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly 
necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the 
just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society. 
(UN, 2007b, art. 46[2])
The nation-state’s interests will prevail in the event of conflict. However, 
Article 46 must be read in conjunction with the full Declaration, which 
explicitly presumes that indigenous peoples are part of the nation-state 
and shareholders in its sovereignty.
Indigeneity may conceptualise ‘general forms of authority in competition 
with states’ (Picq, 2014, p. 24) or it may reconfigure the meaning of the 
term ‘state’ itself. Rather than plural forms of authority in ‘competition 
with states’, a liberal theory of differentiated citizenship might imagine 
plurality within the state as an essential complement to the extant 
indigenous authority that exists beyond the state. Differentiated 
citizenship may then address what Picq called an ‘inadequacy of the state’ 
(p. 24). It may be that indigeneity ‘disrupts state sovereignty’ (p. 23). 
However, this raises questions about what or who is sovereign, where the 
sovereign power lies and how it might reasonably be distributed.
Shared sovereignty is concerned with the processes that are used to make 
decisions. It does not guarantee that policy outcomes will be just, but it 
does guarantee that, when injustice occurs, there is a mechanism for all 
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people to contribute to a reconsideration of the offending policy position. 
For example, it is an ambitious but worthy ideal for public institutions to 
recognise Habermas’ (1997) argument that:
when someone prescribes for another, it is always possible that 
he thereby does the other an injustice, but this is never possible 
with respect to what he decides for himself (for volenti non fit 
injuria—‘he who consents cannot receive an injury’). Hence, only 
the united and consenting will of all—that is, a general and united 
will of the people by which each decides the same for all and all 
decide the same for each—can legislate. (p. 45)
Although an assimilationist rationale can potentially be read into this 
aspiration, an intellectual alignment with the politics of indigeneity 
ensures that one does not have unmediated majoritarian democracy such 
that the same people are always and necessarily on the losing side.
Indigenous conceptions of sovereignty are culturally located; they do not 
exactly parallel the concept as it is used at international law. However, 
the juxtaposition of international and indigenous perspectives to develop 
a liberal theory of differentiated citizenship may be possible and may hold 
considerable political value in helping to advance and give meaning to the 
right to self-determination.
While indigenous peoples can ordinarily identify a common territory, the 
capacity to utilise and govern it independently remains diminished for 
most indigenous populations. However, this does not mean that their 
sovereignty is, as a matter of course, overridden. It is certainly a weaker 
sovereignty than that which existed before colonial settlement, yet so 
too is state sovereignty a continuously less strong and secure construct 
that, in turn, creates new and different opportunities for indigenous 
peoples. Although these are not opportunities of absolute power, many 
indigenous peoples find purpose in their pursuit. Sovereignty ‘depends on 
conditions that operate above the level of the individual states themselves’ 
(Hindess, 2000, p. 31).
Modern sovereignty evolved in response to ‘capitalist production 
requir[ing] a normative code with legal force to reorganize resources 
and space so they can be turned into commodities’ (Forman, 2016, 
p. 285). The extent to which indigenous peoples influence that normative 
code is largely the product of their relative importance to the national 
economy. State sovereignty’s relative importance as either a constituent 
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of (when  inclusively structured) or constraint on (when exclusively 
structured) indigenous self-determination depends on the size of the 
state’s incursions into indigenous affairs. However, state capacity is subject 
to increasing global economic constraints. At the same time, indigenous 
economic and political capacity to trade and engage with nonstate actors 
is increasing. Economic independence challenges subservience to the 
state. The international economic opportunities that Maori pursue are 
illustrative. Treaty settlements strengthen Maori contributions to the 
national economy. For example, between 2001 and 2010, the Maori 
economic asset base increased from NZ$9.4 billion to NZ$36.9 billion 
due in part to these settlements (Westpac New Zealand, 2014).
Treaty settlements strengthen democratic capacity by creating further 
avenues for independence. They show that Altamirano-Jiménez (2004) 
was wrong to dismiss economic entrepreneurship as the ‘yoke of 
internal colonialism’ (p. 354). Economic independence is preliminary 
to self-determination and essential to reducing subservience to the state. 
Economic factors show that sovereignty is more complicated than just 
indigenous authority over their own affairs. In Canada, substantive 
participation within the state is a pragmatic imperative when one 
considers that economic marginalisation costs the country C$28 billion 
a year (Public Policy Forum, 2017). Basic infrastructural investment in 
indigenous communities would reduce the financial cost of poverty by 
$2.2 billion each year (Public Policy Forum, 2017).
Sovereignty determines people’s political location vis-a-vis the state. 
However, locations change, and, therefore, it is conceptually useful to 
find a language for discussing where one thinks power ought to lie and 
why. According to Wiessner (2008), sovereignty inheres in its bearer: 
‘it grows or it dies from within’ (p. 1176). It can be summarised as an 
indigenous peoples’ right to ‘recapture their identity’ (p. 1176) and to 
enjoy the political rights and responsibilities that such capacity requires. 
Sovereignty is concerned with the political capacity for citizenship to share 
in the construction of the public interest because:
In the absence of a Philosopher King who reads transcendent 
normative verities, the only ground for a claim that a policy or 
decision is just is that it has been arrived at by a public [that] has 
truly promoted the free expression of all. (Young, 1989, p. 263)
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Sovereign authority is best distributed to allow people to lead flourishing 
lives as politics’ ultimate purpose (Aristotle, 1988). It ought to be 
distributed with reference to principles of ‘objectiveness, reasonableness, 
necessity and proportionality’ (Xanthaki, 2008, p. 282). Indigeneity 
means that sovereignty is inclusive and ‘grounded in the right of all 
citizens to shape the society in which they live’ (Clarke, 2006, p. 119). 
The concept of indigenous peoples as shareholders in public sovereignty 
assumes an active citizenship quite different from assimilation into a single 
homogenous entity. It is thus a form of citizenship of inherent political 
value—without it, self-determination’s potential is curtailed.
Sovereignty as Ideology
Traditionally, political discourses of sovereignty are neither natural nor 
neutral (Shaw, 2008). They are not always attentive to diverse ways of 
thinking about public authority and what it could mean for indigenous 
peoples. One needs a responsive political theory to refute arguments that 
sovereignty is an absolute and coercive force with which indigenous people 
cannot compete. One needs to be able to set aside Alfred’s (1999) argument 
that, for indigenous peoples to seek sovereignty, they must imitate all that 
it implies as a negative force inconsistent with indigenous political values. 
Alfred (2005) argued that one ought to ‘de-think’ sovereignty, which 
he labelled a ‘social creation’ reflecting non-indigenous political values. 
He wrote of the ‘reification of sovereignty in politics’ (Alfred, 2005, 
p. 33)—of a system that states use against indigenous political authority. 
However, Carroll (2012) objected that Alfred’s (1999) ‘intellectual battle 
is constructed around monoliths: the state versus indigenous peoples’ 
(p. 157). Public sovereignty can instead be shared to advance indigenous 
interests.
A share in public sovereignty is not a right to be ‘consulted’ in policy 
development simply because the state cannot find the political will 
to ensure participation. Even the all-powerful sovereign of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan exercises an authority for the people’s collective benefit. It is an 
authority that can be withdrawn if it is not exercised for that purpose. The 
Leviathan’s sovereignty is indivisible and, for the time being, absolute, but it 
is not forever unconditional (Hobbes, 1946). Hobbes allowed sovereignty 
to reside in an assembly and for the individual to retain liberty over things 
that cannot be transferred to the commonwealth. The sovereign rules for 
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all, not for itself. When ‘our refusal to obey frustrates the End for which 
the Sovereign was ordained; then there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise 
there is’ (Hobbes, 1946, p. 142). Sovereignty is only valid when it is 
given freely by the commonwealth and exercises ‘protection’ as its specific 
purpose. Thus, a commonwealth is not simply a vesting of sovereignty in 
a person or assembly but a forging of unity (Hobbes, 1946).
Sovereignty’s ‘dynamism’ appears when it is juxtaposed with a more 
substantive account of an indigenous right to self-determination. This 
book’s principal intent is to show how the Declaration allows one to 
think broadly of power; that is, to accept Shaw’s (2008) argument that 
sovereignty is not ‘apolitical and uncontestable’ (p. 9) but an expression 
of how people understand the just distribution and expression of political 
authority. Sovereignty ought also reflect the ways in which people wish to 
belong to a national political community.
McCue (2007) described her people’s (Ned’u’ten) power as ‘rooted in our 
creation stories, our spirituality and our organic and peaceful institutions. 
Sovereignty requires the energy of the land and the people and is distinct 
about locality’ (pp. 24–25). In McCue’s conceptualisation, sovereignty is 
not concerned with the power of domination but with balanced political 
relationships.
Shared sovereignty need not presume the ‘parallel law-making system’ 
that the Federal Court of Australia dismissed in Yorta Yorta v The State of 
Victoria (1998, para. 44) because, wherever sovereignty resides, it is shared 
and distributed in ways more complex than a simple binary can describe. 
The Uluru Statement from the Heart described enduring indigenous 
sovereignty as:
a spiritual notion: the ancestral tie between the land, or ‘mother 
nature’, and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples who 
were born therefrom, remain attached thereto, and must one day 
return thither to be reunited with our ancestors. This link is the basis 
of the ownership of the soil, or better, of sovereignty. It has never 
been ceded or extinguished, and co-exists with the sovereignty of 
the Crown.
…
With substantive constitutional change and structural reform, 
we believe this ancient sovereignty can shine through as a fuller 
expression of Australia’s nationhood. (Referendum Council, 2017, 
paras. 3–5, emphasis in original)
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The Referendum Council (2017) sought ‘constitutional reforms to 
empower our people and take a rightful place in our own country’ 
(para. 8, emphasis in original). Arguing that ‘When we have power over 
our destiny our children will flourish’ (para. 8), the council called ‘for 
the establishment of a First Nations Voice enshrined in the Constitution’ 
(para. 9). It was maintained that a guaranteed voice would structure 
public reason into Australia’s constitutional framework. Having such 
a voice implies changing political relationships to alter what it means to 
be an indigenous citizen. Constitutions are statements about who belongs 
and who does not. The Australian Constitution is clear—citizens do not 
belong on equal terms and race is a criterion for exclusion:
If by the law of any State all persons of any race are disqualified 
from voting at elections for the more numerous House of the 
Parliament of the State, then, in reckoning the number of the 
people of the State or of the Commonwealth, persons of that race 
resident in that State shall not be counted. (s. 25)
Liberal societies exclude to protect the interests of the more powerful and 
for fear that another’s claim to a share in political authority might diminish 
their own. ‘They exclude through the denial of history to make another’s 
claim seem unreasonable’ (O’Sullivan, 2018b, para. 7) and often in the 
language they use to describe democracy. For former Australian prime 
minister Malcolm Turnbull, the proposed voice was ‘contrary to equality 
and citizenship’ (Belot & Laurence, 2017, para. 1), as it gave indigenous 
people rights beyond those held in common with other citizens. There 
was to be no space for political participation from distinctive cultural 
or sociohistorical perspectives. ‘One person, one vote’ satisfied liberal 
democracy, whereas the Referendum Council seemed to propose one 
voice of equal value, reflecting a more expansive and inclusive conception 
of equality.
McCue’s (2007) account of sovereignty provides a further perspective. 
In exercising their sovereignty, Ned’u’ten:
Clan members and hereditary chiefs are guided by the attributes of 
peace, respect, generosity, balance, harmony, compassion, sharing, 
gifting and discipline in their relations with all that is alive, all that 
has gone before, and all that has yet to come. These attributes are 
inalienable, inherent and sacred. (p. 25)
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However, as McCue (2007) remarked, it remains difficult to examine 
sovereignty as a term that describes ‘inherent’ indigenous power. This 
is because the ‘meaning of “sovereignty” is yet to undergo significant 
Indigenous and political treatment, definition and elaboration, especially 
with respect to its coordinate relationships to the right to self-determination 
and Indigenous worldviews’ (pp. 19–20). This book goes some ways 
towards filling that gap in both liberal and indigenous political thought, 
confirming that, at the very least, sovereignty presumes protection from 
external interference.
McCue (2007) explained that, for the Ned’u’ten people, ‘the exercise 
of sovereign jurisdiction’ occurs:
• within our potlatch system, our clan and house structures as 
units of politics/territories;
• when our hereditary leaders fulfil their responsibilities and 
obligations; and
• when there is a transmission of oral histories and traditions, 
principal customs, and ceremonies from one generation to the 
next. (pp. 24–25)
According to Coates and Newman (2014), the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia highlights that:
at a fundamental level … Aboriginal communities have a right 
to an equitable place at the table in relation to natural resource 
development in Canada. Their empowerment through Tsilhqot’in 
and earlier decisions has the potential to be immensely exciting 
as a means of further economic development in Aboriginal 
communities and prosperity for all.
…
the time is now for governments, Aboriginal communities, and 
resource sector companies to work together to build partnerships 
for the future … We need to keep building a national consensus 
that responsible resource development that takes account of 
sustainability issues and that respects Indigenous communities 
contributes positively – very positively – to Canada and its future. 
(p. 21)
From another Native American perspective, sovereignty is:
more of a continued cultural integrity than of political powers … 
to the degree that a nation loses its sense of cultural identity, to 
that degree it suffers a loss of sovereignty. (Deloria, 1999, p. 113)
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In the US, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
held that:
The principle of tribal sovereignty in American law exists as 
a matter of respect for Indian communities. It recognizes the 
independence of these communities as regards internal affairs, 
thereby giving them latitude to maintain traditional customs 
and practices. But tribal sovereignty is not absolute autonomy, 
permitting a tribe to operate in a commercial capacity without 
legal constraint. (as cited in Wiessner, 2008, p. 1168)
Wiessner (2008) explained that the Court ‘also observed that tribal 
sovereignty is strongest when based on a treaty or when the tribal 
government acts within the borders of the reservation in matters 
concerning only tribal members’ (p. 1168). Tribal sovereignty is then 
restrained and conditional.
Independent Indigenous Nations
In 1831, in Cherokee Nation v Georgia, Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Marshall described indigenous nations as ‘domestic dependent nations’ 
(p. 2). According to Carroll (2012), the concept, which resembles ‘that of 
a ward to his guardian’, continues to influence ‘a large part of the present 
definition of tribal sovereignty’ (p. 145). An alternative perspective is that 
indigenous nationhood implies equality. Justices Thompson and Story’s 
dissenting opinion, in the same case, sets out principles of sovereignty 
that are capable of plural interpretation and are not conditioned by ward 
like dependence:
The terms state and nation are used in the law of nations … as 
importing the same thing; and imply a body of men, united 
together, to procure their mutual safety and advantage by means 
of their union.… We ought, therefore, to reckon in the number 
of sovereigns those states that have bound themselves to another 
more powerful, although by an unequal alliance. The conditions 
of these unequal alliances may be infinitely varied; but whatever 
they are, provided the inferior ally reserves to itself the sovereignty 
of the right to govern its own body, it ought to be considered 
an independent state […] to be placed among sovereigns who 
acknowledge no other power. (as cited in Duthu, 2013, p. 13)
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In 2016, in United States v Bryant, the Supreme Court considered tribal 
courts’ capacity to ensure fair trials and safe verdicts. The case, which 
became a test of tribal sovereignty, recognised that ‘no liberal sovereign 
can be absolved of the imperative to protect the rights of the accused in its 
criminal proceedings’ (Cutler, 2016, p. 1752).
Significantly, in her analysis of the case, Cutler (2016) did not use the state 
courts’ standards as the necessary point of comparison. This is because 
tribal sovereignty is not simply a replication of the state’s. Tribes predate 
the US itself, being ‘both preconstitutional and extraconstitutional’ 
(Cutler, 2016, p. 1755), which entails that their sovereign powers do not 
proceed from the national constitution. Therefore:
Procedural protections for tribal court defendants should be 
measured not by replication of state and federal public defense 
systems, but rather by analyzing tribal courts under international 
principles of comity to determine if a verdict is fundamentally fair. 
(Cutler, 2016, p. 1752)
Affirming tribal sovereignty’s independence makes it clear that it is not 
a  subset of the colonial authority of the state. People have the right 
to a fair trial—not as the colonial state defines it, but as international 
law protects it (Cutler, 2016). The Declaration provides guidance on 
procedural fairness:
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and 
maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive 
customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the 
cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance 
with international human rights standards. (UN, 2007b, art. 34)
The difficult question for contemporary politics to resolve is that the 
‘inherent’ sovereignty recognised in United States v Bryant conflicts with 
Chief Justice Marshall’s earlier insistence that tribal sovereignty belongs to 
indigenous nations as ‘domestic dependent nations’.
Dependency undermines sovereign political authority, leaving much 
of the scope for indigenous wellbeing vulnerable to the goodwill of 
the state. ‘[T]he rights-affirming strain of [Chief Justice Marshall’s] 
doctrine’ is important, while its ‘rights-limiting strain … is out of step 
with contemporary human rights values’ (UN, 2012a, p. 7). The politics 
of indigeneity must resolve the philosophical contradiction between 
recognising indigenous rights so that states may honour international 
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standards of justice, supported by economic and social imperatives to 
maximise indigenous capacity, and, conversely, the state’s wish to retain 
political authority over indigenous peoples.
Five hundred and sixty-six American Indian and Alaskan Native tribes 
enjoy nation-to-nation relationships with the US. However, there are many 
other groups, including Native Hawaiians, that do not receive equivalent 
recognition (Independent Sovereign State of Hawai‘i, 2017) even though 
they have long sought it. For example, the Nation of Hawaii, the oldest 
Hawaiian independence organisation, wishes to restore the ‘National 
Sovereignty of the Hawaiian people’ as a meaningful and practical path to 
self-determination (Independent Sovereign State of Hawai‘i, 2017, p. 1).
Indigenous Hawaiians do not enjoy any legal arrangements for 
self-government to support the apology that the US offered in 1995 
for ‘the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii’ in 1893 and the suppression 
of the people’s ‘inherent sovereignty’ (UN, 2012a, p. 11). While the US 
acknowledged that reconciliation logically follows apology, it remains an 
elusive aspiration.
H-K Trask (1999) demonstrated sovereignty’s simplicity and reasonableness 
for Hawaii:
Because of the overthrow and annexation, Hawaiian control and 
Hawaiian citizenship were replaced with American control 
and American citizenship. We suffered a unilateral redefinition of 
our homeland and our people, a displacement and a dispossession 
in our own country … orphaned in our own land. Such brutal 
changes in a people’s identity—their legal status, their government, 
their sense of belonging to a nation—are considered among 
the most serious human rights violations by the international 
community today. (p. 16)
An alternative Hawaiian perspective is that, for ‘Kanaka Maoli, our 
struggle has always been about nationhood, an essential foundation for 
the practice and perpetuation of our culture’ (Trask, 2012, p. 285).
Land and education are essential to culture. Ho‘omanawanui (2012) 
argued that the Declaration validates indigenous claims to recover lands 
from military jurisdiction. For example:
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories 
of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public 




2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the 
indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures 
and in particular through their representative institutions, 
prior to using their lands or territories for military activities. 
(UN, 2007b, art. 30)
Ho‘omanawanui (2012) also argued that the implementation of the 
right to education, at Articles 13 and 14 of the Declaration could have 
‘dramatic’ and ‘positive’ (p. 291) effects on measures such as teaching 
in the Hawaiian language:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop 
and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, 
oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, 
and to designate and retain their own names for communities, 
places and persons.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure this right 
is protected and also to ensure that indigenous peoples 
can understand and be understood in political, legal and 
administrative proceedings, where necessary through the 
provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means. 
(UN, 2007b, art. 13)
Further:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their 
educational systems and institutions providing education in 
their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural 
methods of teaching and learning.
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right 
to all levels and forms of education of the State without 
discrimination.
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take 
effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, 
particularly children, including those living outside their 
communities, to have access, when possible, to an education 
in their own culture and provided in their own language. 
(UN, 2007b, art. 14)
The cultural validation that public support for indigenous education 
provides is an important measure of political recognition. It is a statement 
that indigenous people belong to the nation-state as citizens.
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The Inuit Circumpolar Council (2009) asserted its sovereignty with 
reference to the Declaration and earlier UN instruments, insisting that 
‘Central to our rights as a people is the right to self-determination’ (art. 1.4). 
The council’s declaration on sovereignty is an assertion of a transnational 
Inuit right to share political authority with the Arctic states. It challenges 
sovereignty as the preserve of single nation-states in whose formation 
Inuit people had no say. The right to self-determination transcends state 
boundaries to once again show that indigenous sovereignty is not a simple 
parallel to the sovereignty claimed by the postsettler state. From one 
Haudenosaunee perspective:
We were and are not citizens of the United States, Britain, or 
Canada and as it was agreed when the US–Canadian border was 
drawn it ought to remain ‘ten feet above our heads’. (Garrow, 2012, 
p. 172)
Sovereignty is a treaty right compromised by interference with indigenous 
people’s free passage across traditional territories divided by an imposed 
international border. The Declaration states that:
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international 
borders, have the right to maintain and develop contacts, 
relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, 
cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their 
own members as well as other peoples across borders.
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, 
shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure 
the implementation of this right. (UN, 2007b, art. 36)
The Declaration may lend moral persuasiveness to a treaty right that 
neither Canada nor the US have respected, for it maintains that:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, 
observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their 
successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, 
agreements and other constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as to diminish 
or eliminate the rights of indigenous peoples contained 




The Distribution of Sovereignty
The Declaration is ultimately concerned with plurality in the distribution 
of public sovereignty to uphold diversity. Ivison, Patton and Sanders 
(2000) claimed that:
one of the interesting consequences of the encounter between 
liberalism and its colonial past and present might be a more 
context-sensitive and multilayered approach to questions of 
justice, identity, democracy and sovereignty. The result would 
be a political theory open to new modes of cultural and political 
belonging. (p. 21)
A series of polarising questions concern how political authority is 
distributed, how people belong and how and why they might consent 
to state authority. Indigenous demands for an inclusive public authority 
occur because people are entitled to ‘safe spaces’ (Wiessner, 2008, p. 1174) 
to construct lives that they have reason to value (Sen, 1999a). Indigenous 
peoples are not going to go away; sovereignty is their insistence on 
the right to be present and ‘to stay’ as indigenous. Yet states resist the 
reconfiguration of sovereignty, not recognising that one community’s need 
for relationships with others makes sovereignty relative and relational. 
Sovereignty ought not be conditional on indigenous peoples sacrificing 
their cultural values or adopting institutional arrangements at odds with 
those values.
Sovereignty can be understood as the authority to realise self-determination’s 
potential, which in turn presumes substantive recognition of property 
and governance rights. From this foundation, broader consideration of 
the distribution of political authority and the precise terms on which 
sovereignty is shared might occur—that is, the terms on which peoples 
might belong together differently (Maaka & Fleras, 2005). The nation-
state is not necessarily the only place in which sovereignty lies. When the 
nation-state exercises sovereignty, it only does so on the people’s behalf. 
In this context, distinctions between the people who are included and the 
people who are excluded assume great political importance.
The idea that indigenous people constitute distinct groups disturbs 
the presumption that consent to government might be given through 
culturally homogenous majoritarian democracy. Majoritarian democracy 
is routinely used to challenge indigenous claims and to restrict distinctive 
and guaranteed indigenous participation in public affairs—as Australian 
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prime ministers Turnbull’s and Morrison’s rejection of an Indigenous 
Australian voice to parliament showed. The presumption that a majority 
is always morally prior to a minority and more likely to be virtuous in its 
policy objectives means that the arguments for particular and distinctive 
indigenous contributions to policymaking are not always admitted. 
However, sovereignty ought not be used as a ‘shield’ to protect the state 
from indigenous objections to its abuse of power (Wiessner, 2008). It is 
significant that, as early as the 1830s, the Native American William Apess 
sought recognition of the ‘rights of indigenous peoples as liberal subjects’ 
(Dahl, 2016, p. 3).
Liberalism’s inability to give theoretical justification to ‘conquest’ does 
not mean that it needs to understand indigenous peoples ‘as paternalistic 
wards of the state unable to make political claims of their own’ (Dahl, 
2016, p. 3). Liberal political rights presume personal agency, not the 
patient anticipation that the benevolent state will one day ‘do justice’ 
to indigenous claims, as Waldron (2004, p. 253) expected. Instead, the 
Declaration is both the outcome and expression of indigenous agency as 
liberal citizens sharing national sovereignty, just as sovereignty is shared 
by other citizens.
Contemporary postsettler states struggle to manage political pressures 
for inclusion and exclusion; likewise, they struggle to acquire legitimacy, 
at least symbolically, in the eyes of indigenous citizens. Legitimacy 
would mean that indigenous peoples would find it unnecessary to think 
exclusively outside a liberal framework to acquire political voice and 
influence—that is, a share in national sovereignty. They would find their 
experiences aligned with Rousseau’s understanding of popular sovereignty 
as the mechanism through which individuals become citizens concerned 
with the common good (Habermas, 1997). Maximum authority over 
their own affairs would occur alongside a distinctive space in public 
sovereignty as one of the Declaration’s central presumptions. Indeed, 
if ‘sovereignty … is a social creation’ as Alfred (2005, p. 46) proposed, 
it is logically a continually evolving phenomenon. The very fact that it is 
not an ‘objective or natural phenomenon, but the result of choices made 
by men and women, indicative of a mindset … rather than a natural 
force creative of a social and political order’ (p. 471) means that it is 




As a concept, state sovereignty is both constrained and variable (i.e. not 
static). Public attitudes to power and how it should be shared evolve with 
time and context and in response to changing political and economic 
constraints and opportunities. Politics occurs from assumptions about 
what makes power legitimate and what makes it illegitimate. It is the 
political spaces that sovereignty creates, and those that it limits, that are 
important. An expansive politics of potential cannot be defined or limited 
by these theoretical descriptions of political possibility but nor can it 
develop without reference to them. Colonial political theory gave states 
power over people (e.g. the power to dominate was the essential message 
that the colonial order took from Locke’s theory of labour, as discussed 
in Chapter 3). However, indigeneity’s juxtaposition with liberalism 
proposes the state as the agent of the people’s sovereignty (as opposed to 
the force that exercises coercive and destructive power over some—but not 
necessarily all—people).
The juxtaposition provides ways of thinking about the political values 
and expectations that would moderate the dominance of the majority. 
Ultimately, indigenous sovereignty over their own affairs, and through 
equal membership of a liberal state, is possible, and the Declaration shows 
how. To this end, the politics of indigeneity’s theoretical engagement with 
liberal democracy requires a form of differentiated citizenship to check 
unbridled majoritarian rule.
Differentiated citizenship promotes a cohesive and inclusive liberal 
political community, for indigeneity is a politics of ‘shared sovereignties’ 
(Maaka & Fleras, 2005, p. 187). Its substantive character and relationship 
with self-determination and sovereignty is the following chapter’s 
concern. Differentiated citizenship’s opposite is an exclusionary politics 
in which a settler cultural identity, rather than citizenship, is the criteria 
for democratic participation. A New Zealand proposal of this kind is 
then discussed in Chapter 9 and contrasted with models of indigenous 








Liberalism is concerned with freedom, autonomy and the development of 
human capacity. Therefore, if one presumes that freedom and autonomy 
should belong equally to everybody, then political systems and processes 
need to be arranged for inclusivity and equal democratic participation. 
Substantive indigenous voice is important because political systems 
and political decisions reflect the values of those who have designed or 
made them. Democratic inclusivity means that it is fair and reasonable 
for indigenous values and epistemologies to influence decision-making. 
However, indigenous policy is often made without reference to indigenous 
people’s evidence of what works or to their views of the values that ought 
to inform policy, which makes exclusion one of the causes of the unfair 
distribution of power.
Public reason and participatory parity may help to create political systems 
in which indigenous people can see their own values and priorities 
reflected. However, public reason requires an informed public, the lack 
of which was a particular concern to the TRC. The commission showed 
that reason means that public policy is informed by truth and evidence, 
not prejudice. This chapter argues that all people should have equivalent 
opportunity to contribute to public debate and thus to the ‘formation 
of [public] values and priorities’ (Sen, 1999b, p. 153). This is because 
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politics is concerned not just with abstract or theoretical rights but also 
with helping to bring people ‘as close to good functioning as their natural 
circumstances permit’ (Nussbaum, 1987, p. 5).
Self-Determination as Inclusive Citizenship
The Declaration shows that, for all its negative consequences, colonial 
settlement has not reduced indigenous peoples to a ‘state of absolute 
disempowerment’ (Collingwood-Whittick, 2012, p. 125). Instead, and as 
a politics of possibility (O’Sullivan, 2017), indigeneity is concerned with 
human potential—with the right to self-determination through inclusive 
and differentiated citizenship and with self-determination’s transformative 
capacity to contribute to people’s enjoyment of lives that they have reason 
to value (Sen, 1999a). From this perspective, decolonisation may include 
assimilating ‘the colonizer into Aboriginal processes of power-sharing’ 
(Watson & Venne, 2012, pp. 88–89) in which indigenous agency is taken 
for granted. Indigenous peoples might then consider the ways in which 
postsettler states may be reconfigured for inclusivity. A liberal theory 
of indigeneity’s distinctiveness is its focus on group rights and cultural 
context as essential constituents of individual liberty.
Differentiated citizenship can be structured to promote democratic 
participation in which all people enjoy the full rights of liberal democratic 
citizenship, and indigenous people enjoy guaranteed authority over their 
own affairs. From this perspective, an inclusive liberal polity can be 
structured in congruence with self-determination and in association with 
the Declaration. This conceptualisation of differentiated citizenship is 
consistent with Ivison’s (2002) postcolonial liberalism, which argues for:
a space within liberal democracies and liberal thought in which … 
Aboriginal perspectives and philosophies can not only be heard, 
but [also] given equal opportunity to shape (and reshape) the 
forms of power and government acting on them. (p. 1)
Differentiated citizenship is politically valuable to indigenous self-
determination. It acknowledges the expression of political rights in 
language that is amenable to international sympathy and the liberal 
insistence that ‘individuals or groups cannot simply assert that they want 
something; they must say that justice requires or allows that they have it’ 
(Horscroft, 2002, p. 263).
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Colonialism brings a distinctive context to people’s experiences of 
citizenship. That context in turn requires distinct processes for agreeing 
on public values to provide people with meaningful political voice. 
Politics is not concerned only with who holds which public office but 
with the exercise of political authority for the common good. The politics 
of indigeneity that the Declaration may support is not concerned with 
superior rights but with giving expression to liberal rights in a meaningful 
context. Liberalism cannot find difference repugnant to the integrity of 
the state, for as Young (1989) argued:
The responsible citizen is concerned not merely with interests but 
with justice, with acknowledging that each other person’s interest 
and point of view is as good as his or her own, and that the needs 
and interests of everyone must be voiced and be heard by others. 
(p. 262)
Patton (2005) identified three elements of a just noncolonial politics 
‘derived … from the requirements of reparative, distributive and 
relational justice’ (p. 256). The first requires states to repair, as far as 
they can, the consequences of historical injustice. The second requires 
non-discrimination in public policy such that any lingering ‘views about 
the hierarchy of peoples and cultures’ (p. 257) are dismissed. The third, 
which is concerned with the nature of political relationships (Patton, 
2005), is potentially the most important and far-reaching in giving effect 
to the Declaration.
Relational justice addresses the limits of distributive justice. On its own, 
distributive justice can have assimilationist tendencies. It is not necessarily 
attentive to the historical, political and cultural contexts of material need 
and does not consider that greater need in the distribution of material 
resources can be the outcome of the colonial experience itself. While 
indigenous political claims often have distributive implications, their 
foundation is in a broader moral argument for the recognition of prior 
occupancy. However, liberal societies are most responsive to those with 
the greater political voice. A strong relationship between indigenous 
peoples’ relative population size and political influence is to be expected. 
Conversely, the broader liberal theory that the Declaration embraces ought 
to give moral reasoning greater influence, including, especially, indigenous 
moral reasoning in the determination of just policy objectives. Moreover, 
it ought to allow the claims of indigeneity to carry political authority in 
ways and for reasons that are independent of relative population size.
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Mansbridge (1996) argued that liberal theory need not assume that 
a majority is always more likely to be objectively correct in its claims, nor 
must liberal theory insist that majority interests necessarily exist at the 
expense or exclusion of all others. Under liberal democratic arrangements, 
a group’s relative population size ought not be the determinant of its capacity 
for self-determination, nor should size explain its relative wellbeing. 
Indigeneity is a political theory that makes no such presumption. Instead, 
it shows liberal democracy’s theoretical capacity to frame the possibilities 
of indigenous citizenship to promote substantive political participation 
and to make self-determination an attainable human right.
Limited indigenous voice means that indigenous preferences are unlikely to 
be reflected in policy outcomes. Therefore, it is inadequate to characterise 
geocultural attachments as a choice ‘not conducive to the kinds of full 
participation in Australian society that everyone should have’, as former 
Australian prime minister Tony Abbott did, for example (as cited in 
Dorfmann, 2015, p. 13). Abbott made the argument in support of the 
Western Australian Government’s proposal to cease providing municipal 
services to indigenous communities it deemed unviable (Dorfmann, 2015).
The underlying argument was that self-determination should not be 
available to all indigenous peoples and that such people’s material 
wellbeing ought to be conditional on surrendering historical connections 
to country. Yet the Declaration holds that:
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands 
or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, 
prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned 
and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where 
possible, with the option of return. (UN, 2007b, art. 10)
Abbott styled himself the ‘Prime Minister for Indigenous Affairs’; 
however, by his actions, he showed himself to be mainly interested in 
those indigenous people who were willing and able to exercise a choice to 
assimilate. The Declaration, however, maintains that ‘Indigenous peoples 
and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or 
destruction of their culture’ (UN, 2007b, art. 8[1]). Further:
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to 
an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the 
traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned. 
No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such 
a right. (UN, 2007b, art. 9)
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It can be difficult to rank a series of proposals as more or less just when 
justice itself is contested and not neutral. Indigenous policy is often made 
on the basis of assumptions, not evidence. The collection of data on what 
works in Australian Indigenous policy is a newly accepted priority, and 
the notion that the role of public policy is to improve Indigenous people’s 
lives is a recent development, as the earlier discussion of the Australian 
National Audit Office’s (2017) report on the government’s Indigenous 
Advancement Strategy showed (see Chapter 1). Conversely, prejudice 
is self-justificatory: it removes the need for evidence-based policy 
(O’Sullivan, 2015, 2017).
The test of liberal democracy’s capacity to facilitate indigenous citizenship 
is not simply its mediation of difference but also its establishment of 
common ground that is not threatened by indigenous peoples’ unique 
identities. ‘Deliberative democracy requires the most expansive possible 
conditions of entry to formal or official political arenas’ (Knight & 
Johnson, 2011, p. 283); yet liberal societies commonly exclude ‘others’ 
to protect what their majority populations hold in common, which is 
why institutional structures are determined according to a particular set 
of cultural values that are not neutral.
Institutional values stem from the cultural expectations of those who 
have designed them and reflect the values of those who determine the 
purposes that public institutions should serve. Institutional designers may 
have predetermined expectations about who is to be included and who 
is not. By contrast, institutional cultures might create the expectation 
that people will engage with each other to settle national policy priorities. 
Although deliberative democracy is ‘a complex ideal’ (Bohman, 1997, 
p. 321), it assumes ordered and inclusive terms of political association 
precisely because it has an essential liberal concern for the less powerful.
Liberal democracy is reasonably concerned with all and not just some 
citizens’ deliberative capacity. In this way, politics may counter the market 
failure that would occur if public life were the sum of uncoordinated 
individual choices (Elster, 1997). However, politics does not always and 
necessarily admit that people live in subnational communities. Nor does 
it always acknowledge that intergroup relationships need to be managed 
towards fair distributive outcomes. As Bohman (1997) asked, ‘What 
sorts of social inequalities are relevant to democratic deliberation? How 
large can actual inequalities be before they undermine the democratic 
ideal?’ (p. 321). Inequality in terms of who loses, and why, explains the 
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weakness in Waldron’s (2004) argument that fair and reasonable political 
arrangements could supersede injustice. The idea is that just terms 
of association allow a polity to treat the past as though it never occurred.
Self-determination finds an inevitable and irremovable contradiction 
in the argument that:
Claims about historical injustice predicated on the status quo ante 
may be superseded by a determination to distribute the resources 
of the world in a way that is fair to all of its existing inhabitants. 
(Waldron, 2003, p. 71)
Self-determination’s concern for relational justice, or just terms 
of  association, means that it is not simply a state that is reached and 
secured as a single event. Just terms of association require that the causes 
of unequal distributions of power are admitted.
Bohman (1997) argued that democratic systems can manage unequal 
distributions of power as long as these ‘fall within the limits of the rule of 
law’ (p. 322). However, this holds only if the rule of law is itself just; that is, 
if the burdens and possibilities of the law are distributed fairly and impose 
no structural discrimination on particular groups of people. Political 
equality means equal capacity to influence and to acknowledge that, even 
if one’s preferences do not always prevail, they have the opportunity to 
carry influence and that the decision-making process is fair and reasonable 
in considering all perspectives.
None but the most routine political decisions can be equally acceptable 
to everyone. Democracy does not work in the absence of philosophical 
disagreement. Conflicting perspectives and aspirations are not always and 
necessarily undesirable, nor must conflicting perspectives and aspirations 
preclude finding sufficient commonality for social cohesion and political 
community to occur. Ideas must be exposed to contest. However, the 
question of who loses and whether that is because of unfair decision-
making processes is important. Liberal societies ought to be guided by 
the values implicit in Rousseau’s (1984) social contract—that ‘no citizen 
should be rich enough to be able to buy another, and none so poor that 
he has to sell himself ’ (p. 75)—from which deliberative democracy is 
developed. Inequality of power means that some people cannot meet the 
conditions of deliberation as peers.
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In a remark to a TRC hearing, the then Minister of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development, Chuck Strahl, explained the procedural 
significance of indigenous deliberative exclusion:
Governments like to write … policy, and they like to write 
legislation, and they like to codify things and so on. And Aboriginal 
people want to talk about restoration, reconciliation, forgiveness, 
about healing … about truth. And those things are all things 
of the heart and of relationships and not of government policy. 
Governments do a bad job of that. (quotation is as it appears in 
the source, as cited in TRC, 2015, p. 20)
In Australia, the UN special rapporteur noted that:
While [Australia] has adopted numerous policies aiming to address 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait socio-economic disadvantage, the 
failure to respect the right to self-determination and the right to 
full and effective participation … is alarming. The compounded 
effect … has contributed to the failure to deliver on the targets 
of the areas of health, education and employment in the 
Closing the Gap strategy and has contributed to aggravating the 
escalating incarceration and child removal rates of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders. (UN, 2017b, Self-determination and 
participation, para. 15)
Self-Determination, Democracy and 
Reasoned Public Decision-Making
Democracy requires competing philosophical ideas for its effectiveness 
(Benhabib, 1996), but it needs to manage these in ways that recognise the 
distinctiveness of the indigenous position vis-a-vis the postsettler state. 
The form that democracy takes influences policy outcomes. Indigenous 
peoples must have reason to acknowledge that there is, in fact, a national 
common good and that they can benefit from contributing to it. Questions 
must be asked. For example: Can the common good be understood in ways 
that are not homogenising? Are conflict and the common good points 
on a continuum or are they mutually exclusive possibilities? Is  conflict 
inevitable and public reason impossible because, as Schumpeter asserted 
in his elitist theory of democracy, ‘citizens in modern democracies [are] 
politically uninformed, apathetic, and manipulable’ (Bohman & Rehg, 
1997, p. x)?
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An ill-informed public with a news media that does not accept a mission 
of public education is an obstacle to deliberative democracy. Public 
ignorance of the historical conflicts that arise between indigenous peoples 
and the state undermines reasoned public debate. According to Miller 
(2016), in the assessment of conflict, it is often true that:
Politicians, journalists and ordinary citizens understood neither 
how nor why the crisis of the moment had arisen, much less how 
its deep historical roots made it resistant to solutions … [This] 
does not bode well for effective public debate or sensible policy-
making. (p. ii)
Deliberative democracy works best when elitist democracy’s underlying 
presumptions are wrong and when the determinants of political authority 
are distributed equally so that all people may share the deliberative 
capacities of citizenship. This is because, as Aristotle (1988) put it, 
deliberation is citizenship’s defining characteristic.
Deliberation through the public reason that participatory parity allows 
is essential ‘to the formation of [the] values and priorities’ (Sen, 1999b, 
p. 153) that a society wishes to privilege. At the same time, political 
agreement is not always necessary: people must be free to express their 
own conceptions of justice and be confident that these will be considered 
and have the capacity to influence public deliberation. As Bohman (1997) 
argued, ‘the achievement of consensus in public deliberation depends on 
the discussion being guided by an ideal of impartiality’ (p. 266). It also 
depends on equal access to education because, as Rawls (1993) argued, the 
capacity to deliberate requires that citizens ‘have, at least to the essential 
minimum degree, the moral, intellectual and philosophical capacities that 
enable them to be fully cooperating members of society over a complete 
life’ (p. 183). Schooling plays an important role in developing skills of 
critical reasoning and ‘public reasonableness’. Education helps to create 
the public expectation that a well-functioning liberal democracy depends 
on deliberation grounded in these attributes (Gutmann, 1993). However, 
the attributes that participation assumes may not be culturally neutral 
and may be unequally available to different citizens. For example, the 
TRC (2015) found discrepancies in education funding for indigenous 
children educated on reserves vis-a-vis all others and recommended 
focused strategies to remove educational disparities between indigenous 
and other Canadians.
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From the TRC’s perspective, reconciliation requires that all citizens 
are well informed about colonial conflict and the particular aspects of 
political relationships and deliberative opportunities that indigenous 
politics seek to change. Its recommendation for museums and archives 
brings public memory into reconciliation in an overt and structured 
way. Public memory cements indigenous experiences into the national 
story. For example, indigenous people’s ‘inalienable right to know the 
truth about what happened and why’ (TRC, 2015, p. 332) in residential 
schools is complemented by the wider community’s duty to know that 
same truth so that they can reasonably deliberate and understand the 
claims that indigenous people make as members of the sovereign citizenry. 
The TRC also emphasised journalism’s role in developing an informed 
public equipped with the knowledge to deliberate reasonably, which is 
not, in fact, a simple process. As one witness to the TRC (2015) explained:
Journalism’s first obligation is to the truth. … Journalism does 
not pursue truth in an absolute or philosophical sense, but 
it can—and must—pursue it in a practical sense. … Even in 
a  world of expanding voices, accuracy is the foundation upon 
which everything else is built—context, interpretation, comment, 
criticism, analysis and debate. The truth, over time, emerges from 
this forum. …
Its practitioners must be allowed to exercise their personal 
conscience. Every journalist must have a personal sense of ethics 
and responsibility—a moral compass. Each of us must be willing, 
if fairness and accuracy require, to voice differences with our 
colleagues. … This stimulates the intellectual diversity necessary 
to understand and accurately cover an increasingly diverse society. 
It is this diversity of minds and voices, not just numbers, that 
matters. (quotation is as it appears in the source, p. 296)
However, journalist Duncan McCue argued that editorial positions 
‘are often rooted in century-old stereotypes rather than reality’ (as cited 
in TRC, 2015, p. 295) and that:
Yes, protests often meet the test of whether a story is ‘newsworthy,’ 
because they’re unusual, dramatic, or involve conflict. 
Yes, Aboriginal activists, who understand the media’s hunger for 
drama, also play a role by tailoring protests in ways that guarantee 
prominent headlines and lead stories. But, does today’s front-
page news of some traffic disruption in the name of Aboriginal 
land rights actually have its roots in a much older narrative—
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of violent and ‘uncivilized’ Indians who represent a threat to 
‘progress’ in Canada? Are attitudes of distrust and fear underlying 
our decisions to dispatch a crew to the latest Aboriginal blockade? 
Is there no iconic photo of reconciliation, because no one from 
the newsrooms believes harmony between Aboriginal peoples and 
settlers is ‘newsworthy’? (as cited in TRC, 2015, p. 295)
Reconciliation requires reasoned deliberation by a public whose positions 
may differ but who are at least accurately informed.
Deliberative democracy is grounded in reason; its relationships are 
necessarily respectful. Each party is required to be attentive to the other 
and to consider another’s perspectives as legitimate because they are 
reasoned, even if one disagrees with their substance.
Reasonableness is subjective and emotive, especially when prejudice is 
presented as reasonable or—as Pauline Hanson, leader of the overtly racist 
One Nation Party put it—as the views of ‘mainstream Australia’ (Jackman, 
1998, p. 167). If some people are free to promote policies grounded in 
prejudice, then indigenous peoples must be free to find platforms of 
resistance within the democratic system itself. Public reasonableness 
removes presumptions of ‘self- or group-interest, prejudice or bias, and 
of such deeply entrenched errors as ideological blindness and delusion’ 
(Rawls, 1999, p. 478). Public reasonableness is theoretically attractive for 
its insistence on inclusion and presumption that liberal politics would, as 
a matter of course, consider different culturally framed perceptions of the 
good life.
Christiano (1997) explained the contribution that public reasonableness 
would make to policy outcomes and showed how it would differ from 
prevailing indigenous experience:
When I submit my views and my arguments to you for your 
consideration and response and I listen to your ideas and 
arguments with an eye to learning something from you, I express 
a kind of respect for you, I am treating you as a kind of rational 
and intelligent being who has something to offer. (p. 251)
The converse is a common indigenous democratic experience:
If I am discussing some topic with you or someone else and you say 
something germane to the discussion [that] I simply ignore, I express 
a kind of contempt for you. (Christiano, 1997, pp. 251–252)
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The idea that ‘the force of the better argument’ (Habermas, 1997, p. 24) 
determines the prevailing position does not account for the marked 
philosophical differences that can reasonably exist among peoples. It is 
only the reasonableness of one position that can test the unreasonableness 
of another. However, ‘Imposing substantive criteria of reasonableness 
as an ex ante filter on admissibility would prevent that very process of 
reasonable argument’ (Knight & Johnson, 2011, p. 286). Reasonableness 
‘is defined … in terms of a willingness to entertain and respond to 
objections’ (Cohen, 1994, pp. 1537). Alternatively, unreasonableness is 
to advance ‘institutions and policies that cannot be justified to others’ 
(p. 1538). Public reasonableness may require some people to accept that 
their relative advantage over others is unjust:
Political equality requires that when the time comes to make 
one’s final decision on a question, the asymmetries in the social 
distribution of power and resources should not play a role in that 
decision. (Knight & Johnson, 2011, p. 294)
Plural perspectives will have been admitted into the conversation. 
No perspective is given greater or lesser status simply because of whose 
perspective it is, or to whom its underlying cultural values belong. There 
has been an obviously fair process for dealing with difference. Prejudice 
has been illegitimised because ‘equal opportunity of influence requires 
that asymmetries not give unfair advantage’ (Knight & Johnson, 2011, 
p. 293). However, indigenous experience shows that it is difficult to reach 
a  point at which each participant has ‘equal opportunity to influence 
others’ (p. 295). Indeed, Knight and Johnson argued that ‘real opportunity 
of influence is unachievable under democratic procedures because the 
very nature of the process makes the outcome uncertain and subject to 
the exigencies of political debate and deliberation’ (pp. 295–296).
Rawls (1999) likened justice to procedural fairness, so that even if one 
does not accept a particular decision, one can still accept the process 
by which it was made. Social cohesion requires that people are able to 
see that procedural fairness occurs, which means that public reason is 
only achievable through participatory parity. Conversely, as Knight and 
Johnson (2011) put it, liberal societies are distinguished by party political 
systems developed because people are, in fact, routinely motivated by 
‘self-interest, blinded by prejudice, or deluded by ideology’ (p. 284). 
However, the presumption that self-interest and ideology are objectively 
wrong, rather than simply reflective of difference, is problematic. 
If plurality is objectionable, colonialism’s inherent inequality is reinforced.
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Everybody ought to contribute to the development of the values by which 
state institutions operate. It is unjust to exclude some people from the 
definition of collective values if the values that are ultimately adopted 
then become determinants of people’s access to public services. There is 
a relationship between indigeneity and participatory parity that aspires 
to ‘institutionalised patterns of cultural value [that] express equal respect 
for all participants and ensure equal opportunity to achieve social esteem’ 
(Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 36). People must have had the opportunity 
to contribute to a policy’s development if they are to accept its legitimacy. 
Participation, then, is a necessary precondition for just and efficacious 
policy outcomes. Participatory parity presumes two conditions:
First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure 
participants’ independence and ‘voice.’ … the second condition 
requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value express 
equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for 
achieving social parity. (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 36)
Understood in this way, difference becomes a normative liberal 
presumption and a point against which justice can be measured. Sharing 
a dispersed sovereignty is no longer problematic.
Politics Is ‘Not Simply the Allotment 
of Commodities’1
Linguistic, cultural, resource and participatory rights are ‘external 
protections’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 126) against domination. They are 
important liberal concerns even though they belong to groups before 
they can belong to individuals. Their deprivation constitutes ‘a morally 
arbitrary disadvantage compared to those who can live and work in their 
own language and culture’ (p. 126).
Indigeneity is a theory of the indigenous right to exist as distinct peoples. 
It  is a political strategy of self-determination that makes wellbeing 
a concept that is political as much as it is material. It gives expression 
to Aristotle’s (1988) argument that human flourishing is the point of 
political activity, which Nussbaum (1987) understands as ‘the capability 
to function well if one so chooses’ (p. 20).
1  Quotation from Nussbaum (1987, p. 1).
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Political arrangements are most worthy when they maximise human 
capacity (Aristotle, 1988). From this perspective, one can deduce a political 
aspiration consistent with the politics of indigeneity and supported by the 
Declaration. According to Nussbaum (1987):
The aim of political planning is the distribution to the city’s 
individual people of the conditions in which a good human life 
can be chosen and lived. This distributive task aims at producing 
capabilities. That is, it aims not simply at the allotment of 
commodities, but at making people able to function in certain 
human ways … The task of the city is, then, to effect the transition 
from one level of capability to another. (pp. 1–2)
There are innumerable conceptions of the good life. A ‘deliberator would 
seem to inquire and analyze’ these culturally framed and expressed 
conceptions ‘as though analyzing a diagram’ (Aristotle, 1995, p. 383). 
One analyses through a sociocultural and political lens. Analysis is 
necessary because a certain and constant ‘right way to act is undefined’ 
and each must deliberate by ‘grasping [for] the truth, involving reason, 
and concerned with action about human goods’ (Aristotle, 1995, p. 403).
Indigeneity’s capabilities include the capacity to deliberate, which 
is not simply an abstract right but one that is present to varying 
degrees—a function of the obstacles and possibilities that are structured 
into a political community. In thinking of equality, it is only with 
reference to cultural and political contexts that one can answer Sen’s 
(1979) question: ‘equality of what?’ (p. 1).
Equality is not neutral. It is culturally contextualised and defined 
with reference to one’s ideological disposition. For example, personal 
conceptions of equality may influence the professional practice of those 
whose work affects others’ access to equality as they themselves define 
it. Bureaucratic discretion means that teachers, nurses, doctors, police 
officers and others in frontline public employment have the capacity to 
distort policy intent to make it conform to their own values: to their 
own conceptions of equality and to the weight that equality should carry 
as a policy objective (Lipsky, 2010; O’Sullivan, 2015). This is why, for 
example, the TRC (2015):
Call[ed] upon medical and nursing schools in Canada to require 
all students to take a course dealing with Aboriginal health 
issues, including the history and legacy of residential schools, 
[the Declaration], Treaties and Aboriginal rights, and Indigenous 
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teachings and practices. This will require skills-based training in 
intercultural competency, conflict resolution, human rights, and 
anti-racism. (p. 323)
Decisions about whose health care to privilege, whose learning to prioritise 
and who to prosecute have a significant influence on people’s experience 
of public policy. These are not merely administrative decisions; they are 
deeply political in their rationale and in their consequences (O’Sullivan, 
2015). However, in examining street-level bureaucracies as the places where 
people experience government that ‘they have implicitly constructed’, 
Lipsky (2010, p. xi) excluded the particular experience of indigenous 
peoples who have rarely implicitly constructed those bureaucracies 
(i.e. schools, hospitals, universities and police stations). This omission 
illustrates the democratic significance of indigenous participation at every 
level of the policy process, not only the legislative. The bureaucracy that the 
indigenous legislator may have helped to construct is more likely to use its 
bureaucratic discretion against indigenous interests if indigenous people 
are not present to influence its operations. Therefore, it is significant that, 
in 2018, Australia accepted that there ought to be periodic indigenous-led 
evaluations of its Closing the Gap policy (see Chapter 2).
Politics is ‘not simply the allotment of commodities, but [is concerned 
with] making people able to function in certain human ways’ (Nussbaum, 
1987, p. 1). Equal capacity for democratic inclusion requires plurality 
in how, by whom and for whom public policy is developed. Equal 
opportunity requires that individuals and some groups of individuals 
are differently treated, even though it is wrong to suggest that this must 
involve privileged consideration in the distribution of political authority 
and public resources.
Deliberative democracy is ‘a (broadly speaking) procedural ideal correlative 
to a bottom-line demand for political self-government by the people—
where “by the people” is taken to mean “by everyone”’(Michelman, 1997, 
p. 149). However, indigenous peoples may be politically vulnerable in 
situations in which their distinctive interests are not easily explained 
according to the expectations of ‘public reasonableness’. Distinctive 
arrangements may be required to satisfy procedural justice. A political 
system’s sustainability depends on sufficient numbers of the polity’s 
citizens having reason to support it or simply the incapacity to resist. 
Its objective of autonomy:
195
8 . DIffeReNCe, DeLIbeRATIoN AND ReASoN
is realized by citizens when they act from principles of justice that 
specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give themselves 
when fairly represented as free and equal persons. (Rawls, 1993, 
p. 77)
Differentiated liberal citizenship, which is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter, occurs only if sovereignty belongs to the people and the people 
accept plurality in the distribution of political power and authority.
Plurality recognises that indigenous social units and political structures 
may develop to serve an indigenous public. Just as sovereign political 
authority might rest in many locations, so too does policy capacity. For 
example, Martinez Cobo (1981) argued that self-definition is preliminary 
to indigenous control over indigenous nationhood: ‘There must be no 
attempt to define them according to the perceptions of others through 
the values of foreign societies or the dominant sections in such societies’ 
(p. 92).
The capacity to manage relationships with the state and others is 
among sovereignty’s most important characteristics. Indigenous 
political institutions must be equipped for this task, which is difficult, 
as colonialism’s very purpose has been to undermine these bodies as 
institutions of resistance.
The state can make space for indigenous agency, but it cannot create 
that agency. The Declaration shows that there is scope for what Maaka 
and Fleras (2000) called ‘sovereignty without secession’ (p. 92). It will 
not achieve what Watson and Venne (2012) and Carroll (2012) view as 
just, but it does propose transformational possibilities. Many indigenous 
peoples find these possibilities important and worth pursuing, even 
though they conflict with Champagne’s (2013) argument that the choice 
to participate in state institutions is a choice to assimilate. Champagne 
contrasts assimilation with the restoration of indigenous political 
structures as a choice to exclude oneself from the politics of the state. 
However, the contrast is a false dichotomy in that it represents an 
unnecessary choice that indigenous peoples often reject in favour of some 
form of differentiated citizenship.
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Conclusion
The right to self-determination is the ‘right to effective, democratic 
governance within States, making it possible for the population as a whole 
to determine their political status and pursue their development’ (Solano, 
2002, pp. 17–18). These principles are foundational to a liberal theory of 
indigeneity grounded in the extant rights of prior occupancy and developed 
for the reclamation of political authority in both proportionate and 
distinctive ways ‘to confront prevailing prejudices and create opportunities 
to contextualise the meaning of indigenous liberty’ (O’Sullivan, 2014, 
p. 66). Public sensitivity to others’ needs and aspirations is important, 
especially when these are framed by conceptions of the common good 
that differ from one’s own.
Deliberative democracy presumes recognition, including in the 
distribution of political capacity. It presumes that peoples can understand 
one another better if there is respect for the legitimacy of difference. 
Consequently, democracy’s structure and form matter enormously. It is 
to illuminate differentiated liberal citizenship’s value that the following 
chapter contests the illiberal foundation of the New Zealand Independent 
Working Group on Constitutional Transformation’s He whakairo here 
whakaumu mō Aotearoa report and recommendations for a rigid bicultural 
polity. Examples of differentiated citizenship’s practice and potential are 
provided, not as a panacea for the realisation of self-determination, but as 




Citizenship: A Liberal 
Politics of Potential
Introduction
This chapter discusses differentiated liberal citizenship. It shows the 
constraints on power that arise when an indigenous people reject 
differentiated liberal citizenship, as occurred in New Zealand when the 
Iwi Chairs Forum’s Independent Working Group on Constitutional 
Transformation, Matike Mai Aotearoa (2016), recommended 
a  constitutional order based on rigid distinctions between Maori  and 
Crown authority. The working group’s report, He whakairo here 
whakaumu mō Aotearoa, made the distinction by positioning the New 
Zealand Crown as an exclusively Pakeha entity, thereby making it the site 
of just some citizen’s political authority (O’Sullivan, 2007).
This chapter presents the case for a more inclusive commonwealth to 
allow Maori to exercise liberal citizenship of the state as an essential 
complement to the political authority that iwi may exercise. Through 
a series of examples in which differentiated liberal citizenship has in 
fact been applied in New Zealand and other jurisdictions, this chapter 
highlights its potential as a path to self-determination. It also shows how 
measures such as guaranteed parliamentary representation, a ‘voice to 
parliament’ in Australia and democratic participatory parity at all levels 
of the state political system are important constituents of the right to 
self-determination. As the Declaration affirms:
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Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity 
or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. 
This does not impair the right of indigenous individuals to obtain 
citizenship of the States in which they live. (UN, 2007b, art. 32)
It is important to attend to not only the constitutional or legal aspects of 
the right to self-determination but also the political. Constitutions may 
set the rules, but politics is the process through which self-determination’s 
practical meanings are worked out with others. Consequently, this chapter 
is especially concerned with political transformation; in particular, 
the ways in which political systems might work to include indigenous 
people, epistemologies and values in the policy process. This requires an 
indigenised bureaucracy and policy processes—that is, an indigenous 
voice and presence wherever policy is made.
In these ways, the idea of an indivisible and absolute Crown sovereignty 
is challenged. Public authority becomes the property of the sovereign 
citizenry of which indigenous peoples are a part, just as much as they 
are a part of their own nations or iwi. In New Zealand, as this chapter 
explains, this means that the Crown cannot be presented as the repository 
of Pakeha authority alone.
The chapter shows that departing from a bicultural binary in favour of 
differentiated liberal citizenship creates more expansive opportunities 
for political influence and greater opportunities for self-determination as 
a meaningful practice that may improve people’s lives. The connection 
between citizenship and self-determination is especially strong when there 
is public policy space for indigenous peoples to manage public services 
for themselves and in their own ways. The chapter presents ACCHOs, 
introduced in Chapter 5, as an example and proposes ways of strengthening 
this model of self-determination—not so much through the redistribution 
of resources but through the redistribution of power. Inequitable health 
outcomes reflect more than just the failings of egalitarian justice. This is 
because health outcomes, like outcomes in education and employment 
for example, are reflections of people’s capacities of citizenship.
The political will to change the nature of citizenship by allowing it to be 
exercised differentially is weak across most jurisdictions, many of which 
are struggling to come to terms with the politics of indigeneity that the 
Declaration imagines and strengthens. As this chapter discusses, with 
reference to Canada, strengthening capacities for self-determination may 
also call for a deliberate focus on the reconciliation of interests and not 
199
9 . DIffeReNTIATeD CITIZeNSHIP
simply the reconciliation of conflict. Recognising difference is important, 
but difference ought not blind the policy process to overlapping interests 
that may become more obvious in political systems in which decisions 
are made according to processes of reasoned deliberation. In other words, 
equal political capacity means active citizenship, which in turn is the 
practice of self-determination.
He Whakairo Here Whakaumu mō 
Aotearoa
In 2016, the New Zealand Iwi Chairs Forum’s Independent Working 
Group on Constitutional Transformation, Matike Mai Aotearoa, 
published a report on how New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements 
might be transformed to entrench a bicultural form of government. The 
report sought stronger political relationships between iwi and the Crown, 
and restoration of the sovereignty that was, according to the Waitangi 
Tribunal (‘He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti’, 2014), usurped, not ceded. 
The report’s purpose was to foster ‘constitutional transformation’.
According to Jones (2014), Maori constitutionalism proceeds from:
1. Whanaungatanga – ‘the centrality of relationships to Maori life’;
2. Manaakitanga (and kaitiakitanga) – ‘nurturing relationships, 
looking after people, and being very careful how others are 
treated …;
3. Mana – ‘the importance of spiritually sanctioned authority 
and the limits on Māori leadership’;
4. Tapu/Noa – ‘respect for the spiritual character of all things’;
5. Utu – ‘the principle of balance and reciprocity’. (p. 191)
Importantly, these precepts do not require the Crown and Maori to be 
treated as rigidly distinct entities, with the Crown’s affairs a matter for 
‘them’ not ‘us’ in an unproblematic bicultural binary. Instead, they can 
be understood as examples of the values that Maori citizens might bring 
to their participation in public affairs that might ‘indigenise’ the policy 
process, as discussed later in this chapter.
Extensive consultations preceded He whakairo here whakaumu. These were 
among the most comprehensive and considered constitutional discussions 
in recent New Zealand history. However, constitutions are restraining 
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just as they are emancipatory. The goals of Maori self-determination 
are realisable only through political transformation. Constitutional 
transformation may support political goals, but it does not guarantee 
them. An agreeable constitution, especially in a state that does not have 
a single written instrument, is not an end in itself. To provide scope for 
political transformation beyond that which already exists, a constitution 
would need to have greater force than the combined influence of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, common law and international legal instruments 
such as the Declaration. Ultimately, and simply, political transformations 
require political voice wherever power is exercised, not only within the 
Maori sphere of He whakairo here whakaumu’s bicultural world.
Biculturalism views Maori and non-Maori populations ‘as if they [run] 
on separate parallel train tracks’ (Chapple, 2000, p. 7). The distinct 
non-Maori ethnicity that it ascribes to the Crown leaves the Crown to make 
decisions for ‘its people’ (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 2016, p. 9)—a distinct, 
easily identifiable and homogenous people in whose affairs Maori have 
no business.
Maori may enjoy the right, in principle, to distinct separation from 
biculturalism’s Pakeha Crown. However, self-determination embodies 
greater political authority when sovereignty is recognised as the concern of 
relative and relational distributions of power. The proposition that some 
authority belongs to ‘us’ (i.e. Maori) and some to ‘them’ (i.e. Pakeha) 
is a common theme in Maori political rhetoric. However, the theme is 
inconsistent with Maori political practice, especially the considered Maori 
pursuit of parliamentary membership from general and party list seats as 
well as from the guaranteed Maori constituencies.
Maori unapologetically and systemically pursue participation in the 
executive. Since the 1970s, it has been extremely rare for Cabinets not 
to include Maori ministers. He whakairo here whakaumu understated 
the essential role that Maori members of parliament play in advancing 
opportunities for self-determination. Rather than acknowledge this 
inclusive model of Maori participation in the executive and legislature, 
the report proposed six alternative structural models to distinguish Maori 
political authority from that of the Crown-in-Parliament:
1. A tricameral or three sphere model consisting of an Iwi/Hapū 
assembly (the rangatiratanga sphere), the Crown in Parliament 
(the kāwanatanga sphere) and a joint deliberative body (the 
relational sphere).
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2. A different three sphere model consisting of an assembly made 
up of Iwi, Hapū and other representation including Urban 
Māori Authorities (the rangatiratanga sphere), the Crown in 
Parliament (the kāwanatanga sphere), and a joint deliberative 
body (the relational sphere).
3. A further three sphere model consisting of an Iwi/Hapū 
assembly (the rangatiratanga sphere), the Crown in Parliament 
(the kāwanatanga sphere), and regional assemblies made up of 
Iwi, Hapū and Crown representatives (the relational sphere).
4. A multi-sphere model consisting of an assembly of Iwi/Hapū 
and other Māori representation (the rangatiratanga sphere) and 
the Crown in Parliament (the kāwanatanga  sphere). It  also 
includes a relational sphere which would have two parts – 
a  constitutionally mandated set of direct Iwi/Hapū/Crown 
relationships to enable direct Iwi/Hapu-Crown decision-
making plus a unitary perhaps annual assembly of broader 
Māori and Crown representation.
5. A unicameral or one sphere model consisting of Iwi/Hapū and 
the Crown making decisions together in a constitutionally 
mandated assembly. This model does not have rangatiratanga 
or kāwanatanga spheres. It only has the relational sphere.
6. A Bicameral Model made up of an Iwi/Hapū assembly and the 
Crown in Parliament. This model has distinct rangatiratanga 
and kāwanatanga spheres but has no provision for a relational 
sphere. (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 2016, p. 10)
The first four of these models, and the sixth, diminish Maori political 
authority in ways that prevent self-determination within the state. The fifth 
is essentially the current national parliament with some strengthening of 
Maori representation. However, in making no provision for rangatiratanga 
(chiefly authority), it became the first serious Maori proposal since 
1840 to set aside the Treaty of Waitangi. Were it amended to include 
rangatiratanga, it would be the only model consistent with differentiated 
liberal citizenship and the meaningful sharing of sovereignty.
He whakairo here whakaumu’s models were intended to constrain Crown 
sovereignty. However, and by contrast, self-determination contests 
Crown sovereignty’s exclusive form; it contests the very idea that public 
sovereignty is not shared by Maori. The report does not consider what it 
means for a Maori person to be a citizen of a liberal democratic state. 
It makes passing references to citizenship’s limits but does not consider its 
possibilities. For Maori to separate themselves from the ‘Crown’s people’ is 
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a radical political and constitutional proposal that would logically exclude 
Maori from membership of the New Zealand Parliament and from the 
right to vote for members of parliament.
A more productive approach would be for the ‘relational sphere’—in 
which Maori and other citizens ‘make decisions together’—to remain 
the national parliament, accompanied by the strengthening of Maori 
participation in other spheres of influence in which sovereign power is 
dispersed. Guaranteed participation at every level of the political system 
allows indigenous people to pursue their distinctive aspirations and to 
engage in public affairs as members of the sovereign citizenry rather than 
as subjects waiting for others to conceptualise the justice that ought to be 
‘done’ to them.
He whakairo here whakaumu sought the restoration of mana, which:
as a political and constitutional power … denotes an absolute 
authority. It was absolute because it was absolutely the prerogative 
of every polity, but it was also absolute in the sense that it was 
commensurate with independence and an exercise of authority 
that could not be tampered with by any other polity. (Matike Mai 
Aotearoa, 2016, p. 34)
This perspective of mana positions sovereignty in absolute and indivisible 
terms, yet modern sovereignty is undeniably dispersed. Sovereign political 
authority does not reside with one being or institution alone; it is relative, 
relational and shared. This is because the sovereign citizenry is not 
a singular being. Mana is shaped by external influences, with colonialism 
a transgression of mana. Moral objection alone cannot prevent that 
transgression. Mana’s protection through constitutional arrangements is 
possible only through politics, which is why full attention to political 
context is preliminary to self-determination. As one participant in the 
He whakairo here whakaumu discussions observed:
Although times have changed those old tikanga remain … we 
never lost or ceded our mana and never forgot what was tika 
[right] about how we should exercise it. The challenge now is to 
adapt those things in the 21st century. (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 
2016, p. 36)
The idea that the body of authority that is not exclusively Maori belongs 
to a Leviathan-like Crown prevents Maori from fully exploring political 
possibilities and makes substantive justice unachievable. Power  is 
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continuously rebalanced by demographic changes and by changes in 
people’s perceptions of what is just and pragmatic. Indeed, as a He whakairo 
here whakaumu participant remarked:
Sometimes we get caught in the trap of just accepting what 
colonisation has done, like setting up its own government, and 
saying that it’s right or it can’t be changed because it’s too hard 
… we should try because that’s what the treaty talked about. 
(Matike Mai Aotearoa, 2016, p. 37)
Maori make claims against the Crown for breaches of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. In this sense, they are binary opponents. However, to see Maori 
and Pakeha persons as apart in the politics of citizenship is limiting.
If people do not simply wish ‘to talk about structures but rather the ideals 
that might transform how their right to make their own decisions is 
perceived’ (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 2016, p. 38), it may be useful to consider 
how their right to citizenship is perceived, protected and advanced. While 
He whakairo here whakaumu rightly distinguishes rangatiratanga from 
kāwanatanga (governorship) as spheres of political influence, Maori need 
not surrender one for the other. Participation in rangatiratanga is an 
ancestral right. Participation in citizenship is a treaty right and a liberal 
right and the Declaration upholds both forms of political authority.
The notion of ‘subjecthood’ as it was understood in 1840 and extended to 
Maori under Article 3 of the Treaty of Waitangi has evolved into a more 
far-reaching and politically meaningful citizenship. He whakairo here 
whakaumu provides a clear account of rangatiratanga, but kāwanatanga 
is left as something belonging to others. However, if Maori are not active 
participants in kāwanatanga—the domain of the liberal citizen—they are 
confined to subjecthood.
The ascription of a non-Maori ethnic character to the Crown prevents 
consideration of the relationship between rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga 
in a liberal democratic state—a political structure that is very different 
from a Crown reigning over its subjects. Liberal democratic citizenship 
may constrain self-determination but not in the same ways or for the 
same reasons as subjecthood. The constitutional and political context of 
1840 does not provide a lens through which the limits and possibilities 
for Maori autonomy can presently be considered. It does not explain how 
kāwanatanga, especially, might support self-determination.
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He whakairo here whakaumu makes no comment on how or by what 
authority the state bureaucracy ought to function. Nor does it provide 
any path for Maori appointments to the executive. The report reflects 
a significant dissonance between constitutional thought and political 
practice. Contemporary politics is pragmatic rather than theoretical and 
influenced by immediate political possibilities, economic imperatives and 
treaty settlements. Contemporary Maori politics reflect differentiated 
liberal citizenship’s possibilities. Moreover, it provides a foundation for 
extending Maori influence both within and beyond the state, and for 
recognising that opportunities for self-determination are greatest when 
rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga are accepted as sites of legitimate Maori 
political authority.
Given He whakairo here whakaumu’s perspective on the validity of an 
absolute and easily distinguishable Maori–Pakeha binary, it might 
be assumed that workshop participants were people of singular Maori 
identity. If so, their perspectives are likely to be more fixed than the 
53.5 per cent of Maori who claim two or more ethnic identities (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2013). The report’s models require people of Maori descent 
to take a singular identity: Maori or Pakeha. Imposing a choice of this kind 
would be culturally and socially problematic for a people inclined to place 
significant value on whakapapa (ancestry) from wherever it comes. The 
views of Maori who claim additional non-Maori, non-Pakeha ancestries 
may further complicate the report’s simple view of the relationship 
between ethnicity and political arrangements.
Although He whakairo here whakaumu represents a significant body of 
Maori political thought, it is difficult to imagine Maori being satisfied 
with structural separation from the state. Maori have always wanted to sit 
in the executive, parliament and judiciary. They surely want equal capacity 
to influence public sector policymaking, and those who participate in 
public life in these ways are not the state’s junior bicultural partners but 
active participants in its structure, character and purpose. The Declaration 
does not imagine junior and senior partners because:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, 
while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, 
in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. 
(UN, 2007b, art. 5)
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He whakairo here whakaumu presumes ‘public reasonableness’ (introduced 
in the previous chapter). For example, it requires a suspicious public 
to accept that legislation should be assessed for consistency with the 
Treaty of Waitangi in the first place. If public reasonableness establishes 
that consistency with the treaty is a shared value, there would still 
need to be public agreement that consistency be assessed through an 
especially established parliamentary chamber. As Bohman and Rehg 
(1997) explained:
a democracy based on public deliberation presupposes that 
citizens or their representatives can take counsel together about 
what laws and policies they ought to pursue as a commonwealth. 
And this in turn means that the plurality of competing interests is 
not the last word, or sole perspective, in deciding matters of public 
importance. The problem, to use Kant’s terms is to bring about 
‘the public use of reason’. (p. x)
The Treaty of Waitangi means that the Crown will always remain integral 
to political discourse; however, the Crown is a concept that, in its 
current ordinary usage, raises significant obstacles to Maori capacity for 
self-determination through differentiated citizenship. Current ordinary 
usage means that the Crown is inevitably an instrument of bicultural 
exclusion rather than the expression of a political authority that all 
are entitled to share.
Beyond Bicultural Exclusion
The theoretical tension between the Crown as treaty partner and 
transgressor, and the Crown as the repository of all citizens’ collective 
sovereignty, is an important one, yet its significance is not widely 
recognised in treaty scholarship nor in public discourse. He whakairo here 
whakaumu’s conceptual weakness is its failure to consider this tension 
between the Maori citizen’s dual membership of a hapu that signed the 
treaty and a sovereign national public from which the Crown derives 
its authority.
Beyond biculturalism, there may lie a commonwealth with distinct 
parts and united by equal moral capacities to determine how those parts 
are ruled. Commonwealth means sharing individual authority with 
a collective power from which protection is obtained. Commonwealths 
are based on trust, as Hobbes (1998) declared: ‘Justice and Propriety 
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Begin with the Constitution of Commonwealth. But … Covenants of 
mutual trust, where there is a fear of non-performance on either part … 
are invalid’ (p. 424). For Hobbes:
The Essence of the Common-wealth is One person [or assembly]… 
by mutual Covenants one with another that made themselves 
every one the Author, to the end he may use the strengths and 
means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and 
Common Defence. (p. 515)
Accepting membership of the common citizenry is preliminary to holding 
public institutions accountable for what they do and for the values that 
inform their actions. All people ought to take their place within the 
commonwealth—a body in which authority is always contested and 
never exclusive.
To bring indigenous politics from the margins to the mainstream, 
citizenship requires a commonwealth alongside a liberal theory of 
indigeneity. This means reconfiguring the ways in which Hobbes’s 
understanding of sovereignty prevails as a justification for exclusion. 
For example, in New Zealand, the idea that rangatiratanga constrains 
sovereignty is important: it implies a distinction between the two. 
However, it may be that reconceptualising rangatiratanga as a legitimate 
part of the sovereign whole better reflects the political status that Maori are 
entitled to claim. Rangatiratanga then contributes to self-determination 
within the state; rather than constraining sovereignty, rangatiratanga 
helps to define it. In  helping to define national sovereignty and sever 
biculturalism’s exclusive association of the sovereign Crown with the 
Pakeha polity, rangatiratanga strengthens the possibilities for the Maori 
exercise of authority in and over their own affairs.
Rangatiratanga is diminished if it is not accepted into the sovereign whole. 
Its absence means that it is only from beyond the state (as bicultural 
partner) that scope exists for Maori to contribute to public policy. 
Separating rangatiratanga from sovereignty imposes a structural limit on 
self-determination and depends on a fiduciary obligation to Maori in 
place of the participatory parity of Maori citizens as equal shareholders 
in Crown sovereignty.
Self-determination cannot occur if the complementary relationship 
between differentiated citizenship’s two spheres—the indigenous nation 
and the state—does not enjoy the space to develop. Indeed, as the 
Canadian Public Policy Forum (2017) argued:
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The outcome of true reconciliation must be to ensure that 
Indigenous peoples are fully accorded the opportunity to fully 
participate in the economic and social fabric of our country … of 
the broader society—on corporate boards in business-school case 
studies, in executive roles, and union leadership, in associations, 
in government and in regulatory and environmental assessment 
bodies. (pp. 6–7)
First Nations people need to be part of the national middle class because 
that is where a disproportionate share of national sovereignty resides and 
where national wealth and decision-making capacity are found. They also 
need to be part of the ‘sovereign’ public. Poor education and low incomes 
compromise indigenous people’s capacity as citizens, whereas increasing 
the size of the indigenous middle class raises capacity to engage as equals 
in the affairs of the nation-state.
Notwithstanding this book’s objections to He whakairo here whakaumu, 
the report did identify ‘a very real desire for a more open constitutionalism 
and what we describe as a conciliatory and consensual democracy rather 
than an adversarial and majoritarian one’ (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 2016, 
p. 9). In this sense, the report is a most important and instructive document, 
as it shows the values that people wish to inform political engagement. 
These values are consistent with differentiated liberal citizenship and may, 
in fact, enjoy greater influential possibilities under liberal (as opposed to 
bicultural) political arrangements:
1. The value of tikanga [cultural values] – that is the need for 
a constitution to relate to or incorporate the core ideals and 
the ‘ought to be’ of living in Aotearoa.
2. The value of community – that is the need for a constitution 
to facilitate the fair representation and good relationships 
between all peoples.
3. The value of belonging – that is the need for a constitution to 
foster a sense of belonging for everyone in the community.
4. The value of place – that is the need for a constitution to 
promote relationships with, and ensure the protection of 
Papatūānuku [the Earth].
5. The value of balance – that is the need for a constitution 
to ensure respect for the authority of rangatiratanga and 
kāwanatanga within the different and relational spheres of 
influence.
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6. The value of conciliation – that is the need for a constitution to 
have an underlying jurisdictional base and a means of resolution 
to guarantee a conciliatory and consensual democracy.
7. The value of structure – that is the need for a constitution to have 
structural conventions that promote basic democratic ideals of 
fair representation, openness and transparency. (Matike Mai 
Aotearoa, 2016, p. 69)
He whakairo here whakaumu also showed the importance of relational 
justice:
Contest and debate were regarded [at the consultation meetings 
that informed the report] as essential to good decision-making but 
there was concern that unless it was placed upon some tikanga 
about how conflict or difference could be managed then any 
rangatiratanga and kawanatanga spheres of influence would have 
difficulty working together. (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 2016, p. 71)
The following points were considered important:
• Recognising and acknowledging the kawa and tikanga [culture 
and cultural practices] of each marae, hapū and iwi [meeting 
house, sub-tribe and tribe];
• Restoring, reclaiming and re-practicing our tikanga and kawa;
• Learning, teaching and transmission of Te Reo Māori [the 
Maori language];
• Retelling our own histories in our own ways;
• Learning and understanding how our tipuna [ancestors] lived 
before us;
• Understanding the roles of men and women, tuakana and 
teina [older and younger relatives of the same generation], and 
their importance in our societies;
• Ensuring that Te Ao Māori becomes a living reality for us as 
tangata whenua [people of the land]. (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 
2016, p. 119)
These values could reasonably inform Maori citizenship and political voice.
Guaranteed Maori representation in parliament is an effective illustration 
of deliberative democracy’s capacity to include an indigenous voice. 
It means that Maori contribute to the parliamentary check on the executive 
while also enjoying a greater likelihood of ministerial appointment and 
shows that New Zealand politics is distinguished by a differentiated liberal 
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citizenship of significant potential. It is of much greater potential than 
contemporary Maori discussions about ‘constitutional transformation’ 
care to admit. Indeed, the indigenous right to participate fully ‘if they 
so choose … [in the] life of the state’ (UN, 2007b, art. 5) is a right that 
biculturalism understates, and that He whakairo here whakaumu does not 
properly consider.
Guaranteed representation in parliaments is one of the ways in which 
political systems recognise difference. Such recognition allows for inclusion: 
when different people sit in the one parliament, their commonalities 
emerge from the respect that is implicit in the recognition of difference.
Guaranteed Maori representation in the New Zealand Parliament has 
occurred since 1867. Initially, the number of Maori seats was fixed at 
four. Since 1993, the number has been set in proportion to the number of 
Maori voters who choose to register on the Maori electoral roll. In 2019, 
there were seven Maori parliamentary seats. The social-democratic Labour 
Party won all seven of those seats at the 2017 general election. Maori 
citizens were also elected from general constituencies and party lists, 
providing additional Maori members of parliament from the Labour, 
National, New Zealand First, ACT and Green parties.
In Maori constituencies, Maori candidates are free to use their own 
culturally reasoned arguments to elicit support. Voters are free to evaluate 
alternative positions through a meaningful self-defined cultural prism, 
yet the UN special rapporteur’s endorsement of New Zealand’s liberal 
inclusivity has been conditional. While he welcomed ‘New Zealand’s 
efforts to secure Maori political participation at the national level’ 
(UN, 2011, p. 20), he observed that:
these efforts should be strengthened, and the State should 
focus special attention on increasing Maori participation in 
local governance. The Government should consider reversing 
its decision to reject the findings of the Royal Commission on 
Auckland Governance and guarantee Maori seats on the Auckland 
City Council. (p. 20)
Local governments do not have to assure Maori representation, but they 
are required to ‘establish and maintain processes to provide opportunities 
for Maori to contribute to the decision-making processes of the local 
authority’ (Local Government Act 2002 [NZ], s. 81) 81). Vulnerability 
of this kind shows the importance of indigenous peoples asserting their 
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positions as members of the nation-state. It is only in this way that the 
rights that indigenous peoples might enjoy in and over their own affairs 
can be protected.
‘Constitutional Recognition Must Make 
Indigenous Lives Better. Otherwise 
What’s the Point?’1
In 1996, the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
recommended the creation of an aboriginal parliament. The 
recommendation followed the Native Council of Canada’s proposal that 
a House of First Peoples should ‘have the power to veto certain legislation 
put before it, or that passing such legislation require a double majority 
of the House of Commons and the House of First Peoples’ (as cited in 
Boutilier, 2017, p. 14). The Canadian royal commission’s remarks on the 
purpose of an aboriginal parliament is equally relevant to New Zealand:
The creation of an Aboriginal parliament would not be a substitute 
for self-government by Aboriginal nations. Rather it is an additional 
institution for enhancing the representation of Aboriginal peoples 
within Canadian federalism. (Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, 1996 [Canada], p. 363)
In Australia, Axelby and Wanganeen (2017) proposed a number of 
political and institutional values to assure indigenous people’s meaningful 
decision-making authority. They argued that political power can only 
come, in a substantive way, from the Australian Constitution (Axelby & 
Wanganeen, 2017). Yet, as they acknowledged, and as this chapter has 
also argued, there is no absolute connection between the citizenship rights 
that constitutions recognise and the capacity for citizenship. Constitutions 
are grounded in law, but capacity is also grounded in politics, leading 
Axelby and Wanganeen to declare, in the title of their opinion piece, 
‘Constitutional recognition must make indigenous lives better. Otherwise 
what’s the point?’.
Constitutional recognition must lead to political recognition—to assessing 
political questions of transformative potential and dealing with questions 
of how and on whose terms indigenous peoples belong to the modern state, 
1  The title of Axelby and Wanganeen’s (2017) opinion piece in The Guardian.
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such as: What political capacities ought to proceed from one’s position 
as an indigenous citizen of the Commonwealth of Australia? What does 
‘the Commonwealth’ mean for an indigenous person? While citizenship is 
the embodiment of the rights one holds by virtue of one’s membership of 
a political community, it is the capacity to make something of those rights 
that creates the connection between citizenship and self-determination. 
Watson and Venne (2012) argued that the Declaration cannot contribute 
to establishing that connection. In their view, it is inadequate as an 
instrument of indigenous rights because its provisions do not counter 
the state’s assimilationist tendencies. However, an alternative question for 
a transformative politics of indigeneity is whether the Declaration can 
assist with the reconfiguration of the state and its internal distributions 
of power.
Effective policy requires that the right questions are asked and the right 
problems identified. Policy paradigms that are successful for indigenous 
peoples (in Australia and elsewhere) are ones in which people may exercise 
the capacity for self-determination—that is, where they may enjoy the 
capacity to harness the powers and opportunities of citizenship for their 
own purposes. For example, Davis (2013) argued that, as the Australian 
Indigenous community–controlled health sector can reach ‘individuals 
and families that no government could ever possibly reach’ (p. 13), 
‘we cannot leave it to the state’ (p. 13). Further:
The next phase does not require us to agonise over how the state 
is or is not implementing [the Declaration]; we need to take 
ownership of the text and we need to put meat on the bones of 
[the Declaration]. (p. 13)
Around 50 per cent of the Indigenous Australian population use 
Indigenous health services (Mazel, 2016). As discussed in Chapter 5, 
ACCHOs were established in response to the systematic exclusion of 
Indigenous peoples from health policymaking and the health system’s 
sustained failure to provide Indigenous peoples with services of equivalent 
quality to those provided to other citizens (O’Sullivan, 2015). Their 
use by Indigenous people suggests the importance attached to cultural 
context in the provision of health services. ACCHOs give communities 
(as opposed to governments) the power to determine how health 
services are provided. However, self-determination requires stronger 
institutional arrangements for supporting community priorities in the 
allocation of resources. This suggests that there is a case, both morally and 
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pragmatically, for an Indigenous entity to make funding decisions based 
on contestable bids from ACCHOs. An Indigenous-health purchasing 
agency was recommended to the government by the Health and Hospitals 
Reform Commission in 2009. It was thought that such an agency would 
provide strong institutional support to self-determination in health by 
giving Indigenous people self-determination over funding decisions 
and removing from debate the proposition that health systems have no 
obligation to take cultural imperatives and preferences into account in 
their treatment of Indigenous people (see O’Sullivan, 2015). However, 
the recommendation was not accepted.
The argument for an Indigenous-health purchasing agency is not 
necessarily, or only, about the redistribution of resources but also about 
the redistribution of authority. To put this another way, it is about an 
Indigenous share in the sovereign authority of the state that is strong 
enough to allow Indigenous people to set their own healthcare priorities. 
At present, ACCHOs operate in a context of ‘dependent autonomy’. 
If Indigenous people do not take their place within the state, they cannot 
avoid dependence, for it is the state that determines the political and 
legislative context in which people exercise their capacities as citizens. It is 
the state that appropriates public money to the indigenous shadow state.
As Mazel (2016) observed, governments have come and gone since 1971, 
but ACCHOs have stood firm as examples of what self-determination 
really looks like—they have remained. Rowse (2000) described them 
as the most important contemporary expression of self-determination 
because ‘the politics of Indigenous citizenship is a struggle not only over 
notions of right but also about ways of being present and effective, that is, 
about capacities for Indigenous participation’ (p. 86).
Inequities in policy outcomes transcend the unfortunate to raise important 
questions of justice. Daniels (2008) asked, ‘Why should some people be 
at such a health disadvantage through no fault of their own, losers in 
a natural and social lottery assigning them from birth to an unhealthy 
place?’ (pp. 109–110). For indigenous people, health inequities are the 
outcome of unjust terms of association. If indigenous people ‘are justified 
in claiming a right to health care only if it is derivable from an acceptable 
general theory of distributive justice’ (Daniels, 1979, p. 174), then that 
theory must be concerned with the distribution of political authority at 
least as much as it is concerned with the distribution of material resources. 
The questions of how, by whom and for whom decisions are made are 
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important, as health outcomes tend ‘to be a good guide to the underlying 
capabilities’ (Sen, 2004, p. 23) that people enjoy. Health outcomes are 
a reflection of political capacity and of people’s capacity as citizens.
The internationally sanctioned right to health is only progressively realisable 
(UN, 1966b, pt. II art. 2[1]). Jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, Norway and the US have the capacity to address a policy 
problem that affects small percentages of the national populations and 
for which there are innumerable examples of policy success (O’Sullivan, 
2015). Political decisions cannot remove the injustice of colonialism, but 
they can tend towards the creation of noncolonial relations for the present 
and future.
In 2016, the Australian Medical Association’s annual report card on 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health considered the relationship 
between ‘political will’ and health outcomes, and explored measures 
to reduce the incidence of rheumatic heart disease among Indigenous 
Australians. The association asked:
what medicine is required to prevent new cases of RHD [rheumatic 
heart disease]? Awareness and political will. For the former, there 
is growing public awareness about the terrible impact of RHD 
in Indigenous communities … In relation to political will, the 
AMA [Australian Medical Association] makes a Call to Action to 
prevent new cases of RHD in Indigenous Australia by 2031. This 
is also the target year of the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) Closing the Gap Framework objective to improve the 
life expectancy of Indigenous Australians. Preventing new cases 
of RHD in Indigenous Australia by 2031 will make an important 
and necessary contribution to the achievement of this overarching 
life expectancy target. (AMA, 2016, p. 3)
There is a relationship between political will and more explicit state 
acceptance of the Declaration. Ornelas (2014) proposed the creation 
of agencies within state bureaucracies to oversee and coordinate the 
Declaration’s implementation. Such agencies would not only signal 
the  Declaration’s desirability but also that states are willing to submit 
to international oversight; however, this is unlikely given the absence of 
political will in most states.
Nevertheless, it is worth defending a process of ‘collective deliberation 
conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals’ 
(Benhabib, 1996, p. 69). The presumption that internal self-determination 
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is less valuable than secession is valid only if the two are equally realistic 
possibilities and therefore comparable. When internal decolonisation 
is the only pragmatic possibility, it is more politically advantageous to 
examine the potential that exists within that context rather than to dwell 
on secession’s hypothetically greater political value.
Contemporary postsettler states sometimes ‘overtly reject and undermine 
indigenous social and political orders’ (Champagne, 2013, p. 14), and 
sometimes they do not. Further, the extent to which they are willing 
to entertain those orders as ones of national political significance vary. 
Willingness is subject to significant change according to shifting domestic 
political values and to governments’ perceptions of what they need to do 
to maintain broader electoral support. From an assimilationist perspective, 
there is a rhetorical attractiveness in the view that self-determination 
creates a ‘tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and 
the disruptive potential of minority separatism’ (Schulte-Tenckhoff, 
2012, p. 81). However, the tension is overstated. The ‘separation’ of 
indigenous peoples from the nation-state imposes no restriction on the 
liberal political rights of other citizens.
Citizenship of the nation-state is not something to be undervalued. It is 
not necessarily assimilationist, and citizenship of an indigenous nation 
does not need to be traded off to hold meaningful state citizenship. 
Indigenous resistance to citizenship tends to focus on specific curtailments 
of the right to exist as indigenous, not the existence of the state per se. 
However, if the state is to avoid functioning as a neo-colonial entity, 
indigenous peoples must contribute to the shaping of its institutions and 
opportunities to participate at every level of its decision-making processes. 
In this way, citizenship becomes the embodiment of a set of political 
capacities, and the ways in which these are constrained and in which they 
may be exercised are important.
It is significant that in Canada, as in New Zealand, treaty rights extend to 
the urban diaspora (Belanger, 2010). However, if there is a duty ‘to seek 
out urban Aboriginal leaders for their participation’ (p. 14), then there is 
an assumption that arrangements are not already in place for aboriginal 
people to participate as a matter of course, even though the ‘honour of the 
Crown’ (Haida Nation, 2004, paras. 16–19) demands consultation and 
the accommodation of indigenous rights where this is found to be just. 
In 2014, the UN special rapporteur observed that consultation processes 
in Canada were ‘generally inadequate’ and that:
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There appears to be a lack of a consistent framework or policy for 
the implementation of this duty to consult, which is contributing 
to an atmosphere of contentiousness and mistrust that is 
conducive neither to beneficial economic development or social 
peace. (UN, 2014, p. 18)
Greater participation would assure an indigenous presence and capacity 
to propose new legislation.
Overall, Canada has a strong legislative and jurisprudential framework 
for addressing the indigenous right to self-determination. For its part, the 
TRC imagined the Declaration as having a significant role in domestic 
politics. However, indigenous people commonly lack the financial 
capacity to make governance arrangements work. There is also a tension 
in the sphere of indigenous land rights, such that Aboriginal title is often 
‘regarded as a burden on the Crown’s sovereignty’ (Schulte-Tenckhoff, 
2012, p. 66). Yet self-determination can be conceptualised as a burden 
on Crown sovereignty only if that sovereignty is understood as existing 
in its own right and not proceeding from the collective sovereignty of the 
people. If sovereignty inheres in all and not just some of the people, there 
ought to be no conflict. Political tension emerges on this point because of 
the nature of indigenous belonging and because the nature of the share in 
political authority that belongs to them is unsettled.
Marginalising Citizenship or Indigenising 
the Bureaucracy?
Marginalisation through denial is a common state strategy of 
containment,  even though the ongoing effects of residential schools in 
Canada and the stolen generations in Australia continue to explain social 
dysfunction and diminish people’s capacities for meaningful citizenship. 
The Australian Indigenous Doctors’ Association (2010) argued that:
The policies of assimilation, elimination, forced child removal, 
protection and segregation that were imposed after colonisation 
resulted in a huge disruption of traditional social institutions 
and kinship ties. The damage to the intricate kinship systems and 
community cohesion of Aboriginal people through the stolen 
generations cannot be overemphasised. (p. 7)
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The human right to be part of a family ought to be sacrosanct and precede 
the assimilationist intent of a state. In Australia, the denial of that right 
is hugely ironic when considered alongside the Howard Government’s 
(1996–2007) privileging of family as the only legitimate subnational 
unit of identity, especially as that government’s policy rhetoric was not 
supported by measures to rebuild those families rendered dysfunctional 
by state-sanctioned violence. Similarly, a politics of exclusion distinguishes 
the Indigenous Australian journalist Stan Grant’s (2016) discussion of his 
grandfather’s ‘personal journey in the black migration from mission to 
town a distance of mere miles, but an epochal trek’ (para. 2). Grant’s 
grandfather’s journey was meant to be a migration of opportunity; 
however, three generations later, that opportunity remains unobtainable 
for many Indigenous peoples. Describing an isolation and alienation that 
many Indigenous peoples face, Grant observed that ‘we lived in Australia 
and Australia was for other people’ (A cage in search of a bird, para. 3). 
His observation is reflected in Indigenous people’s perceptions of public 
institutions, hospitals, schools, courts and, especially, parliaments, as being 
for other people. However, Grant (2016) also challenged the distinction 
that the anthropologist WEH Stanner made between the Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous to create a rigid binary world:
Stanner once remarked that for Indigenous people the dreaming 
and the market are mutually exclusive. For Stanner … Indigenous 
people were fixed in time and place. (Redefining aboriginality, 
para. 3)
The market was elsewhere.
Referring to Australia as a ‘parallel’ society, Grant identified a different 
binary, one in which the number of Indigenous students completing 
secondary school was increasing markedly, while policy failures in health, 
criminal justice, housing, employment and economic development for 
Indigenous people continued, showing that ‘life in the open society 
… can be lonely [and] alienating’ for Indigenous Australians (‘Leaving 
the shadow world’, para. 4). Yet it need not be: through a process of 
indigenising the bureaucracy—that is, by allowing Indigenous aspirations 
and epistemologies to influence policymaking in secure and meaningful 
ways—life in the open society could be inclusive and respectful. This 
could be achieved in New Zealand by bringing the cultural values set out 
in He whakairo here whakaumu into public relationships, and in Canada 
by complementing and facilitating nation-to-nation policy cocreation.
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In Canada, the National Indigenous Economic Development Board’s 
‘hope for the future’ rests on differentiated liberal citizenship:
The massive expansion of Indigenous businesses, increased shared 
governance, the intersection of indigenous knowledge and science, 
the enhanced interest from the Federal and provincial governments 
and reconciliation, and especially the passion, dedication and 
intelligence of First Nations’ children and youth. (Public Policy 
Forum, 2017, p. 10)
In 2012, the Harper Government’s (2006–2015) special federal 
representative on West Coast energy infrastructure was commissioned ‘to 
identify approaches that could meet Canada’s goals of expanding energy 
markets and ensuring Aboriginal participation in the economy’ (Eyford, 
2013, p. 2). The resulting report, which emphasised trust, inclusion 
and reconciliation, represented a significant departure from prevailing 
indigenous policy. Significantly, it stressed ‘reconciling interests’ rather than 
differences (Eyford, 2013), presumed that indigenous peoples comprised 
a legitimate part of the public and argued that resource development 
ought to serve their interests. To this end, the report recommended that:
• Canada and Aboriginal communities need to build effective 
relationships and this is best achieved through sustained 
engagement;
• Aboriginal communities view natural resource development as 
linked to a broader reconciliation agenda;
• Aboriginal communities will consider supporting natural 
resource development if it is undertaken in an environmentally 
sustainable manner; and
• these projects would contribute to improving the 
socio-economic conditions of Aboriginal communities. 
(Eyford, 2013, p. 1)
The subject of the report was economically important to the government. 
Since energy exports require developing pipelines and shipping terminals 
on indigenous lands, the government’s aspirations could not be pursued 
without considering constitutionally protected indigenous rights.
While ‘equality in the process of public deliberation may well be 
intrinsically  just’ (Christiano, 1997, p. 244), the question of how 
political systems and institutions protect equality is distinguished by 
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important differences of perspective between state and indigenous actors. 
An important difference of perspective is evident in the situation described 
by Belanger (2010) wherein:
Canadian officials consider Aboriginal self-government a policy 
issue [and] Aboriginal leaders consider self-determination 
a  complex set of relationships that incorporate provisions 
protecting historic lands, as well as a continued political interface 
respecting historic treaties. (p. 6).
Policy contradictions leave indigenous people unable to make long-
term decisions with certainty and clarity, and ill-equipped to maximise 
the inherent economic advantages that transgenerational investment 
timeframes provide to their commercial entities.
Policy tensions also exist between the Canadian Government and First 
Nations over the status of health care as a treaty right. The issue rests on 
whether health care is a right in distributive justice or a right of indigeneity. 
The distinction has implications for how and by whom decisions are made 
and for which purposes. From a purely distributive perspective, it may be 
sufficient for the state to make decisions on its own after consultation. 
However, a politics of indigeneity would require substantive indigenous 
participation and help to address the philosophical questions set out by 
the UN special rapporteur in 2014, which also described the political 
context in which Trudeau came to office in 2015:
The relationship of Canada with the indigenous peoples within 
its borders is governed by a well-developed legal framework and 
a number of policy initiatives that in many respects are protective 
of indigenous peoples’ rights. But despite positive steps, daunting 
challenges remain. The numerous initiatives that have been 
taken at the federal and provincial/territorial levels to address the 
problems faced by indigenous peoples have been insufficient. The 
well-being gap between aboriginal and non-aboriginal people in 
Canada has not narrowed over the past several years; treaty and 
aboriginal claims remain persistently unresolved; indigenous 
women and girls remain vulnerable to abuse; and overall there 
appear to be high levels of distrust among indigenous peoples 
towards the government at both the federal and provincial levels. 
(UN, 2014, p. 1)
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Canada was engaged in a process of negotiating new treaties with 
indigenous peoples. According to the special rapporteur, ‘at least in the 
conception’, these served as examples of ‘good practices’ in the realisation 
of indigenous human rights (UN, 2014, p. 6). However, the relationship 
between indigenous peoples and the state remained ‘strained’. The special 
rapporteur found it ‘difficult to reconcile Canada’s well-developed legal 
framework and general prosperity with the human rights problems faced 
by indigenous peoples in Canada, which have reached crisis proportions 
in many respects’ (p. 6).
The Declaration presumes that self-determination requires an active 
indigenous citizenship. It also presumes that the state can be indigenised. 
Therefore, attention must be paid to group rights and interests so that 
politics can attend to the common good, which ‘cannot be realised as 
the aggregate outcome of individuals pursuing their private interests’ 
(Elster, 1997, p. 14). For these reasons, the common good may not, in 
fact, be a commonly understood aspiration. People define commonality 
from their own vantage points, conditioned by different life experiences 
and aspirations that are mediated through culture and, for indigenous 
peoples, conditioned by colonialism itself. As Rawls (1971) proposed:
Justice as fairness begins with the idea that where common 
principles are necessary and to everyone’s advantage, they are to 
be worked out from the viewpoint of the suitably defined initial 
situation of equality in which each person is fairly represented. 
The principal of participation transfers this notion from the 
original position to the constitution … [thus] preserv[ing] the 
equal representation of the original position to the degree that this 
is feasible. (pp. 221–222)
There must be equal political capacity to work out a shared conception 
of the ‘common’; yet the idea of a completely virtuous citizen is naive. 
Indigenous peoples’ exclusion from substantive citizenship well illustrates 
the point, as ‘normative consensus … has [not] been secured in advance 
through tradition and ethos’ (Habermas, 1997, p. 245). How, then, do 
indigenous peoples find political voice in a system whose institutions are 
not structured to achieve political equality, especially because, in practical 
terms, there is no original position of equality?
The question is also one of how to reach points of equality without 
compromising indigenous distinctiveness. How might distinctiveness be 
reflected in political institutions? Political decision-making is not neutral. 
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Its biases must be open to scrutiny, not just from those with different 
biases, but also from those with fundamentally different views of the 
common good mediated by culture and colonial experience. Is it possible 
that ‘sovereignty should express itself only under the discursive conditions 
of an internally differentiated process of opinion and will formation’ 
(Habermas, 1997, p. 46)?
There must be accepted tests of reasonableness and procedures for 
removing unreasonableness from public decision-making. Indigenous 
voice depends on the acceptability of a plurality of reasons.
People’s perspectives change through exposure to others’ ideas. Reasoned 
deliberation requires that all who deliberate are, as a matter of course, 
exposed to indigenous ideas. Public reason consequently requires that all 
people are equally part of the ‘public’:
to the extent that public deliberation calls upon a set of morally 
important qualities, such as rationality, autonomy and respect 
for others, there is some reason to think that these traits, which 
are important in politics, will be promoted more in a society that 
encourages deliberation among all of its citizens. (Christiano, 1997, 
pp. 248–249)
It may be idealistic, but it is still aspirationally important to consider that:
If discussion is not in an egalitarian context, then many more 
points of view will have to be debated to the extent that previously 
neglected sections of society come to the fore
…
we ought not be aiming at political consensus on moral and 
political matters. As long as public discussion acts as a process of 
trial and error for excluding forms of ignorance, it serves a useful 
purpose. (Christiano, 1997, pp. 248–250)
The point at which political agreement matters most is a procedural one 
and involves the steps that will be followed to make decisions and their 
underlying rationale.
Deliberation requires citizens to engage respectfully with one another 
and with concern for the common good; it is a ‘condition of political 
justification’ and ‘outcomes are justified because they are brought about 
in certain ways’ (Christiano, 1997, p. 246). Such deliberation strengthens 
221
9 . DIffeReNTIATeD CITIZeNSHIP
democracy for indigenous peoples because it is ‘able to root out policies 
based on unsubstantiated prejudices’ (Christiano, 1997, p.  247). 
Ultimately, equal participation in discussion and debate depend on 
supporting institutional arrangements.
Conclusion
The Declaration affirms an indigenous people’s right to separate itself 
from the colonial society established over its territories. An indigenous 
people need not presume equal citizenship of the colonial state or concern 
itself with the affairs of the state other than through a nation-to-nation 
relationship. For example, it may adopt a kind of bicultural binary to 
justify an independent—though isolationist—self-determination as 
He whakairo here whakaumu proposes for New Zealand. However, this 
is a limited and constraining approach to politics, as it overlooks the 
political value of claiming a share in public sovereignty.
In contrast, differentiated liberal citizenship recognises sovereignty’s 
dispersed character and presumes substantive indigenous voice as a right 
of citizenship belonging to indigenous persons as much as to anyone else. 
It is reasonable that arrangements are made for that voice to be expressed 
in ways that demonstrate participatory parity.
Self-determination is a relative and relational power that the Declaration 
allows indigenous peoples to exercise within the state as liberal citizens and 
beyond the state as members of indigenous nations. The close relationships 
between these two spheres of political authority means that the capacity 





The Declaration does not guarantee justice. Instead, it is an instrument of 
significant moral standing that indigenous peoples use to assert their claim 
to self-determination. It is a codification of rights that follow from prior 
occupancy. Its point of greatest political significance is that it prevents 
an exclusive neo-colonial state sovereignty by ensuring substantive 
indigenous capacity to make decisions over their own affairs and to share 
in the decision-making of the state itself. It thus requires reimagining 
where power lies and how it is dispersed—a reimagination of the liberal 
state’s normative structure and underlying political values.
The Declaration supports the argument that liberal democracy should 
work for indigenous peoples as effectively as it works for anybody else. 
It shows how and why this might occur through political frameworks that 
are attentive to the presumption that self-determination belongs to all and 
not just some citizens. In doing so, it helps to create an indigenous affairs 
policy discourse of human dignity and equality that functions as a claim 
to culture and to meaningful political authority.
The presumption that human rights belong to indigenous people is 
inherently and necessarily anticolonial. However, the further presumption 
that these rights belong to indigenous peoples collectively as well as 
individually gives the Declaration potentially transformative significance, 
reframing debates about the meaning of liberal freedom and placing 
liberal freedom into a collective context. The rights that the Declaration 
enunciates demonstrate relationships between culture and personal 
freedom and show why indigenous claims to the autonomy and agency 
that liberal political theory promises cannot be realised unless and until 
the colonial context is also recognised.
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The liberal concepts of citizenship, democracy, self-determination 
and sovereignty are not routinely available to indigenous peoples. 
Indeed, liberalism’s exclusive capacity is as powerful as its inclusive and 
transformative potential, which explains why indigenous people may 
not instinctively turn to Western liberal democratic theories of justice to 
support their own claims to self-determination. However, the critiques 
that indigenous scholars and political actors have reasonably laid against 
liberal democracy are not inherent to the theory itself. They are the 
product of human choices and subjective theoretical interpretations. The 
Declaration helps us to understand how and why. As a liberal instrument 
of different and potentially transformative potential, its political value is 
the theoretical possibilities it develops for expressing indigenous claims 
in the liberal language that frames the politics of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the US, and in the liberal language that the international 
community seeks to impose on all states. The Declaration’s intent is to 
help democracy to work better.
Indigenous self-determination requires reconciliation based on trust and 
political inclusivity. Reconciliation is a significant moral and political 
challenge to the prevailing order of Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the US—four states that were initially opposed to the Declaration 
but came to support it when they realised that it could be interpreted as 
aspirational and did not threaten their territorial integrity or democratic 
presumptions. Yet as an instrument of reconciliation, the Declaration is 
not a politically benign statement of symbolic principle.
Reconciliation requires reparation or restitution. It also requires a strong 
and obvious connection between the state’s sorrow for its transgressions of 
justice and policy outcomes that show a public commitment to correcting 
the consequences of injustice and ensuring that unjust policy measures do 
not recur. Reconciliation is an essential precursor to just terms of political 
association that, in turn, serve as a precursor to a postcolonial politics of 
self-determination.
The purpose of reconciliation is to improve people’s lives. For reconciliation 
to occur, indigenous peoples must be able to identify good reasons for 
setting aside their mistrust of the state. Ensuring that indigenous peoples 
may claim a distinctive share in public sovereignty is therefore important. 
Constructing a state that is not the colonial entity that once usurped 
indigenous self-determination is difficult. It is, perhaps, an unlikely 
aspiration; yet it remains a morally defensible goal that is worth pursuing 
using the supporting principles set out in the Declaration.
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Parties in a political relationship can only accept each other’s legitimacy on 
the strength of trust. For indigenous peoples, this may mean the right to 
presence; to participatory parity in public affairs; to an equal say in setting 
out what constitutes just terms of association; and to having a substantive 
voice in the development of the society that has emerged over their lands, 
often without their consent.
However, mistrust runs deeply into the indigenous experience of the 
colonial state. Schools, hospitals, police forces and welfare agencies 
have been used consciously and systematically to undermine indigenous 
societies. They continue to obstruct the creation of a politics of trust. 
Yet they are all potentially important sites of the right to self-determination, 
and their transformation into institutions that work for indigenous 
peoples and not against them is important. A reconciled state is one in 
which indigenous peoples may influence what schools do and why, and 
shape them to support, not impede, self-determination. A reconciled 
state is one in which indigenous people have the political and professional 
capacity to ensure that hospitals recognise relationships between culture 
and wellbeing, and police forces and welfare agencies fulfil their protective 
functions equally well for all people.
Canada’s initial objection to the Declaration was grounded in the 
argument that it was a noncolonial state and that its prevailing political 
institutions, values and cultures gave indigenous people equal capacity 
for citizenship. New Zealand took this argument further, suggesting that 
the Declaration was inconsistent with universal citizenship and with the 
Treaty of Waitangi. There was a fear that the Declaration would raise new 
and more far-reaching rights that would disturb the negotiated political 
settlement of claims for breaches of the treaty.
The idea that the Declaration provided indigenous peoples with veto 
powers over resource development was especially worrisome for the four 
dissenting states, which responded by trying to position indigenous 
peoples beyond the national public. A ‘them’ and ‘us’ binary politics was 
promoted that excluded or denied the proposition that indigenous people 
might be part of the national polities as equal liberal citizens. However, all 
four states eventually ‘read down’ the Declaration’s significance and agreed 
that it should be given aspirational value. Their initial opposition reflected 
colonialism’s continuing presence and highlighted the importance of the 
claim to more inclusive liberal democratic politics. In doing so, it showed 
the value of pluralism in public affairs, for the alternative to pluralism 
is exclusion.
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When state-based arguments against the Declaration are set alongside 
indigenous arguments that universal human rights are incompatible with 
self-determination because they privilege the individual over the collective, 
one finds an intellectual conflict resolvable with reference to a liberal 
theory of indigeneity. The argument against extending universal human 
rights to indigenous people shows the value of bringing liberal political 
theories into debates over the nature and purpose of the indigenous right 
to self-determination. There is considerable political value in the liberal 
argument that all people’s freedoms are inherent to their humanity, that 
all people are fundamentally equal and that one person’s humanity is not 
inferior to another’s simply because they are the physically weaker party 
in a contest over collective cultural values. Self-determination is enhanced 
by a liberal theory of indigeneity grounded in the view that equal human 
worth belongs to all, not just some, indigenous people, just as it belongs 
equally to indigenous people vis-a-vis all others.
Indigeneity is a theory of fundamental human equality. This means 
that, while self-government may be an important constituent of 
self-determination, it cannot express the concept’s full potential. 
Self-government over a defined territory is not a substitute for the claim 
to shared national sovereignty. In Canada, the constitutional right to self-
government is conditional. It is not the inherent right that the Declaration 
promises nor is it a right that, on its own, can protect indigenous peoples 
against an all-powerful and constraining state. That right is partly protected 
by the right to exist and to deliberate, as indigenous, inside the state. This 
is politically important because the state is not a neutral construct that 
instinctively or naturally represents all citizens equally. It is only through 
having a substantive presence in its deliberations that all may share in the 
formation of collective values and political priorities.
Self-determination is the outcome of a wider capacity to share sovereignty. 
Working out how sovereignty should be shared is a complex, complicated 
and contested matter. However, the underlying principle of human equality 
is a simple one. It is a matter of justice that indigenous people have the 
political capacity to exercise that equality in whichever spheres are required 
to allow people to lead lives that they have reason to value. Therefore, 
self-determination is as much a political capacity as it is a political right. 
However, the capacities that it embodies come from the wider political 
values and institutional structures that determine where power resides. 
The capacity for self-determination is facilitated or constrained according 
to sovereignty’s prevailing character, shape and form.
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The New Zealand Waitangi Tribunal’s finding that the Treaty of Waitangi 
was not a cession of sovereignty to the British Crown as successive New 
Zealand governments have insisted is a finding that creates new theoretical 
possibilities for inclusive understandings of political power. However, the 
right to equal liberal citizenship is compromised by the bicultural ‘them’ 
and ‘us’ binary that confuses the sovereign for the Pakeha polity.
Biculturalism positions Maori as the political ‘other’ distinct from the 
kāwanatanga of the New Zealand state. Although there are many 
important examples of Maori participation in the state—most significantly 
as members of the executive—there remain alternative strands in Maori 
political thought that privilege bicultural distinction and separation. For 
example, Matike Mai Aotearoa’s (2016) position paper, He whakairo here 
whakaumu, claimed independent indigenous authority (as justified by the 
Declaration and Treaty of Waitangi) but surrendered any claim to national 
citizenship. The paper, discussed in Chapter 9, helps to illuminate the 
merits of a liberal theory of indigeneity realised through differentiated 
citizenship as an alternative of more far-reaching potential.
The Declaration not only proposes ways in which differentiated liberal 
citizenship might be realised but also has the capacity to support self-
determination’s translation from political right to political capacity. 
Political arrangements do not arise from an intellectual void. Their 
capacity to support or constrain indigenous self-determination arises from 
prevailing theories of the state: what it is, to whom it belongs, and by whom 
and by what means decisions should be made in its name. Indigeneity is, 
then, a liberal theory of the state. Its contribution to indigenous political 
aspirations is a presumption that there is a political gap to be closed 
between conditional accounts of indigenous citizenship and citizenship as 
the expression of fundamental political equality. It provides a theoretical 
justification for culturally meaningful inclusion, self-determination and 
just terms of association. Further, it is a theory that allows indigenous 
politics to transcend colonial victimhood. As a politics of potential, 
it presumes procedural fairness in the ways that public decisions are made. 
It presumes that indigenous voice is procedurally fair. It is not a guarantee 
of justice. However, by allowing independent indigenous political 
authority, it rationalises a liberal citizenship capable of helping people to 
live lives that they have reason to value. A liberal theory of indigeneity 
uses the Declaration to help democracy work better because of the simple 
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